Analytic Interest Psychology

.. AND ..

Synthetic Philosophy.



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ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY

AND

SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY.

ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY

AND

SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY,

BY

J. S. ENGLE, A. M.

BALTIMORE
KING BROTHERS
1904

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DEDICATION.

After the day's sport is over and the fishermen, seated in the evening twilight on the hotel piazza, have discussed the catch, the Mind turns to the old channels of thought. Thus it was, that the author and his friend sat one evening in the summer of 1904, with Lake Champlain just visible through the darkening twilight. Psychology and Philosophy became the subject of conversation, and the new views, which the writer presents in these pages, found an interested hearer.

This friend, with whom the writer fished last summer, and to whom, when the fish were slow in biting, he talked the views of Psychology and Philosophy herein presented, is the friend, who now, by his generous help, makes possible the publication of this volume.

In no sense is he committed to the views herein advanced. But, in every sense, he is committed to the policy of fast friendship.

This volume is affectionately dedicated, therefore, to the banker, philanthropist and friend,

T. T. Fishburne.

PREFACE.

If the conclusions reached in this volume be correct, there is here presented a system of Psychology as well as a Synthetic Philosophy.

This whole work is based upon introspective study of the Principle of Interest in the Mind, together with a critical examination and study of psychological teaching. The literature has been thoroughly examined, and much of that which bears upon the subject of Interest will be found cited in its proper place.

The first seven chapters of the Analytic Interest Psychology constitute really an introduction to the constructive work, beginning with Chapter VIII. In these first chapters the endeavor is made to discover what the Principle of Interest is. It is found to be :

(1) The Basic Principle of Psychology.
(2) The explanation of Abnormal Psychology.
(3) The Nexus of the Mind.
(4) Identical with Consciousness of Process.

(5) So fundamental to Cognition, Feeling and Will as that it may be termed the Mental Ultimate which shows itself as Cognitive Interest, Affective Interest and Conative Interest.

The reader will, however, in this connection, very probably ask: "But what is the definition of Interest?" It is insisted that the work above stated is an attempt to reach the true definition of Interest. In order, however, that it may be seen that this line of work is in line with the statement of the psychological authorities, the definition of Interest given in the Dictionary of Psychology (the standard in the psychological world) is here cited:

"Interest * * The consciousness which accompanies mental tendencies of any sort, so far as they terminate upon mental objects or stimulate to the construction of them.

"Considered in abstraction from the content or object upon which the tendency goes out, interest is usually considered a phase of feeling, and classed with the intellectual feelings."

(This definition is signed by Baldwin and Stout.)

Here, then, it is stated that Interest is really conative and affective and that it is also an intellectual feeling—but intellectual feeling has a cognitive element. Hence the Dictionary itself, almost recog-

nizes, although unconsciously, the contention of these first chapters. For Interest is clearly fundamental to Cognition, Feeling and Will. *Certainly one cannot have a sensation without some glint of Interest.* Blot all Interest absolutely from your Mind and what would you have left? Then, as Interest is thus fundamental to Cognition, Feeling and Conation, and, since, by the very definition of the Dictionary, when that is properly interpreted, it is conative and affective and has a cognitive strain, there is nothing for science, when it considers the rudimentary Consciousness, the very embryonic mind itself, to do, save to say that Consciousness and Interest are there identical—Consciousness is there, as it were, but a point of Interest. But rudimentary Consciousness gives the explanation of all other Consciousness. If, however, rudimentary Consciousness of the infant be a point of Interest, the process or active Consciousness of the adult is also this principle of Interest.

The writer, having long studied his periods of intensest Interest, found that always there was a kind of incubating period before new Meaning came. Thus the thought of Chapter I, Part I, that Interest is the Mental Dynamic or that Interest is the Basic Principle in Psychology, came like a flash

after a long incubating period. Upon examination he found this to be true of others. He also found that there was a kind of incubating period even in the apprehension of a percept. Upon investigation he found, that while this period might be but the smallest fraction of a second, there was something of temporality in the matter of Interest, through the attention, gathering even the essentials of a percept.

Then, with these facts as basic positions in his thought, he *made the generalization that this must be true of all Consciousness in all Time, and that there is something answering to what he, in this volume, terms the Interest-Moment. In this Interest-Moment, Interest incubates Meaning.* It may be an instinctive Interest-Moment, and old Meaning only be incubated, or it may be an Interest-Moment in which new Meaning is incubated.

The writer feels, now that he is writing this preface, after the greater part of the volume has been printed, that he must do further work in the matter of clearly differentiating the Interest-Moment, in which nothing but old Meaning is evolved, from the Interest-Moment in which absolutely new Meaning is incubated. He may, perhaps, be pardoned, if, as he fears, in a few places, he is not exactly clear as to the Interest-Moment. In all this field of thought he has been in an absolutely new territory. He has

had to get his bearings as best he could; he has had to construct terminology as best he could, and give definitions as best he could, and, all this, with the varied duties of his daily life demanding his attention.

This Interest-Moment in which Meaning is incubated has its stress not upon "Moment," but upon the fact that it is a segment of Consciousness. *It is a Cross-Section of Consciousness or Interest in which a Glint of Meaning is incubated.* When the writer speaks of period, in the definition of Interest-Moment, he means a period of Consciousness—a certain section of Consciousness. In all Consciousness the new Glint of Meaning is incubated by the aid of Instinctive Interest-Moment processes flashing in their instinctive Meaning-Glints until this particular Interest-Moment bursts in a new Glint of Meaning, *i. e.*, a Judgment-Burst or new Meaning-Glint. Thus a present Interest-Moment may recapitulate all the Past. (See Chapter IX, Part I, on Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation.)

The two great working principles here, as well as in the whole line of thought, have been the theories (1) *Of Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation* (Chapter IX, Part I), (2) *Of the Instinctive Judgment* (Chapter XI, Part I). These are thought to be basic facts, fundamental in the proper interpretation of Mind.

The position of Psychological Idealism has also been fundamental in the development of this line of thought.

Thus the unit in the study of Consciousness was found to be the Interest-Moment. *The Unit on the Process Side is functioning Interest,* and *the unit on the Content Side is a bit or Glint of Meaning. From these Units all the psychological or Mental facts are evolved and these are the great facts in all Mental Life.*

The *Judgment-Cluster, i. e., the Mental Object, as we call it, is produced by aggregations of Instinctive or Deliberate Interest-Moment Processes, each giving its bit of Meaning.*

Thus a simple and satisfactory explanation of the Mental Object having been reached, the *whole process of Perception, Conception, Memory and Imagination, was seen to be identical, the only difference being as to some of the instinctive Judgments* (*these particular Judgments I term Instinctive Coefficient Judgments*), *which go into the Judgment-Cluster which constitute their particular Content.*

The Emotions and Feelings, also, to the author's mind, have explanation (Chapters XIII and XIV, Part I.)

The Categories have their explanation in what is called Meaning-Survival, (Chap. III, Part IV), *i. e.*, in the processes of the Instinctive Judgment. Instinctive Judgment flashes forth these Meanings for us as a part of every Judgment-Cluster or idea.

The Philosophies are but the natural development of the Psychology. That that explains Mind should explain the facts of human life. Thus there stands forth the Philosophy of Psychology, the Philosophy of Social Psychology, the Philosophy of Life Development, the Philosophy of Ethics, the Philosophy of Practical Life, the Philosophy of History and the Philosophy of Religions, etc., each with Interest as the Basic Explaining Principle.

But this means, that, naturally, a Synthetic Philosophy has been found. Hence, in Part III, the statement, in regard to Interest Synthetic Philosophy, is given.

But what is the Philosophy of Interest itself? What is the explanation of this Interest which in itself is a Synthetic Philosophy? In Part IV this question is considered and we have the Philosophy of Interest itself.

Several articles are in preparation in which are considered certain positions, fundamental to this chain of reasoning. These articles, to which the reader is referred as they may appear, are :

Interest is Identical with Consciousness of Process.

Interest is Cognitive.

Interest explains Hypnotism.

Psychological Idealism is necessarily the scientific position for Psychology.

The theory of Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation and its Implications.

The theory of the Instinctive Judgment and its Implications.

There is no such thing as so-called Memory.

The Units of Mental Process and of Mental Content which explain Mind.

The Philosophy of Mathematics.

The Philosophy of Speech.

The Philosophy of Art.

The Philosophy of Sociology.

(In these four last articles the thesis in each case is that Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle.)

The Interest Synthetic Philosophy.

Meaning-Survival.

A New Apologetic for the New Testament—The Psychology of Paul and of Christ from the standpoint of Interest Psychology.

The author wishes to stress the fact that the work presented in this volume was not done with the view of presenting a book to the public. The writer, for twenty years, has been endeavoring to find some order, in his own thinking, as regards psychological and philosophical subjects. The questions of the Psychological Ego, of the Mental Ultimate, of the explanation of Abnormal Psychology, of Association of Ideas, of Memory, of Interest, etc., in fact, the questions of the great problems of Mind and Philosophy have been more or less constant subjects of the author's thought.

Attention is called to the fact that Chapter I, Part I, which may seem not to be in line with views given later regarding Interest, stands simply because the paper, as it was written in April, 1904, is given without change. This also explains why, in Chapter XVIII, Part, I, Problems of Interest, the statement is presented that the writer does not exactly see his way clear as to Psychological Idealism. The paper, as it was read at the Hopkins, is printed and it contained that sentence when read. The writer felt, when preparing copy for the printer, that

he had to let the sentence stand, as he states that he gives the paper as read at the Hopkins. In the later preparation of Chapter VIII, Part I, however, the writer went over all his notes on the subject of Psychological Idealism, and the last shadow of doubt as regards the correctness of his position left his mind. He wishes to emphatically state that, to his mind, Psychological Idealism is the only scientific position for Psychology.

It is well recognized that the whole of this volume presents views which are new and revolutionary in Psychology and Philosophy. The readiness, however, with which thinkers, to whom these ideas have been advanced, admit that along these lines there is truth, even though they may not altogether agree with these positions, has led to the thought that perhaps the best method would be to thus publish the present volume. The later and more detailed presentation of this line of work may thus be saved from those errors which necessarily spring from an uncriticised production.

The term "Thesis" is used in this book in a technical sense. By it the author means to indicate an original line of thought which he hopes to develop farther.

The proof of this volume has been read largely in the small hours of the morning. It is a striking fact that proof read at these hours sometimes seems not to have been read. The following errata are to be noted: Page 16, "are" for "is." Page 50, "incohate" for inchoate;" "Hoofding" for "Hoffding." Page 143, an unnecessary "the." Page 183, "Physic" for "Psychic," etc.

The author wishes to express to his friends Senator Isidor Rayner, W. H. Matthai, Edwin W. King, C. E. Muller, George N. Numsen, O. L. Rhodes, C. M. Armstrong, G. C. Brinkman, B. F. Wescott and to his father, J. J. Engle, as well as to others, his appreciation of their kindly advice and assistance.

J. S. Engle.

Baltimore, Md., December 14, 1904.

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ANALYTIC INTEREST

PSYCHOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

Interest is the Mental Dynamic, or, the Law or Principle of "Psychic Progressions."

(This is my first paper on Interest submitted in the Department of Psychology at the Johns Hopkins University, April, 1904. It represented a long course of thought and of reading on the subject of Interest. I am working on the thesis of this chapter as a subject to be submitted for the Ph. D. degree.

The thesis then presented, as will be seen, is that Interest is the Fundamental and Determining Principle in the construction of Mental Objects—that, as is said, Interest is "The Basic Principle" of Psychology. The body of the paper is given here.)

Psychology cannot be a science unless it has a Principle by which to explain its phenomena.

There may be enumeration of facts—collection of cases—explanation of one minor thing in terms of another, but until there be found a Principle which we call a Law or a Dynamic, etc., to which

the maze of facts can be given reference and which, as we say, is *the explanation of the facts, there can be no science.* This is true of Astronomy, of Chemistry, of Political Economy, Morals, etc., etc. The newer Botany takes up the question of how the plant grows. So *Psychology to be Genetic must show both that the Mind* has Progressions and *how it has Progressions, i. e.,* what Principle *is the fundamental one in its progress and is the Nexus of all.* Certainly Genetic Psychology must have such a Principle in order to be a science.

To be true to psycho-physical parallelism it is necessary for this Principle to be a mental one. To find the Mental Dynamic on the physical side means to make of Psychology a province of brain Physiology. Whatever the future may show as to this, which would be not psycho-physical parallelism but psycho-physical identity, Psychology has a right to find that Principle which is mentally fundamental and to make it the basis of the science. Thus it is true to psycho-physical parallelism and a science at one and the same time.

My thought is that *Interest is this required Law of Progressions or Dynamic for Genetic Psychology—that to posit this Principle rounds out Genetic Psychology as a science.*

The Negative Argument.

Cognition does not furnish the Explaining Principle, for in that the mental activity issues, and hence it does not find in Cognition its source, save in the give and take process and this process requires something for the cognized object to affect back in the Mind. The old Psychology said the cognized object affected the "Ego" and thus subject and object was found in the Mind, and a give and take process formed.

Roughly, my view is, that here, where the old Psychology posited the Ego, we must posit Interest and we have a give and take process, not between *mental activity (as subject)* and the Object, but between *Interest and the Object—the Object can influence the mental activity only as it influences Interest.* That would mean that the give and take process is between the *Object on the one hand and the Subject (Interest)* on the other, and this process is the mental activity.

However it may be as to the above, the Principle of Genetic Progression is not to be found in Cognition.

The Dynamic or Law of Progression is not Feeling, for Feeling is the coloring or tone of the Mental Activity and *hence cannot be the explanation of the activity.*

(Here is a battle ground, of course; if Feeling can be differentiated from Interest, much ground is cleared for my position, for Feeling is often held to be the Dynamic.) But:

(1) In that great department of Mental Activity—the construction of sense and memory objects—Feeling is not the Dynamic—Interest is. The only way to make Feeling the Dynamic, is to make Feeling equal to Interest, which begs the question.

(2) My position would be something like this—that the so-called "Feeling of Interest" is "*atelic*" *Interest*, which is "a sort of tendency" producing Mental Activity—which activity has the Feeling tone.

(3) The only way in which Feeling is made the Dynamic is by giving it two meanings which are (*a*) *the tone of the Activity* (*b*) *the Initiative Power*, and my point is that to give Feeling this latter definition is to really beg the question.

(4) Feeling to be Dynamic has to arouse Interest. Feeling will not cause the construction of sense objects or of memory objects, etc., if *there be no Interest.*

(5) Feeling, as strictly Feeling, in its highest manifestations, inhibits the construction of objects,

i. e., Mental Activity. While Interest, as Interest, in its highest manifestations quickens the construction of objects. With such differences in their effects, Interest and Feeling ought not to be identified. But, if on the point of Feeling, my contention were wrong, I could fall back upon the position that The *Feeling of Interest* is the Dynamic of Genetic Psychology.

The law of Progressions is not the Will, for the Will = development of Conation = Mental Activity.

There is Mental Activity in the construction of sense objects which does not involve the Will, but it does involve Interest.

The Law of Progressions, is not Desire, for Desire does not explain the formation of sense and memory objects. I have not had the time to go into this part of the subject, but the preceding sentence seems to be firm ground; and, also, there is not Desire in all that is Interest, *i. e.*, Interest is more fundamental than Desire.

Since Conscience is Feeling (of the Ought) Conscience is not the Principle or Law.

This leaves Interest as the Mental Dynamic or Law of Progressions, for the above powers, with their sub-divisions, compose the human mind.

The Positive Argument for Interest as the Mental Dynamic or the Law of Progressions in the Formation of Mental Objects.

The place of Interest, in the development of each class of Cognitive Objects, is the positive argument for Interest as the Dynamic in the formation of Mental Objects.

In the formation of the nine kinds of Cognitive Objects of the table, Interest has played its part—the more one studies that part the more important it seems to be. Interest has its part in Desire—all Desire has Interest involved. It has its part in Feeling. It has its part on the Volitional side, through motives. The Will depends upon motives, but Interest is an essential factor there.

Hence, wherever we take the Mind for examination, we find *Interest is the Basic Principle.* Let Interest absolutely fail and Thought, Desire, Feeling and Volition would also fail—there might be reflexes in such a case, but not the Psychic, as we term it.

All the teaching in regard to the place of Attention in Mental Life, is really stress upon the Fundamental Place of Interest.

Of course, if Interest be the Law of Psychic Progressions, it is a standpoint from which Social Psychology should be studied.

Now, I would like to make, as the subject of my thesis (*i. e.*, for the Ph. D. degree) some such a subject as this: Interest as the Principle or Law of "Psychic Progressions" or, if I find that Interest and Feeling cannot be differentiated: The Feeling of Interest, as the Law of "Psychic Progressions," or, using my original term: Interest as the Dynamic of Genetic Psychology.

CHAPTER II.

Interest is the Apperceiving Principle.

(This thesis is one advanced in the paper submitted at the beginning of the term, and now on file in the Hopkins Psychological Seminary—the development here is a compend of the argument of that paper upon the same subject. There is great question among Psychologists as to what the Apperceiving Principle is. My position is that Interest apperceives.)

Stout, in his Analytic Psychology, has over fifty pages on Apperception. Among other statements is this :

"Under the head of *Apperception* we are especially concerned with the relation of the new to the old, in so far as it gives rise to modifications of the old. We consider the whole process as one by which the mind grows. As Mr. Shand remarks, attention has a cumulative effect on its own process. Each act of attention leaves behind it a kind of deposit, which is taken up and utilized by succeeding acts, and ever grows with the growth of our attentive experience. Now, this cumulative effect of attention on its own

process is precisely what is meant by Apperception. In the doctrine of Apperception we consider how Attention becomes progressively modified by retention, how the products of past process determine and are determined by succeeding changes." (Stout's Anal. Psychology Vol. II, page 112.)

Almost sentence by sentence this description of Apperception deserves to be considered.

As Mr. Shand remarks, "Attention has a cumulative effect on its own process." But Attention is Volition and is the outcome of Interest. Hence this sentence should read—Interest has a cumulative effect on its own process.

Again "Each act of Attention leaves behind it a kind of deposit"; but, since Interest is fundamental to Attention, the fundamental truth here is: Each act of Interest leaves behind it a kind of deposit.

"Now this cumulative effect of Attention on its own process is precisely what is meant by *Apperception.*" This really should read: Now the cumulative effect of Interest on its own process is precisely what is meant by *Apperception.*

"We consider how Attention becomes progressively modified by retention." This should read: In the doctrine of Apperception we consider how Interest becomes progressively modified by retention.

But as to Stout's definition of Apperception which follows his description: "From this point of view, Apperception may be defined as *the process by which a mental system appropriates a new element, or otherwise receives a fresh determination.*" (Italics his. Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, Page 112.) Now, as to this definition, discussion must be as to the phrase, "mental system," which he makes the apperceiving subject. That he really makes a "mental system" the subject, is seen from various passages, as: "A system so organized may so apperceive in a two-fold way according to the nature of the apperceived group. It may assimilate the new element in a general manner, etc." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, Page 129.)

"It is apperceived by one of the subordinate sub-groups." (Page 130.)

Stout has no clear definition of "mental system." He is delightfully vague as to this "mental system" —just so he is vague as to his "mental dispositions."

Now, not to multiply words, I insist (1) that there is no mental principle specified in his definition of Apperception, and (2) that the principle of Interest fulfills all the conditions which his supposed "Mental system" is invented to fill. Hence, the proper definition of Apperception, from Stout's standpoint, is,

The process by which Interest appropriates a new element or otherwise receives a new determination.

James has the following statement as to Apperception: "Apperception is a name for the sum total of the effects of what we have studied as Association; and it is evident that the things which a given experience will suggest to a man depend on what Mr. Lewes calls his entire psychostatical condition, his nature and stock of ideas, or, in other words, his character, habits, memory, education, previous experience and momentary mood. We gain no insight into what really occurs, either in the mind or in the brain, by calling all these things the 'Apperceiving mass,' though, of course, this may, upon occasion be convenient." (James' Psychology, Vol. II, Page 107.)

James is wrong in his statement that Apperception means only Association. The Psychologists who hold to Apperception are striking at a truth which is fundamental to Association itself. But this truth has not been properly presented. James is entirely correct in stating that nothing is gained by calling a man's nature and stock of ideas, etc., the apperceptive mass. For, if by this is meant part of the content of consciousness, then Apperception, as James says, becomes mere Association, while, if by "Apperceptive mass" is meant ought of mental process or Active

Consciousness, there is nothing in Active Consciousness like "An Apperceptive mass." The term at which "Apperceptive mass" is aiming, though it does not reach it, is that "dispositional" Interest which becomes Active Interest, *i. e.*, *Interest which apperceives.* Only here does Apperception become something separate and distinct from Association.

The criticism, which Stout passes upon Wundt's idea of Apperception, is in point: "The reaction of Consciousness upon its own content, seems to form the essence of Wundt's Apperception. I venture to think that my position is not open to the objections brought by such critics as Munsterburg, against that of Wundt. The main point of Munsterburg's contention, I take to be as follows: In order to investigate and define a process, we must be able to assign the special and definite terms between which it takes place, the special and definite factors which enter into it. Now Wundt's Consciousness or disposition of Consciousness cannot be regarded as such a special and definite factor; therefore his whole procedure must be envolved in vagueness and a kind of mystery" (Stout's Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, Pages 41-42.)

This is eminently a proper criticism—Wundt does not clear up the point as to what it is which apperceives.

Stout continues: "This objection (that of vagueness) does not extend to the conception of noetic synthesis; for the schematic apprehension of a whole is as much a distinct content of Consciousness and a distinct factor in mental process as is the sensation of red or blue." But that only has to do with Apperception as a process, and Wundt describes the process. But as regards what it is which apperceives Stout is as vague as Wundt. Stout's "mental system," which, in his definition of Apperception, he says apperceives, is as vague as Wundt's "determination of Consciousness." My position is: that at which they are striking in their vague terms is really Interest —that Interest is that which apperceives. Only when this is recognized will the Psychology which stands for Apperception have solid ground beneath its feet. Only thus can it justify its position, which it feels to be correct, against Associationalism.

In the Dictionary of Psychology, the following definition of Apperception is given by Stout and Baldwin: "The process of Attention, in so far as it involves interaction between the presentation of the object attended to, on the one hand, and the total preceding conscious content, together with preformed mental dispositions, on the other hand."

Now "the total preceding conscious content" can only mean the fringe of conscious content still exist-

ing in the direction of the past—that is, if a psychological fact be meant; the "preformed mental dispositions" do not exist as a psychological fact. Hence the interaction spoken of is between the "conscious content," just leaving the mind and the content just coming in, and the interaction is through the Attention. I submit that no one can understand such a condition as is here described. The only way by which the "conscious content" just leaving the mind, and the "preformed mental dispositions," can affect "the present presentation," is by them affecting *Interest*, which affects "the present presentation." Now that is just what they do. The food of *Interest* is "the conscious content" as it passes out of the mind—the determination of Interest is the preformed disposition, which is a physiological or neurological condition, and *Interest* is that which apperceives the present presentation.

Hence, it is thought that my thesis, that Interest is the Apperceiving Principle. is established.

CHAPTER III.

Interest is the Explaining Psychological Principle in Abnormal Psychology.

(The theses positions advanced here as to Sleep and Hypnotism are contained in my paper on file at the Hopkins.)

The question how far brain mechanism is responsible for the facts of abnormal Psychology cannot be reviewed here.

The position maintained in this connection is that, *on the mental side*, Interest is the chief explaining principle of abnormal Psychology.

(a) Sleep.

Introspection shows, in the few moments preceding sleep, the gradual dying away of mental objects. Interest, which is the Nexus of the mind, seems then to be relaxing. The bond between Interest and the mental object is being loosened; or rather, Interest is beginning to cease the production of mental objects. This condition is exactly the reverse of a high state of Interest. When one is intensely interested in an

object all the details are held by Interest. The rapid panorama of objects are flashed forth by Interest—one succeeding the other in quick succession. But, in sleep, Interest's production of mental objects ceases.

(b) Hypnotism.

Perhaps no better way to use the very little space at command for the consideration of Interest as the psychological explaining principle of Hypnotism can be found than to give a few quotations from such a volume as Sidis : "The Psychology of Suggestion"—a recent volume on Hypnotism, of which Professor James speaks in high praise.

This volume voices the common emphasis upon *Suggestion* as the explanation of Hypnotism. The point of the present chapter, as regards Hypnotism, is that *it is not Suggestion which explains Hypnotism, but Interest. It is not the Hypnotizer's suggestions, but the patient's Interest in these suggestions which explains Hypnotism.*

Interest may not respond, in the least, to the Suggestion, and the result is, there is absolutely no hypnotic condition produced.

Interest may respond to a degree to the suggestion and the patient feels that he has been almost hypno-

tized. Interest may make, what may be called a perfect response, hypnotically, to the suggestion, and one of at least two different results may follow :

(1) *The fixation of Interest upon one single mental object—the consequent cessation of that change in mental objects which is a condition of Consciousness, and consequently immediate sleep.*

(2) *We may have the fixation of Interest not upon one object which does not change like the button on one's coat, etc., but the fixation of Interest on a mental object which, because Interest is given a drift in a certain direction, changes and Interest runs in a certain channel and has no notice for anything else.*

Sidis says : "There is, however, one more element in Suggestion—an element which must be taken into account, and without which our definition of Suggestion will be incomplete. This factor, or element, is the overcoming or circumventing of the subject's opposition. The suggested idea is forced on the stream of Consciousness : it is a stranger, an unwelcome guest, a parasite, which the subject's Consciouness seeks to get rid of." (Sidis—The Psychology of Suggestion, pages 10-11.) The subject's *Will* seeks to cast it off—but his *Interest* clings to it—this is the explanation here.

Sidis gives an example of a hypnotic state :

"Evidently the post-hypnotic Suggestion took deep root in his mind. He struggled hard against it, to put it down, to suppress it; and it was due to this fact that he attempted to counteract the suggested idea by ridiculing it. As long as I was in the room, he wanted to show the *energy of his Will*, and he struggled hard against the insistent idea, keeping it at bay; but when I left the room one of the motives of resisting the Suggestion was removed, and the struggle became an unequal one. The insistent parasitic idea asserted itself with greater force than before, and this time, not meeting with such a strenuous opposition, it gained the upper hand and realized itself completely." (The Psychology of Suggestion, page 14.) Here one's *Interest* and his developed Will are in opposition, and the result is that Interest gains the upper hand.

"A familiar thing in a strange abnormal position or shape produces the most effective suggestion. Nothing speaks so much to the childish or popular mind as a caricature, monstrosity, a grotesque figure. A distorted picture of a familiar scene or person will at once attract the attention of a child, and powerfully affect its conduct in case the picture is intended to show the fate of bad children." ("The Psychology of Suggestion," page 42.) This is simply because

the child's Interest is aroused—the monstrosity *attracts Interest.*

"But however the case may be with the relative suggestibility of the particular factors studied, these last experiments on choice suggestion, together with the other suggestion experiments, establish the fact of normal suggestibility on a firm and unshakable basis. *Man is a suggestible animal, par excellence.*" ("The Psychology of Suggestion," pages 43-44.)

This fact of normal suggestibility is simply the fact of *normal* Interest.

"The same is true in regard to normal suggestibility. It rarely attracts our attention, as it manifests itself in but trifling things. When, however, it rises to the surface and with the savage fury of a hurricane, cripples and maims on its way everything it cannot destroy, menaces life, and throws social order into the wildest confusion possible, we put it down as mobs. We do not in the least suspect that the awful, destructive automatic spirit of the mob moves in the bosom of the peaceful crowd, reposes in the heart of the quiet assembly, and slumbers in the breast of the law-abiding citizen. We do not suspect that the *spirit of Suggestibility* lies hidden even in the best of men; like the evil jinnee of the Arabian tales it is corked up in the innocent-looking

bottle. Deep down in the nature of man we find hidden the *spirit of Suggestibility.* Every one of us is more or *less suggestible.* Man is often defined as a social animal. This definition is no doubt true, but it conveys little information as to the psychical state of each individual within society. There exists another definition which claims to give an insight into the nature of man, and that is the well-known ancient view that man is a rational animal; but this definition breaks down as soon as we come to test it by facts of life, for it scarcely holds true of the vast multitudes of mankind. Not sociality, not rationality, but *suggestibility* is what characterizes the average specimen of humanity, for man is a suggestible animal." (Sidis' "The Psychology of Suggestion," page 17.)

Now all this is readily swung into place under my view—there is no such thing as suggestion unless the so-called suggestion strike's one's *Interest*—the greater the Interest aroused, the greater the suggestibility—the so-called "spirit of suggestion" is Interest. *Man is a suggestible animal simply because in his inherent nature Interest dwells as the Principle of the Mind.*

So far as my reading and study go, no one has hitherto suggested that Interest may be the expla-

nation of Hypnotism. It may be worth the consideration of thinkers to give some thought to this subject.

(c) Crystal Vision.

"'I find in the crystal,' writes a crystal-gazer, 'bits of dark wall covered with jessamine, and I ask myself where have I walked today? I have no recollection of such a sight—not a common one in the London streets; but tomorrow I repeat my walk of this morning, with a careful regard for the creeper covered walls. Tomorrow solves the mystery. I find the very spot, and the sight brings with it the further recollection that at the moment we passed the spot I was engaged in absorbing conversation with my companion and my voluntary attention was pre-occupied.'" (Sidis' "The Psychology of Suggestion," page 154.)

Each of us has certain Interest Centers, *i. e.*, our Interest functions, in regard to certain mental objects or to certain classes of mental objects, with greatest readiness. Just so Perception has, as it were, different Interest centers. I, for instance, in my landscape, will always note the tree and possibly the greensward comes next. Hence, the fact revealed by this case of crystal-gazing, was that a certain

almost Sub-Interest centre had functioned sufficiently to leave a trace on Memory.

(d) Double Personality.

So far as I have been able to discover, there has been no investigation made, in the marked cases of double and treble personality, to discover whether the second personalty, which, suddenly one day asserted itself, to the exclusion of the first, was not in process of development for some time. Is it not possible that the cases of marked alternating personalities had their inception in mere differentiation of two or three lines of Interest, and in the formation of a habit on the part of Interest to function in a certain way and hence to follow certain lines of thought, and that then the bond of memory, because of some neurological condition failed and a certain line of Interest functioning prevailed? Why might not the student, who is a merchant, lose the power some day as he studies, of recalling his life and associations as a merchant? Then how naturally for him to remain altogether a student! The fact is, that we carry different incipient personalities with us. The wonder is not that there are double personalities, but t their number is so few.

(e) Fixed Ideas.

The explanation of the Fixed Idea, from this point of view is this :

Interest functions as regards the one thing. Just as the bird is fascinated by the snake, so Interest is fascinated by this single Idea. The hypnotic state has become self-inflicted, as it were. There is now no need of an Hypnotizer, for Interest flashes forth that Mental Object which is Interest's own Hypnotizer. The patient sits wrapped in his broodings because Interest is in a single groove.

However important any other fact may be as an explaining Principle in Abnormal Psychology, the thesis here is *that the fundamental explaining Psychological Principle, in this field, is Interest.*

CHAPTER IV.

The Principle of Interest is the Nexus of the Mind.

(This position is one of the earliest reached by me. Through the summer it was one of the topics upon which I worked and it is advanced in the paper on file at the Hopkins. Because of the necessities of space, a compend only of the treatment, which has been prepared, can be given.)

Hume stated that the mind had a unity, but what it was he admitted that he could not discover.

Royce, in his Psychology, emphasizes the unity of Consciousness, but does not explain that unity.

James also stresses the fact of this unity. The empirical fact of the unity of Consciousness is clear; but the question still remains an open one in Psychology as to what Mental Principle it is, if there be such an one, which is the Mental Nexus.

The thesis herein presented is that Interest is the Mental Nexus.

(1) All that Interest fails to seize fails to enter into the composition of Mental Objects. All that Interest gathers becomes a part of the Mental Object. This fact alone is enough to raise the supposition that Interest is the Nexus.

(2) The bonds by which any Mental Object is held together are those of Interest. True, it may be said that memory holds objects together or that association is the mental bond. But the truth seems to be that Interest is fundamental to both memory and association and explains them.

(3) The general proposition may be made that in every moment of mental life that which constructs Mental Objects is Interest.

(*a*) So long as the Mental Object stands before us, Interest holds the compound elements of the Object together.

(*b*) When the particular Mental Object falls to pieces, as it were, or to use another figure, fades away, Introspection shows always a relaxation of Interest. While, on the other hand, if Interest be high, the Mental Object may be of vast complexity and yet be held together.

(4) The Mind's change from one Mental Object to another is directed by Interest. The falling to pieces

or the fading away of a particular Mental Object is determined by Interest concentrating itself upon a particular aspect or part of this Object. This causes a relaxation on the part of Interest as respects the rest of this particular Mental Object. This part of the Mental Object which Interest loses (or in which, as we may say, "we lose Interest") vanishes and the second Mental Object is built up by Interest from a nucleus born of the first Mental Object and is held together by Interest until the same process is repeated. Thus it is clearly seen that Interest is the Mental Nexus.

(5) In the fading of the particular Mental Object, there is, it may be, some one phase or part which abides longer than all the rest of the Object and which really becomes the nucleus for a new Mental Object. But the part which lingers longest and which becomes the center of a new Mental Object, is always that feature of the former Object which is most *interesting*. Interest thus retains some parts of one object longer than other parts, simply because it has an affinity for them. Thus Interest is the Nexus.

(6) Even in those cases, to which reference has already been made where association seems to be the only factor, and where the disassociated parts of a former Mental Object flash up because, as is com-

monly held, they have been frequently associated, the conditions are not changed.

That which laid this track of association was the Principle of Interest. The Principle of Interest through the primeval forest of the possibilities of Mental Objects hewed out the way of association and walked therein all the time that associations were being made. Mere association of ideas is no working Principle of the Mind. Let all Interest in a particular idea as it stands momentarily before the Mind die and no associations come, however beaten the track and easy the passage. Let Interest be somewhat aroused and there will be some associations. Let Interest be moved to the intensest point and scores of *associated* ideas troop in. Hence, it is Interest which rules in so-called Association. This must mean that Interest is the Mental Nexus.

(7) Introspection shows that, just before the moment of sleep, the Mental Object almost disappears. Interest is falling to the point of Sub-Interest. The bonds uniting Mental Objects into a whole, are falling away, and Interest is not stirred by what is even the most interesting segment of the dismembered Mental Object, and instantly sleep is the result.

(8) Interest has, in its essential nature, a synthetic capacity. For me to say that I am conscious of a thing does not imply a synthetic capacity of itself. James found that Consciousness tended to unity only by scientifically examining Consciousness. But as regards the nature of Interest it is readily apparent that Interest has a native synthetic capacity.

Reference is made to later chapters, especially those dealing with the subject of Cognition, for more detailed consideration of this thesis. The explanation of Cognition, given in these pages, is from the standpoint that Interest is the Mental Nexus.

CHAPTER V.

Interest is Identical with Active Consciousness, i. e., the Process Side of Consciousness.

(This thesis is one contained in the paper on file in the Hopkins Psychological Seminary. The treatment given here is a compend from that paper.)

(1) *There can be no doubt that active consciousness or Consciousness of Process and Interest are coincident.* Examine any mental state at any particular moment, and so far as Active Consciousness extends Interest extends. Interest is coincident with Cognition. It is also coincident with all Affective and Volitional process. Where there is absolutely no Interest, no Consciousness can be found. Nor does Interest extend where there is no Consciousness.

Moreover, Active Consciousness and Interest vary together. A high state of Consciousness is a high state of Interest. A high state of Interest is always a high state of Consciousness. A low state of In-

terest is a low state of Consciousness. Now *this fact that Interest and Consciousness vary uniformly, is unique.* A high state of Consciousness does not necessarily mean a high state of Feeling, for Cognition may be at its height in that state of Consciousness, and Feeling at a low ebb. But, as has been seen, a high state of Consciousness always means a high grade of Interest.

Now, because of this fact, that Interest and Consciousness vary uniformly, either Interest and Consciousness are identical or else one is the outcome of the other.

The classification has to be either

Active Consciousness or Interest	Cognition
	Feeling
	Conation

or else

Active Consciousness	Cognition
	Feeling
	Conation

and Interest *be written with one of these three latter terms.* Now this latter supposition cannot be correct, for, if it were, and Interest were identified with any one of the three so-called Ultimates, there would be times when a *high state of Consciousness would mean*

a low state of Interest. This is true in the case of Cognition, Feeling and Will and would have to be true in the case of Interest, if it were identified with one of these.

But a high state of Consciousness is never found with a low state of Interest. Active Consciousness and Interest are hence either always coincident or else identical. But to make Consciousness and Interest absolutely coincident means with all the wonderful points of similarity between them, a constant endeavor on the part of Science to show them identical. *It is here held that they are identical.*

But to show even more clearly that Active or Process Consciousness and Interest are identical, the views of several Psychologists may be considered.

(a) Spencer.

Spencer says: "It is admitted on all hands that without change Consciousness is impossible; Consciousness ceases when the change in Consciousness ceases." (Psychology, Vol. II, page 291.) Just so the condition of Interest is changed. If change in Interest can be prevented hypnotic sleep, etc., is the result. The fixation of the Attention, in the beginning of the hypnotic trance, means

simply *the cessation of change in Interest* and the result is the unconsciousness of the hypnotic state.

Spencer continues: "Consciousness is not simply a succession of changes, but an orderly succession of changes—a succession of changes combined and arranged in special ways." (Psychology, Vol. II, page 292.)

Now it is true that in Consciousnesss there is an orderly succession of changes—just so in a state of Interest this is true and Interest carries in itself the explanation of this "system of orderly changes."

Spencer says: "The changes form the raw material of Consciousness; and the development of Consciousness is the organization of them." (Psychology, Vol. II, page 292.)

The point here is, that Spencer's Psychology is absolutely a Psychology of the Mental Object—he leaves out of view the Mental Subject. Hence he makes the changes to be changes in the Mental Object, ("the phenomena of Consciousness"), whereas they are changes, first of all in the Mental Subject, which bring changes in the Content. But, as I shall endeavor in another paper to show, the Pyschological Subject is Interest. Then the changes which constitute "the raw material of Consciousness" are changes in Interest. Hence Active Consciousness is Interest.

(b) Hoofding and Villa.

"Consciousness is, as Hoofding says, a unity. It is a unity, in so far as we can embrace, in a single mental act, objects, which, in space, are far removed one from the other, and this quality represents itself principally in the 'energy' with which the Contents of Consciousness, in the beginning disconnected and dispersed, became gradually comprised in a united and connected whole." (Villa's Contemp. Psychology, 304.) This "energy" to my view, is Interest. It is Interest which gives the distinctive unity of Consciousness, for it is the energy which holds all together. On this point a separate paper will be submitted.

"To recapitulate what we have said concerning the properties of Consciousness—the latter consists in a series of processes which are not merely reproductions of external phenomena but apperceptive and volitional acts. It thus has its root in the fundamental and most characteristic process of mental life—viz: the Will. The Will manifests itself in the course of mental life not only in each of the apperceptive acts of which Consciousness in general consists but in the *general synthetic connection of them*

which form individual Consciousness." (Villa's Contemp. Psychology, page 311.)

Villa here makes the Will virtually identical with Consciousness, and he does this simply because he has confounded Spontaneity or Interest with the Will. As we shall see later, this confounding Interest and Will is the reason why so many Psychologists place Will as *the* single Ultimate.

But Villa, like many others, confounds Interest and Will. Hence he is really talking of Interest when he is placing the Will as the essence of Consciousness.

"*Consciousness*," says Villa, after a review of all the different theories, "is a perpetual choice between the several impressions which offer themselves to us. The impression, which strikes us most strongly, to which we turn our attention especially, and which we perceive therefore with the greater distinctness, forms, in that given moment, the centre of Consciousness." (Villa's Contemp. Psychology, 300.)

This is but to say that the *centre of Interest is the centre of Consciousness, i. e.*, that Consciousness and Interest are identical.

(c) James.

"Consciousness," says James, "consists in the comparison of these ('simultaneous possibilities')

with each other, the selection of some and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention." (Psychology, Vol. 1, page 288.)

But *it is Interest which shows itself in this attention of which James speaks*—hence he identifies Interest and Consciousness.

James also says: "*Consciousness* is *interested* in some parts of its objects, to the exclusion of others and welcomes or rejects; chooses from them, in a word, all the while." (Vol. I, page 284.)

James in another place shows that *Consciousness* is one continuous process of selection: "Let four men make a tour of Europe. One will bring home only picturesque impressions—costumes and colors, etc.; a third will give a rich account of the theatres, etc.; to another all this will be non-existent and distances, prices, etc., will take their places; whilst the fourth will perhaps have been so wrapped in his own subjective broodings as to tell little more than a few names of places through which he has passed. Each has selected, out of the same mass of presented objects, those which suited his private interest and has made his experience thereby." (Psychology, Vol. I, page 286.)

Now all this is but a *description of the principle of Interest at work—i. e.*, Consciousness is the same as Interest.

(d) Bain.

"While sleep, unaccompanied with dreams is the abeyance of Consciousness, becoming awake is its resumption.

The awakened Consciousness may vary variously in its degree and its contents. It may be so feeble as to possess no specific quality in prominence; it may rise to every gradation of intensity." (Bain's Dissertations on Leading Phil. Topics, page 228.) This is exactly true of Interest. It is *Interest* which must fall asleep if sleep comes. It is Interest which awakes when we say we awake.

"Consciousness is essential to memory. It is certainly true, in the main, that in order to make permanent acquisitions, or to associate trains of ideas, such trains must, in the first instance, have started in Consciousness. It is a recognized condition of retentiveness, that the things retained must have the full occupation of our conscious moments, for a longer or shorter time, and that the more intense the conscious flame, the more rapid is the adhesive growth." (Bain's Dissertations on Leading Phil. Topics, page 232.)

This is an exact description of the necessity of Interest to Memory.

"No fact of our constitution is more irrefragable than this—the absolute necessity of Consciousness in order to acquisition." (235.)

"Probably the most effective measure of conscious endowment is that, which we have chiefly laid stress upon, educability." (236.)

But this is really descriptive of Interest.

(e) Ladd.

"We may, however, realize what Consciousness is by comparing it with the so-called Unconsciousness. But the Unconscious, considered as the contradictory of Consciousness, is synonymous with no psychic state or fact; or, rather it is the denial of any truly psychic state or fact; it is the non-psychical." (Ladd's Psychology, 30.)

"Where there is no Consciousness there are no psychic facts as data for Psychology; wherever there is Consciousness there already exist psychic facts demanding scientific description and explanation." (Ladd's Psychology, 31.)

Just so the range of Interest is the same as that of the psychic. The Sub-Conscious is the Sub-Interest.

"Attention is the necessary presupposition and unceasing accompaniment of all the life of Consciousness. As many writers truly, yet figuratively say, attention may be variously distributed over the different parts of the area covered by each state of Consciousness." (Ladd's Psychology, 33.)

But Attention is, if not the presupposition, at least the unceasing accompaniment of all Interest. Hence Ladd really makes Interest identical with Consciousness.

"The unity of each state of Consciousness is such that it in no wise makes impossible a variety of contents (and even a variety of self-recognized contents) as belonging to that one state. But the variety also of the contents of each state of Consciousness is such that it, whether recognized or unrecognized, in no wise destroys or impairs the unity of that particular state." (Ladd's Psychology, 36.)

But, exactly so, Interest "*in no wise makes impossible a variety of contents,*" and yet, "*the variety of this contents,*" *in no wise affects the Unity of Interest.*

"Different fields of Consciousness, differ, then, as respects (1) extent or circuit; (2) intensity, or amount of mental life entering into them; (3) speed of movement as measured by the number of recognizably different fields occurring in a definite amount of

objective time; and (4) character, or predominating specific qualtity." (Ladd's Pyschology, 39.)

But Interest has *these same four qualifications, i. e., Interest is identical with Consciousness.*

(f) Volkmann.

"Dies fuhrt zum Begriffe des Bewusstwerdens. Unter diesem verstehen wir das wirkliche (weil wirksame) Vorstellen und stellen als leitenden Gedanken den Grundsatz auf: wir werden dessen bewusst, was wir wirklich, d. h. durch ein umghemmtes Vorstellen, vorstellen." (Volkmann's Psychology, Vol. 1, page 169.)

I give this quotation from Volkmann to bring out the fact that Consciousness is often improperly identified with knowing. Often, when one speaks of being conscious, he means simply *knowing.* This use of Consciousness is proper, for a part of Consciousness is knowing, but it is not right to *define* Consciousness as knowing.

To my view that Interest and Consciousness are identical, it may be said: "I can be intensely interested in a sound of which I am hardly conscious. How can Interest and Consciousness in this case be identical? Is not the rule given, sometime since, that a high state of Consciousness always means a

high state of Interest, broken here?" "No," my answer is: "When you say you are hardly conscious of the particular sound you mean that you hardly *cognize* it—you make Consciousness equal to knowing which is incorrect."

(g) Wundt.

Wundt, in his Physiologische Psychologie, insists that "Verbindung von Elementen" is a characteristic of Consciousness. He argues for this at length in his third volume. *But "Diese Verbindung von Elementen" is a characteristic of Interest.* Wundt could not possibly have more properly described Interest's work, for it is only *as Interest deals with objects that the processes Wundt describes take place.*

Wundt, in his Physiologische Psychologie (Vol. 3, page 373) argues at length that the four features in the development of Consciousness are Synthesis, Attention, Passive Apperception and Active Apperception. The thesis will be taken up later that passive and active Apperception of which Wundt speaks here, are but passive and active Cognitive Interest. Now, supposing them to be such, it is a very striking fact, that the four features which Wundt emphasizes in the development of Consciousness all belong to Interest. These four are:

(1) Synthesis
(2) Attention
(3) Passive Apperception
(4) Active Apperception

and all are, as has been said, essentially of the nature of Interest, or spring from Interest.

(h) Baldwin.

The definition which Baldwin gives of Consciousness is ; "*Consciousness is the one condition and abiding characteristic of mental states.*" (Italics his.) (Handbook of Psychology, Vol. 1, page 45.)

Now the one condition of mental states is Interest, moreover the abiding characteristic of mental states is Interest.

(i) The Dictionary of Psychology.

"Consciousness," Stout and Baldwin say, in the Dictionary, "is the distinctive character of whatever may be called mental life." Now what "the distinctive character of mental life" is, is not stated. But, in plain terms, the distinctive character of mental life is Interest. There is no mental life without Interest—there is no perception—no memory—no feeling—no striving, as we shall see, without Interest.

But to continue the definition of Consciousness given in the Dictionary: "Whenever there is not total unconsciousness in the sense in which we attribute unconsciousness to a table or a log of wood, the existence of some form of mind we denote by the word Consciousness. Whatever we are when we are awake, as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound sleep, that it is to be conscious. What we are less and less as we sink gradually down into dreamless sleep, or as we swoon slowly away, and what we are more and more as the noise of the crowd outside tardily arouses us from an after dinner nap, or as we come out of the midnight of the typhoid fever crisis." (Quoted in Dict. from Ladd's Psychology, page 30.)

But, "to sink into dreamless sleep," Interest must ebb more and more—"to come out of the midnight darkness of the typhoid fever crisis," *i. e.*, to come to Consciousness, is for normal Interest to once more begin its sway.

The Psychologists, whose statements respecting Consciousness have been considered, are but a part of those whose writings have been reviewed. No greater Psychologists live than these. No "*ex parte*" consideration of their views respecting Consciousness has been given. In a reading of their writings concerning Consciousness, others may find

views which to them seem opposed to my thesis, that Interest is identical with Active or Process Consciousness. I must confess, however, that I have found, in their writings on Consciousness, nothing which to my mind is repugnant to this view.

The present line of argument has been an examination of the views of these different Psychologists, preceded by an Argument from the way Consciousness and Interest ever vary together. It is hoped that sufficient argument has been given to cause Psychologists to consider the question as to the correctness of these views.

CHAPTER VI.

The Principle of Interest is the one and only Mental Ultimate, fundamental to the three so=called Ultimates, Cognition, Feeling and Cona= tion. In their essential nature they are respectively, Cognitive In= terest, Affective Interest and Conative Interest.

(This is a thesis upon which work was done during the summer of 1904 and which is contained in the paper at the Hopkins. The treatment here is a compend from that paper. This is one of the earliest positions reached in my thinking.)

The human mind, when it considers itself, instinctively demands that unity be found. The so-called mental Ultimates, which are Feeling, Cognition and Conation, it is not satisfied with because they do not constitute a unity. The mind feels that a unity must be posited. A unity has, in fact, ever been posited. Psychologists speak of the "Mind" or of

"Consciousness" as that which is the principle comprehending the three so-called Ultimates.

Because the unifying principle is demanded by the mind itself and because all psychologists admit this in some form (either as "Mind," "Consciousness," etc.), the question whether there is really a mental principle which is *the single* fundamental, deserves consideration.

Now there is a mental principle to which our attention is especially drawn by the fact that psyschologists meet grave difficulties in satisfactorily placing it in any scheme of classification.

This is the Principle of Interest. Some psychologists hold that it is *conative*, some that it is *affective* and others that it is *cognitive*, in its nature.

Thus Baldwin says: "Steinthal agrees with Volkmann, saying interest is the readiness of a group of ideas to assimilate a new idea." (Baldwin's Psychology, Vol. 1, page 147.)

"Volkmann defines interest as the relation of an idea to the group of ideas which represent the Ego." (Baldwin's Psychology, Vol. 1, page 148.)

These psychologists, then, hold that Interest is cognitive. Baldwin, etc., hold that it is affective, and Dewey, Royce, etc., maintain that it is conative, while Stout, in his latest psychology (1903), states that it is both affective and conative.

It would seem that because authorities have thus looked at the principle of Interest from this threefold standpoint, the question ought, long before this, to have been raised as to whether Interest is not the Ultimate comprehending the three so-called Ultimates.

Then, too, Psychology is but beginning to deal with Interest. It is a striking fact that the great psychologist Herbart, who gave the first treatment of moment concerning Interest, gave his treatment, not in his Psychology, but in some letters on Education. It is a more striking fact that, with a few exceptions, the only authors, who have taken up the problems presented by Interest, have been those who have dealt with Pedagogics. These authors, unfortunately, have treated Interest from no strictly scientific or psychological standpoint. That Interest has not been properly studied by psychologists, I adduce, as a reason for considering the question as to whether, after all, it is not the fundamental. The failure to find *the* Ultimate, which has marked Psychology's history, may be possibly explained by this neglect to adequately consider what Interest is. Dr. Baldwin well says: "The place of Interest in the mental life has remained anomalous; it has had no adequate discussion from psychologists." (Psychology, Vol. 1, page 147.)

Now to state my position at the outset: My thesis is *that this principle of Interest is the single Mental Ultimate* and that the proper and scientific classification is this:

Interest { Cognition / Feeling / Conation.

Argument I.

Argument from the Definition of Interest that Interest is not only Affective and Conative but also Cognitive.

(1) It is an admitted fact that words should be taken in their ordinary acceptance, if possible. No one has a right, in order to support some theory, to *change the meaning of a word.* He may, to his own satisfaction, prove his theory; but his theory will not be taken over as scientific truth.

There are, however, cases in which the meaning of a word is not changed, but its *full connotation* is simply brought out. The word has always had in the minds of men a "psychic fringe" which the lexicographers have not caught. Their eye has been held by only a part of its meaning. In such a case

as this, it is the part and duty of Science to bring to light *all* this implicit meaning. The word "Consciousness," itself, is a case in point. Once "Consciousness" was "Self-Consciousness." But at last it was seen that Consciousness was more than "Self-Consciousness" — that it was really "Consciousness," as we know it today. The true and proper implicit meaning was made explicit. Just so is it with Interest. My view does not *change the meaning of Interest*—it simply makes explicit what has ever been implicit—it simply gives to "Interest" the scientific recognition of its true connotation. My position is that the meaning of Interest is an argument for Interest as *the* Mental Ultimate.

(2) The lexicographers, however, bear me witness that I do no violence to the meaning of Interest. Thus the Standard Dictionary says: "To Interest —to excite the sympathy, curiosity of or attention of" (Vol. 1, page 939.) Now "to excite the sympathy of" is to arouse the affective nature; "to excite the curiosity of" is to start cognition — it is to arouse cognitive Interest, and to "arouse the Attention of" is to start volition, for attention is volition. Hence, this definition asserts that "to interest" is to arouse cognitive, affective and conative process.

(3) It is a striking fact that, unconsciously to himself, Baldwin, in his Psychology, treats of three

kinds of Interest. He speaks of "Interest of a peculiar sort—a feeling of curiosity, of exploration. In early childhood interest is almost altogether of the exploring kind. First, it is physical exploration; the infant explores his own body, then foreign bodies, his room, then adjacent rooms. The direction of his attention is largely accidental, depending upon casual stimulations. Then there begins a kind of exploration, the understanding of his own dress—the meaning of facial and vocal expression. The exploring instinct satisfied, his interest is at an end." (Psychology, Vol. 1, page 141.)

Now this so-called "feeling of curiosity" is really cognitive Interest with its feeling tone. And the above is an illustration of Baldwin's unconscious treatment of *Interest as cognitive.*

On page 143 of his Psychology, Vol. 1, he speaks of Emotional Interest, and *he classes Interest as an Emotion.* Here, then, Interest is affective.

Again, he says: "A general characterization of Interest as a psychical state is best reached when we ask why it is that we act voluntarily in this way or that. The answer must invariably be, because we are interested in this course or that. As will appear later, the most important thing about Interest

is its quality of stimulating the Will." (Baldwin's Psychology, Vol. 1, page 139.)

Here, then, we have volitional Interest. Because Interest does stimulate the Will, or rather issue as Will, we may class it as volitional.

Thus the fact which was noted in the beginning of this paper, that some psychologists consider Interest as cognitive, some, as affective, and some as conative, is to be supplemented by this fact: When a psychologist enters upon any proper discussion of Interest he necessarily, though he be unconscious of it, gives a *triple view* of Interest.

In fact, Interest cannot be defined save in terms of the three so-called Ultimates. In all Interest there is (1) *a feeling tone*—this has caused many psychologists to make of Interest a feeling or an emotion; (2) there is *tension or striving*—this has caused many psychologists to make Interest volitional, and in addition (3) there is in all Interest at least the incohate idea of an object—it is "interest in"—this has caused some psychologists to stress the intellectual side of Interest. My position is, that one who has introspectively considered the principle of Interest as he finds it in his own mind and then endeavors to give its full connotation will be forced to employ the three so-called Ultimates in

the definition. Hence the very Definition of Interest shows that it is *the* single Mental Ultimate and that the proper classification is :

Interest { Cognition
Feeling
Conation.

Dewey's views substantiate very forcefully the above position :

"I begin with a brief descriptive account of interest. Interest is first active, projective or propulsive. We take interest. To be interested in any matter is to be actively concerned with it. The mere feeling regarding a subject may be static or inert, but interest is dynamic. Second, it is objective. We say a man has many interests to care for or to look after. We talk about the range of a man's interest, his business interest, local interest, etc. We identify interests with concerns or affairs. Interest does not end simply in itself, as bare feelings may, but always has some object, end or aim to which it attaches itself. Third, interest is subjective ; it signifies an *internal* realization or feeling of worth. It has its emotional as well as its active and objective sides. Wherever there is interest

there is response in the way of feeling." (Dewey's Interest as Related to Will.)

Again, Dewey says as to the objective side of Interest: "Every interest, as already said, attaches itself to an object. The artist is interested in his brushes, in his colors, in his technique. The business man is interested in the play of supply and demand, in the movement of markets, etc. Take whatever instance of interest we choose, and we shall find that, if we cut the factor of the object about which interest clusters, interest itself disappears, relapsing into mere subjective feelings." (Dewey's Interest as Related to Will.)

It is seen therefore that the very Definition of Interest shows that it is cognitive as well as conative and affective.

Argument II.

(A) *Interest is fundamental to the three so-called Ultimates.*

(B) In their essential nature, they but express the essential nature of Interest.

(A) *Interest is fundamental to the so-called Ultimates.*

(1) Interest is Fundamental to Feeling.

(a) It is fundamental to the *highest form of Feeling*—the emotions—with which Interest is often identified.

Now, if Interest be merely an emotion it is a very peculiar one, for it stands fundamental to all the emotions.

Following Baldwin's classification of the emotions, we have :

(1) *Emotions of Activity*—"these arise through the attention." (Baldwin's Psychology, Vol. II, page 176.) But attention is the outcome of Interest, and, since these emotions arise through the attention, *Interest is fundamental to them.*

(2) Emotions of Content—These are :

(a) Self Emotions (Psychology, Vol. II, page 57.) But here Interest in self is fundamental.

(b) *Objective Emotions—But here Interest is fundamental.*

(c) *Expressive Emotions—*

1. Emotions of attraction.
2. Emotions of repulsion.

But here also Interest is fundamental.

(d) *Sympathetic Emotions.*

But Interest in others is fundamental here.

Also *Representative Emotions* and the *Emotions* of *Religion* find Interest as fundamental. *To the whole circle of the emotional nature Interest stands as fundamental—hence it is not a mere Emotion.*

(b) Interest is fundamental to the *lowest forms* of Feelings—*i. e.*, the Sensations.

Helmholtz says : "We only attend with any ease and exactness to our sensations in so far as they can be utilized for the knowledge of outer things : and we are accustomed to neglect all those portions of them which have no significence as regards the external world. So much is this the case that for the most part special training and practice are required for the observation of these latter more subjective Feelings." (Quoted from James' Psychology, Vol. I, page 241.) This statement but shows what almost all psychologists comment upon, that even as regards sensation the mind has a *selective process.* Now this selective process which the mind has, in dealing with possible sensations, *is the selective process of Interest. Interest must be aroused before the possibility of a sensation becomes an actuality.*

The battle is on today concerning the lowest forms of life, as to whether they are mere reflexes as Loeb, for instance, teaches, or whether as others insist, they have mentality.

For our purposes it is not necessary that this question be decided *pro* or *con.* Where, of course, there is nothing but reflexes there is no mind, but where sensation begins to appear mind begins to show itself. Now the first sensation which appears in the scale of life implies the presence of rudimentary Interest. Fix the point where sensation shows itself, and then, necessarily, Interest is there, for Introspection shows us, beyond question, that the absolute elimination of Interest must mean the absolute elimination of Sensation.

When we reach the human mind, the region of the "Sub-conscious" sensations is simply the region of the "Sub-Interest" sensations. Let a possible sensation arouse Interest and it becomes a sensation. *Let it fail to arouse Interest and it may stand as the portal of the mind from one's infancy to his death and yet he will never once have that particular sensation.*

Now, if sensation in its affective element be, as it is, the most rudimentary form of Feeling and if Interest is thus fundamental to sensation, Interest is fundamental to Feeling. If Interest be only a feeling it is most unique, for it lies at the base of all feeling and only as it is touched is there Feeling. Under these circumstances, to identify Interest with

Feeling is to neglect the end and aim of classification, which is to discover fundamentals.

(2) Interest is Fundamental to Cognition.

(1) The Treatment of sensation under the last head comes in here as proof. For if Interest be fundamental to the *affective* element in sensation, it is even more so as regards its cognitive element, since, at least, in a sense, sensation's affective element is fundamental to its cognitive element.

(2) In the formation of the various kinds of Mental Objects, Interest has played its absolutely essential part. No one of the mental objects, from the sense object to the aesthetic object could be constructed did Interest not exist.

(3) The whole treatment of Chapter I, as well as that of the Chapters which treat of Cognition, are referred to as sufficient proof that Interest is fundamental to Cognition.

(3) Interest is Fundamental to Conation.

(*a*) The identification of attention and volition has reached such a stage that it is not necessary to

pause to give proof. There is more and more a concensus of opinion that attention is the outcome of Interest. To take up that matter would be to only follow work which has already been done.

Then if attention is identical with volition, and if attention is the outcome of Interest, volition is the outcome of Interest and Interest is fundamental to volition.

(*b*) On the point that Interest is fundamental to conation, all the treatment of Dewey, Royce, Bain and that great school which insist that Interest is a part of conation might be submitted. Almost whole chapters could be quoted from these authors.

Hence, it is seen, by a critical consideration in each case, that Interest is fundamental to Cognition, Feeling and Conation.

As was stated, this argument is:

(A) *Interest is fundamental to the three so-called Ultimates.*

(B) *The three so-called Ultimates in their essential nature, but express the essential nature of Interest.*

The first division, (A) of this article has been discussed. (B) remains to be considered.

(B) *The three so-called Ultimates in their essential nature, but express the essential nature of Interest.*

It has been shown that Interest is fundamental to the three so-called Mental Ultimates. But it must also be shown that the three so-called Ultimates are the expression or outcome of Interest—that Interest is not merely something that lies back of Cognition, Feeling and Conation, but that it shows itself in Cognition, Feeling and Conation. Thus, if it can be shown that each of the three so-called Ultimates is, in its essential nature, of the nature of Interest, they become for us, respectively, Cognitive Interest, Affective Interest and Conative Interest.

Now, as has been asserted, my position here is this: "*The three so-called Ultimates in their essential nature, but express the essential nature of Interest.*

(1) As to Cognition, my thesis here is that Cognition is in its essential character, Interest.

In the Dictionary, Baldwin and Stout define Cognition as "*the being aware of an object.*" Their aim is to give a comprehensive definition expressing the essential nature of Cognition. But, just as it is of the essential nature of Cognition to have reference to an object, it is a part of the essential nature of Interest to refer to an object. The

statements, "I am interested," "I am in a state of interest," all imply *an object reference.* My point here is that Interest, which, as has been shown, is fundamental to Cognition is, in part, at least, of its essential nature, Cognitive. Hence, *Cognition is Cognitive Interest.*

(2) There is here another line of thought:

Thought deals with *ideas,* and whatever ideas are or are not, their essential nature is to have *meaning.* Whatever one calls an idea is not an idea unless it has *meaning, and having meaning makes the idea.* Thus we see that it is of the essential nature of Cognition, in its higher stages, to deal with *meanings.* It is also of Cognition's essential nature in Judgment to deal with meanings. Turning to even Sense-Perception, we find that Cognition's essential nature is to deal with *meanings.* As has been pointed out in a quotation from James, sensations without meaning are disregarded. Stout, very properly, in his Psychology, has a treatment of what he terms "Primary Meaning" in his consideration of Perception. It is seen, therefore, that in all its stages Cognition's essential nature is to deal with *meanings.* But it is of the essential nature of Interest to do the same. In a part of its nature, it is as natural for Interest to deal with

meanings as it is for the fledgling to open its mouth for food. In fact, *meaning* is the food for Interest just as it is for Cognition. Here again, we see that Interest, which as has been shown, is fundamental to Cognition, is, in a part of its essential nature, Cognitive—that Cognition is of the nature of Interest. Hence *Cognition is Cognitive Interest.*

(3) Baldwin, justifying the classification of Cognition, Feeling and Conation which he gives, says: "The representative states have as their common characteristic their reference to a thing or object. Knowledge is a function of mind only as there is something to be known, and in the higher forms of its operations its states are taken to represent or signify objects. In its earliest beginnings also, in sensation, the objective bearing of knowledge, as affording us a reference away from ourselves to a something which is presented to the Consciousness, is its distinguishing feature." (Baldwin's Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, page 36.)

But Interest has just this objective reference which Baldwin makes the mark of Cognition.

(4) *Interest determines the Cognitive Direction.*

Interest undoubtedly determines the direction of the Cognitive function in its normal operation. A

dozen men, walking within the same city block, will each be thinking of a different subject, but, in each case, Interest has given the direction of thought. To quote an illustration from Stout: "Defoe describes in a very vivid and natural manner the state of Crusoe's mind after seeing the print of a man's naked foot on the shore: 'I came home to my fortification not feeling, as we say, the ground I went on, but terrified to the last degree; looking behind me at every two or three steps, mistaking every bush and tree and fancying every stump at a distance to be a man. Nor is it possible to describe how many shapes my affrighted imagination represented things to me in, how many wild ideas were found every moment in my fancy and what strange unaccountable whimsies came into my thought by the way.'" (Stout's Anal. Psy., Vol. II, page 104.)

Robinson Crusoe's eye was idly following the waves breaking on the shore and there came in the mass of his visual sensations, sensations which became a distinct percept—that of a man's footprint. Interest and the Object now are at play like a shuttlecock. Each pulsation of Interest gives more *meaning* to the footprint there in the sand. And the added meaning of the footprint is food to the flame of Interest. Interest becomes Volitional as well as Cognitive. He starts for his fortification:

"I came home to my fortification not feeling, as we say, the ground I went on, but terrified to the last degree." Interest and the Object are still at their shuttlecock play and his terror is the *affective side of this.* "Looking behind me at every two or three steps; mistaking every bush and tree and fancying every stump at a distance to be a man." So Interest, not *terror* has given the direction of Crusoe's Cognitions—the terror is but the subjective side of Interest. It is true that Interest has given the energy (Conative) but it has also given the *Cognitive direction.* But *when we reach that which gives the direction to Cognitive processes we are in the very heart of the domain of Cognition, i. e., Interest, in part, is essentially Cognitive.*

(5) Interest not only determines the direction of Cognition but it *determines* the *content of Cognition.* To return to the illustration above: Interest brought the visual sensational element together into a percept for Robinson Crusoe. He saw a footprint. Thus, it was *Interest* which determined the percept of a footprint as the mental content at that moment. Moreover his *cognitive content, while he stood gazing at that footprint and while he was on his way home was absolutely determined by Interest.*

It is not necessary to discuss this fact, which seems almost self-evident, that Interest determines the Cognitive content. But *Cognition* is that which determines the Cognitive content. The scheme universally employed by the psychologists is this:

Mind or Consciousness { Cognition—thoughts; Feeling—feelings; Conation—volitions.

Here "*the thoughts*" are the contents of Cognition, and Cognition is just what determines this content. But we have seen that it is, after all, Interest which determines the content of Cognition. Hence Interest, in part, is identical with Cognition, *i. e., Cognition is Cognitive Interest.*

(6) Interest does more than determine the direction of Cognition—it does more than determine the content of Cognition—*it makes the Mental Object.*

Thus Robinson Crusoe, between the time he saw the man's footprint and the time he reached his fortification, had a thousand mental objects, but there was not one which Interest did not make. Interest was that which, in the first place, brought out of the "buzzing confusion" of visual sensations the percept of a footprint. At one moment on his way home

the mental object was "savages," at another "cannibals," at another "his-own-death," at another "men-pursuing-him," etc., etc. Like a panorama, the rapid series of mental objects swept on for him, but each one was the output of Interest. Each mental object as it died away gave to Interest such a glint of *meaning* as that Interest with its synthetic and constructive process flashed forth another mental object; or rather, the first mental object faded into the second as Interest dealt with the first, and so on to the end of the series.

Thus *Interest makes the mental object, but to make the mental object is the peculiar part of Cognition. Hence Interest, in its essential nature, is, in part, Cognitive, and Cognition is Cognitive Interest.*

Stout and others admit that Interest is Conative and Affective. The generalization of this chapter is that Interest is also Cognitive. The arguments given to show that Interest is Cognitive are but brief outlines, but if they present the truth, mere outlines may suffice.

All extended argument that Interest in its essential nature is also Affective and Conative is omitted here, since Stout and others admit this.

Argument from Ladd's Position that Interest is Cognitive as well as Conative and Affective, and is hence, the Single Mental Ultimate.

Ladd's position, apart from the line of argument already given as regards his views on Consciousness, substantiates the thesis that Interest is *the* Single Mental Ultimate. In his Psychology he has a long chapter on *Primary Attention.* As *Attention is the outcome of Interest,* this "Primary Attention" (as will be seen from his statements) is really Interest. But: "Primary Attention is a form of psychical energy which necessarily enters into the determination of the character of every field of Consciousness. In other words Primary Attention is a most general form of mental life." (Ladd's Psychology, page 65.)

"Whereas *Voluntary Attention is of the nature of a developed and trained faculty, Primary Attention is a necessary accompaniment of every truly psychic fact.*" (Italics his—Psychology, page 71.)

"Primary Attention, essentially considered, is the variously related degrees of psychic energy expended upon the different aspects, elements and objects in the one field of Consciousness. Now, the three Primary aspects of all mental life are Intellectuation,

Feeling and Conation. All objects known in any field of Consciousness are constituted and held in the mind only by activity of the mind as Intellectuation, Feeling and Will." (Ladd's Psychology, page 75.)

Here, Ladd points *out Primary Attention as that of which Intellectuation, Feeling and Will are the outcome. But to all Attention, Interest is fundamental,* hence his Primary Attention is Interest, and therefore, according to Ladd's view, when it is properly interpreted, Intellectuation, Feeling and Will, are the outcome of Interest.

Ward's Position.

Ward, in his celebrated article in the Encyclopedia Brittanica, stands emphatically for a "Subject" in Psychology. But what the Psychological Subject is which many psychologists realize must be posited, he cannot say.

Stout, in his last Psychology (1903), takes the position *held by many that investigation as to a Psychological Subject is fruitless.*

Now in *Cognition* the *Psychological Subject,* so far as *Psychology can discover it, is Interest.* Farther treatment of Interest, as the Psychological Subject, will be given later. But if Interest be the Psycho-

logical Subject, then since the Psychological Subject is the Psychological Ego, we have the classification:

Interest { Cognition
Feeling
Conation.

As has been stated, the argument in this chapter, in which it is sought to show that Interest is the single Mental Ultimate, gives only a part of the positions on this subject which the paper in the Hopkins Seminary contains. It is hoped that this chapter will at least cause some to turn their thinking upon this subject.

CHAPTER VII.

The Fallacies of Conation from the Standpoint of Interest.

Bain, who really began the modern teaching on Conation, says: "I shall examine at length the two fundamental component elements of the Will. There are, first, the existence of a spontaneous tendency to execute movements independently of the stimulus of sensations or feelings; and, secondly, the link between a present action and a past feeling whereby one comes under the control of the other." (Bain-Emotions and Will, page 298.)

"This fact of spontaneous activity I look upon as an essential prelude to voluntary power, making one of the terms or elements of Volition, in other words, Volition is a compound made up of this and something else." (Page 296.)

Bain confuses mere reflex spontaneity with mental spontaneity. He, however, is correct in insisting that the Will is to be traced back to the essential fundamental of our mental nature, if such there be.

He is also right in defining Conation from the strict standpoint of the Will. He does not seek to make Conation the whole of mental process. In other words, Bain's view of Conation is sensible and proper.

The same is to be said of Ladd's view of Conation: "We have already chosen the word *Conation to correlate with sensation and feeling* in the *most* fundamental use of the latter terms." (Ladd's Psychology, page 210.)

This is exactly as it should be—Conation is made to correlate with Feeling and Sensation (by Sensation here, he means Cognition) in the most fundamental sense.

"By Conation we do mean to designate a primary and indubitable datum of Consciousness. To repeat the truth which came before us while studying the Attention, all psychic life manifests itself to the subject of that life, as being, in one of its fundamental aspects, its own spontaneous activity. All complex psychic facts are fully described only when we add to the phrases, 'I have such sensations and recognize such objects and feel affected so and so,' this other equally pertinent and necessary declaration, 'I now act in this or that way.'" (Ladd's Psychology, page 215.)

Here Conation is properly correlated with elementary Feeling and elementary Cognition.

Sully's views are also correct:

"It should thus seem to follow that the most obvious general differentiating circumstances in all Conative phenomena is the presence of the psychical correlative of muscular action. Our Consciousness of Activity is based upon the common peculiarities of our muscular sensibility." (Sully's Human Mind, page 173.)

"Taking Feeling first of all, we see that Conation contrasts with this in respect of its passivity. Pleasure and pain are non-active. The difference between Feeling and Conation is further seen in the peculiarities of the psychical initiation of voluntary action.

In like manner one differential serves, in general, to differentiate conation from the region of intellection" (Sully's Psychology, pages 175-176.)

Thus it is seen that Sully seeks to make Conation merely the volitional side of our nature, traced to its very beginning. He stands with Ladd and Bain as to this.

But from this proper view of Conation there has been wide departure. This brings up the subject of "*The Fallacies of Conation.*"

I. The Fallacy which confounds Conation and Interest.

This has already been referred to in this volume. To confound Conation and Interest is a dangerous fallacy. Interest is more than energizing or striving. But this is all that is contained in the true meaning of Conation. Interest has in it, the feeling tone which has caused many to class it as an emotion. Pure Conation is energizing — striving. It is "Wherever one state of Consciousness tends by its inherent nature to pass into another" (*i. e.*, the activity in that process). But Interest is far more than this. We can imagine a state of pure Conation in which there is simply mental energizing. We can also imagine a state of pure Interest and in this there would be at least rudimentary reference to an Object and a Feeling tone, beside the energizing. Hence Interest and Conation are not to be confounded.

II. The Fallacy of confounding Conation and Mental Spontaneity.

"Spontaneity is a conception relative to mechanical Causation on the one hand and Self-Activity (q. v.) on the other." (Dictionary of Psychology.)

"Self-Activity—(1) Change determined in a being without other conditioning factors, and without

destroying the identity of the being ; entirely imminent change.

(2) Such change within the psychic self. * * * As used in current thought it is applied mainly to change in the mental self." (Dictionary of Psychology.)

Now, by confining Spontaneity and Self-Activity to Conation and ruling out a Spontaneity of Feeling and a Spontaneity of Cognition, Conation is, of course, made the single Fundamental. But Spontaneity is change—*i. e.*, Change in mental states. But cognition is change in mental states—Feeling is change in mental states, hence Spontaneity is to be used also as regards these two terms. *There is more than the volitional side of our nature which runs back into the sphere of Spontaneity.*


By Spontanity I mean here the root and fundamental of Mental Life. There is a sphere of the inner life which is spontaneous.

James thus describes it: It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving or withholding its assent, it influences the movements they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest—not the pleasant or painful, nor even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within us to which pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the


painful, speak. (James' Psychology, Vol. I, page 298.)

Now the question is simply this:

Is the following the representation of the true mental situation:




This diagram means that Mental Spontaneity (however you may define it) does not run out into Cognition and Feeling, but runs out only into Conation, and that Conation is to be written also where Mental Spontaneity is written, so that Mental Spontaneity consists in Conation alone. Now, is the above diagram the proper view, or is the following the truth of the case?



This second diagram means that Mental Spontaneity shows itself, not only as Conation, but also as Cognition and as Feeling, and that Cognition, Feeling and Conation are to be written with Mental Spontaneity, showing that each begins in that region.

It seems to me that to thus present the case is to answer it in favor of the 2nd view. The language and thought of everyday life, as well as of the psychologists, support the view that Cognition, Feeling and Conation all run back into Mental Spontaneity.

The situation has been something like this :



X is the region of Spontaneity. Now Bain simply extended the domain of Will back into the region X, and said: *Some X is Volitional* and called the some X, Will or Conation. Then came other psychologists who began to claim more and more of X (or the region of Spontaneity) for Conation until the school arose which teaches that Conation is the

Ultimate—that Conation is the whole of X or the whole of Spontaneity.

But Interest is now more and more recognized as this region of Spontaneity. Simply because the Will has been made to mean the whole of Mental Spontaneity, Interest is made to equal the Will. It is not seen that Spontaneity is as distinct from Conation as from Feeling. The only proper statement is that the region X of the diagram (Mental Spontaneity) is Interest, which lies back, not of Will alone, but also of Cognition and Feeling as well—that is, that Interest is fundamental to all three and is the single mental Ultimate, and that the three so-called Mental Ultimates are only expressions of it. This view commends itself because of its simplicity, and fundamental truth is always simple. There is a Mental Principle—Interest—which is certainly a fundamental one—it is admitted that Interest is of the region of Spontaneity—then posit Interest and give Conation its proper meaning of "energizing," and we have :

Interest. } Cognition, Feeling, Conation.

III. The Fallacy of Confounding Mental Activity when used in the sense of Mental Process and Conation.

There is an ordinary method of speech which psychologists themselves employ. They use "mental activity" in the sense of "*mental process.*" Sully states that he uses the term "*mental activity*" in a two-fold sense—first, as mental process, and secondly, as strict activity, (conative): "The reader must note the double employment of the expression mental activity, now comprehensively and somewhat loosely to include all manifestations of mind, and now more strictly to mark a distinctly active phase of mind." (Sully's Human Hand, Vol. I, page 62.)

Thus Sully states that he uses the term mental activity in the two-fold sense above indicated.

Now with the tendency of Thought, as it exists today, strongly toward Conation as *the* single mental Ultimate, this fact, that mental activity is commonly used to mean mental process, is a fine opportunity for confusion and for arguments that the Will is the Fundamental. If Conation be *mental activity* (in one sense of the term) and if mental process means mental activity (in another sense of the word) the improper inference, is drawn, that Conation is mental process, and hence is *the* Fundamental. This

fallacy has undoubtedly made many believe that Conation has some peculiar place as the Fundamental.

IV. The Fallacy of Boldly Identifying Mental Process and Conation.

Many have been influenced by the fallacy just described, but more have they been influenced by the necessities of the case. The *tremendous difficulty with Wundt's Apperception and with all Apperceptive teaching is that there is no proper explanation of what it is which apperceives.* The psychologists of the new school who hold, first, that the question of the Ego must be decided by Philosophy, and, second, that Psychology must make its deliverance before Philosophy can properly begin its work, are ruled out of the use of an Ego in their Psychology. But they must have "an *apperceiver*," and the "Ego" flourishes as luxuriantly in the writings of Wundt or of Stout as in those of McCosh. They feel, however, the utter and absolute inconsistency of their position and are keenly alive to the necessity of discovering some psychological principle which is the "*Apperceiver.*" The three so-called Ultimates will not do—not one of them—for that would be the

"Faculty" Psychology with a vengeance! Hence, in this hour of need, Conation is as fully identified with Mental Spontaneity (define it as we may), as possible, and is then boldly made to be the same thing as mental process and thus the single mental principle of Conation is reached as that which apperceives. The position of this chapter is that it is the necessities of the case more than anything else which is running so much Psychology into the Conative Camp. *These necessities, however, disappear when it is seen that Interest is the Apperceiver, psychologically, and that Cognitive Interest is really Apperception.* Thus the need, which has caused Conation to be loaded down with meaning that does not belong to it, disappears, and a simple and satisfactory solution of the problem is found.

Stout stands as an illustration of those who have committed this fourth fallacy of identifying mental process and Conation. Stout says: "According to the view which we have expounded, to be mentally active is identical with being mentally alive or awake." (Stout's Anal. Psychology, Vol. I, page 168.)

Now, it is true that there is mental activity in all conscious life. Other statements of his, however, show that he means more than this in this particular case. "We have repeatedly spoken of the further-

ance and hindrance of psychical activity. To make our analysis sufficiently definite, we must now examine the nature of the obstacles which may impede the current of Consciousness. There are two kinds, first, the first falls entirely within the sphere of mental process, it consists in a conflict between two incompatible moods of mental activity, an internal discrepancy in the course of a train of thought on a theoretical point, the discovery of an obstacle to the execution of a plan for some practical end, the conflict of motives, etc." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. I, page 156.)

Now the reason that I give this quotation, is this: (1) In the first two sentences Stout evidently identifies psychical activity and "the current of Consciousness."

(2) *He gives an example of Cognition: "An internal discrepancy in the train of thought"—and an example of Volition—"The conflict of motives," and calls these "two incompatible modes of mental activity."* Thus he really classifies Cognition from his standpoint of Conation. Just following this, he speaks of "the general flow of mental activity arising out of a conflict between its *special modes*" (page 158.) Again, "the antagonistic *modes of activity*" (same page.) This simply means that he is classifying Cognition, Feeling and Conation from

the standpoint of Conation alone, as *modes of activity.* This is the position of Losakij, in his "Die Grundlehren des Psychologie von Standpunkte des Voluntarismus," and that of Lipps, in his "Leitfaden der Psychologie" (1903), in which (pages 213-214) he classifies the Cognitive Processes by the "*Arten des Strebens.*"

The above description of Stout's position is true of his whole treatment of mental activity. Thus on page 148, Vol. I of his Anal. Psychology, he contrasts *two trains of thought,* and says of one case: "But the activity involved is obviously of a *lower grade* than that which is exemplified in a train of reasoning, or in a systematic effort to recollect a series of events."

This classifying mental processes by their different "grades of activity" simply means that mental *activity* is made by Stout identical with mental process. *Thus a foundation for his treatment of Apperception as conative is laid.*

Turning to his second volume (Anal. Psychology) we find him saying: "Under the term Apperception are included all such processes as understanding, interpretation, identifying, subsuming, etc." (Page 110.) Thus it is clearly seen that, in this statement, Stout makes Apperception include the *Cognitive Processes.* But *the definition of Apperception*

which he gives is wholly from the volitional standpoint: "Apperception, may be defined, as the process by which a mental system appropriates a new element, or otherwise receives a fresh determination." (Page 112.) On page 113 he says: "Apprehend" means originally "I grasp." On page 114 he is explicit: "*Apperception is Conative process.*" "A mental group or system is a grouped or *systematized tendency*, and the union of such groups or systems is the confluence of different modes of mental activity." (Page 113.)

Stout's whole treatment of Apperception is thus from the conative standpoint. It is not necessary to multiply quotations. Examples may be found on any page of his chapter on Apperception of the way he makes *mental process* identical with *mental activity*, and then, by the use of this fourth fallacy which we are considering—*i. e.*, by identifying Conation and mental activity—he makes the mind essentially conative.

I have examined Stout's position minutely, because he, with his conservatism, is a fine illustration of whither the present tendency of thought, respecting Conation as *the* Ultimate, must necessarily carry one.

Now, the question here as to Conation is simply this, and it is fundamental to Psychology: Is *mental synthesis merely conative?* Stout's position is that it is conative and that since it is conative and since mental synthesis is a great part of the mind, the mind is essentially conative. (This last is whither his view must carry him.) Thus he has the long chapter in his Analytic Psychology in which he seeks to show that the concept "*activity*" enfolds all mental process. Then, according to his view, since Conation is mental activity, and since mental process is mental activity, conation is mental process, and is, hence, the whole thing. He expends, upon this view, the strength of his learning and intellect.

Now, mental synthesis is as *essentially cognitive* as it is conative. If, in the human mind, there is anything cognitive, mental synthesis is cognitive. If mental synthesis be not cognitive, there is nothing essentially cognitive about the mind, for mental synthesis is the predominant factor in perception, in memory and in thought. Of course, in mental synthesis, there is the energizing or striving, which, as we say, "causes" the synthesizing; but energizing a process is not the same as the process itself. There is more in mental synthesis than the energiz-

ing. To say that mental synthesis is conative, because Conation gives the energy (in whatever definition of the view one pleases), is, to use an illustration from the world of things, the same as to say that a railroad train is steam because steam gives the energy by which the train is run. Why, also, is Feeling not *the* Fundamental to Stout and to the great conative school of today? With just as much justice, all mental process might be made a state of Feeling, for there is Feeling in all such process. If Stout selects the "energizing" factor as *the* factor, others have the right to select Feeling as *the* factor.

The fact is, that the Apperceiving Principle, after which Wundt, Stout, etc., etc., make such a struggle, is Cognitive Interest. It is no mere faculty, but the psychological subject, showing itself in a particular way—the psychological *subject apperceives.* What Introspection shows to be the fact, *i. e.*, that the subject apperceives, is in accord with this psychological view.

It is to be remembered that Conation is, after all, but a *theoretical* principle. The Dictionary stresses this fact in more than one place. The psychologists also stress it. Yet to explain certain facts in the human mind, the theory of Conation is posited, and then, that theory is made to explain all the phenomena of the mind!

The explanation of the present tendency of psychological thought, which as has been seen is toward Conation as the explanation of the mind, is found in the fact that biological explanation of mind rules the day. There is so much "striving" in biology's sphere that it becomes very easy, when the distinctly mental is reached, to make striving or Conation the Basic Explaining Principle. The insistence here is that errors are being carelessly fallen into by some of the greatest thinkers simply because sufficient thought is not being given to the Fundamentals of Psychology. If there be hundreds of acute thinkers, in the psychological field, intent upon solving some of the remaining problems of vision, why may not a few pitch their tents before the greatest of all problems which psychology has? Such problems are: What is the Nexus of the Mind? What is the Apperceiving Principle? What is the Psychological Subject? What is the Psychological Ego? What is the explanation of Hypnotism? What is the true province of Conation? What is Interest? What is Interest's place in the mind? What is the determination of Mental Objects? What is the Mental Object? How is the Mental Object constructed? It is repeated that certainly here, before these great problems, the thinkers of today should pitch their tents. There can be absolutely no question that

the so-called foundations of the Psychology of today need reviewing. Why should one be unwilling to take up great problems when they are at hand? Why should the thinkers in psychological university seminaries or in colleges be delving after the solution of minute questions yonder on the borders of the science, when it is plainly and clearly the fact that in the capital itself of Psychology there are conditions which require the presence of some of the forces of Psychology?

If these chapters can bring but a few thinkers to see the necessity of having a part of the forces of Psychology turn their attention to the very center of the Science itself, my aim will be accomplished.

CHAPTER VIII.

Psychological Idealism.

There are few subjects in Psychology which are as deserving of minute and careful investigation as that of so-called Sense-Perception. The psychological authorities have such an uncertain tone here that one's attention is necessarily aroused to try to discover the cause of these uncertainties of statement.

The old view that a tree was seen as a tree has given place to the view that there is not much immediate knowledge in the perception of a tree. Yet the authorities cling to a bit of immediate knowledge of the external world. A nest-egg seems to be absolutely a requirement. In such a case as this every thinker must necessarily examine for himself the question as to whether, after all, this nest-egg of immediate knowledge of externality, be an absolute requirement.

If a system of concepts be built up by judgment —if a concept be enlarged by judgment—if a percept be built along the same lines as a concept—if apperceptive processes develop, as Stout and others teach, both percept and concept, it seems that the

imperative necessity is upon us of asking whether judgment cannot give an explanation which will show this nest-egg of immediate knowledge, which psychological science is clinging to today, to be a mere figment of the imagination. Judgment builds up concept systems—judgment fattens concepts—judgment builds up concepts. Why may not Mind have developed ability to interpret sensation (affective) from the very first and inchoate judgment be at the base of all Mentality? This valued bit of knowledge of Externality—this "minimum" of the cognition of the external world—how different it is from all else that Mind has! The flashings forth of judgment are seen in all other reaches of Mentality, but this sacred bit of immediate knowledge of Externality has been immediately given, and Mind must reverence it! Mind must accept it as a thing given! But if I, as I sit here writing, can judge that the sound, yonder in the street, is a wagon's noise, why may not Mind from the very start have carried this judging—this interpreting ability—and used it from the first?

For me now to meet the requirements of Life, I must develop ability to interpret varied sensations. Why may it not have been always thus with Mind? Why may not this necessity which is now upon me to judge aright of Externality have been upon all

Minds in all times? *Why may not this necessity of judging Externality, laid upon Mind from the start, be the secret of mental development?*

The view of but a single author can, for lack of space, be considered, James, because of his eminent position in the psychological world, and because of his proper position as a leading authority, is, therefore, briefly reviewed.

James begins by defining sensation, and begs the question at the start. He defines sensation as cognitive. (James' Psychology, Vol. II, page 3.)

Perception and sensation are names for different cognitive functions according to him. He holds that sensation, so long as we take the analytic point of view, differs from perception only in the extreme simplicity of its object and content.

He says: "As we can only think or talk about the relations of objects with which we have acquaintance already, we are forced to postulate a function, in our thought, whereby we first become aware of the bare immediate natures by which our several objects are distinguished. This function is Sensation." (James' Psychology, Vol. II, page 3.)

So he, because of necessity, postulates this function which gives immediate knowledge of the nature of things—*because he has to have it, he postulates it.*

He takes a thing which is admittedly feeling, and says, *necessarily, this thing must be cognitive, hence we make it cognitive by definition and all will go well.* But, my position is, that he has no right to thus beg the question at the very start.

James continues : "The nature and hidden causes of ideas will never be unravelled till the Nexus between the brain and consciousness is cleared up." My point is that this cutting off of everything below immediate awareness of external things and saying that we cannot know anything about the part below the immediate awareness of externality, will not do—that sensations give the raw material of the Mental Object.

James continues : "All we can say now is that sensations are the first things in the way of consciousness. Before conceptions can come, sensations must have come, but before sensations came, no psychic fact need have existed, a nerve current is enough."

That James is clearly wrong as to his position here, the whole trend of thought in the chapters of this book seem to show. Interest is fundamental to sensation (affective) and, since this is the case, it is unscientific to postulate a bit of immediate knowledge of externality as a kind of batch of dough for the baking. It is held that this sacred

bit of immediate knowledge is but a remnant of the days of uncritical thought and that Science, finding a proper explanation, can well dispense with it.

One trouble with James is that he calls thought, feeling; and feeling, thought—he is not clear-cut here, and the result is that in these fundamentals he does not do clear-cut work and this results in vast differences for all the rest of his work and for his Epistemology. Yet he continues: "Sensations are the stable rock, the terminus a *quo* and the terminus *ad quem* of thought."

Moreover, James studies only the adult mind. In it sensation may be always instinctively *knowledge-giving*. But the question is as to the *start*—the first mind—rudimentary mind—from which all higher minds come—what of it? My position is that Mind developed only by the development of ability to "size up" the outer through the inner—that sensations (feelings) became the *signs* of outer things and the ability to read these signs aright brought survival.

James says: "In his dumb awakening to the consciousness of something there, a mere this, as yet, the infant encounters an object in which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all the categories of the understanding are contained. It has objectivity, unity, substantiality, casualty in the full sense in

which any later object or system of objects has these things. Here the young knower meets and greets his world, and the miracle of knowledge bursts forth as Voltaire says, as much in the infant's lowest sensation as in the highest achievement of a Newton's brain." (James' Psychology, Vol. II, page 8.)

Now let us admit all this, but remember, that behind this infant mind there are many generations, that the question is not of the infant's mind but of *Mind in its infancy* (a tremendously different question.) This infant's mind which James examines has, I admit, this instinctive ability to perceive, but it has this, my contention is, *instinctively.* This instinctive apprehension of the external world by the infant is possible, because it has inherited a brain system ready to work in that way, and ready, because it has inherited the advances of many generations. The real question is as regards *Mind* in its infancy—in its embryonic period—in that time when it was only a point of *Interest*, showing itself in feeling, primary cognition and conation. The question is what then was the Mental Object? What is it Cognition deals with first of all?

Now, it would seem that, because sensations (affective) are in the lowest minds and because it is admitted that judgment does deal with sensations,

it is an unnecessary supposition to suppose that judgment in its start had any other object save sensation to deal with. The supposition that in the lowest minds there is any object save feelings or sensations (and that which cognition built out of sensations by judgment) is against *Science's insistence on simplicity of explanation—it is not scientific.*

Mark it, cognition had to find its start. To start, there must be the raw material of a Mental Object. What is this raw material? James' position is that it was a blur which had objectivity about it. The position here is that it was a sensation, a *feeling* that a feeling is the raw material of cognition, and that cognitive processes of interpretation simply had to be developed to meet the demands of Externality, and that the Mind has thus devoloped—that the adaptations to environment shown in bodily growth are as nothing to the adaptations shown by the Mind in the ability it has developed to interpret the external world aright.

CHAPTER IX.

Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation.

I have submitted my theory of Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation to a high psychological authority, and he tells me that it is new in literature. So far as my reading and knowledge go, nothing similar to my theory of Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation has been advanced by any thinker.

The chapter on Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation is given place at this particular point in this volume as an introduction to chapters X, XI, XII, which deal immediately with the subject of Cognition.

The view is held, that, in order to follow the thought of the next few chapters, the marvelous recapitulating power of Mind must be stressed. Only as we see that Interest can sweep instantly from one point of mental development to another can the explanation of Cognition, etc., of these pages be properly considered.

The following positions seem to be bound up together as basic explaining principles :

(1) *Interest is Consciousness.*
(2) *Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation.*
(3) *Instinctive Judgments.* (Chap. XI.)

The writer therefore requests that these chapters be considered as an organic whole.

In fact this *Interest Psychology is an organic whole in this: It stands as a presentation of the General Thesis that Psychology is the Science of Interest.*

It is generally held that the individual Consciousness, in its development through life, is a recapitulation of the racial or even a recapitulation of all finite Consciousness.

In the few years we spend here we recapitulate the life which has preceded us. Whatever have been the stages of its advance we follow therein and recapitulate in ourselves the race's development. Hence, although our days may be few, there is hurried into our brief life a compend of all the past.

Now my position is that this view of recapitulation is utterly inadequate—that it constitutes an utter failure to set forth the true facts of recapitulation. According to my theory of Instantaneous Recapitulation it is held *that the individual, at any second, may reduplicate the whole racial experience.*

In other words, if the race has existed for thousands

of years, each of us, in a moment, may, in our Consciousness, live over again these thousands of years. Or, if the evolutionary hypothesis be true, and Mind has been even millions of years in its development, we may live in a moment all these millions of years.

Thus, when Consciousness or Interest functions at the sleep point, the lowest Consciousness is recapitulated. But in a second the man may be awake and conceptualizing processes start. In this case, Consciousness or Interest has flashed its progress, if evolution be true, across the bridges of millions of years. Or one has a sensation, and immediately in the higher region of thought mental processes go on. Here, too, is *Instantaneous Recapitulation of conscious processes which* once were slow and labored in their operations.

There is, thus, the Instantaneous Recapitulation of—

(1) *The slow development by which Mind reached any processes higher than sensation.*

(2) *There is thus also the Instantaneous Recapitulation of the slow processes by which the racial Mind reached higher thought processes.*

(3) *There is, in this passage in thought from a sensation to a concept, an Instantaneous Recapitulation of all the slow mental processes by which the individual passed from mere ability to feel a sensation to ability to conceptualize.*

There can, it is maintained, be no question that at any moment our Mind sweeps the strings of all the Past and lives in a moment the ages which have gone.

The Concept Consciousness has borne evil fruitage in Psychology since it is static in its connotations. The Mind, in the full sweep of its activities, has not been fully studied. The thought has not been emphasized that Mind climbs the Alps of the Past every second. Down to the abysses of the Past, Interest may drop or up to the point of highest mental development, Interest may function. The so-called Reduplication which teaches that one's whole life is a reduplication of the past sees nothing of what is really the case—that Mind is the true and real Reduplication or Recapitulation. All the past is compressed into the Mentality of this present moment. Science, it would seem, must recognize this as a basic fact. Thus will the proper conception of the vast and wonderful ability of Interest or Consciousness to function with matchless rapidity be seen. The view given in this volume of the Instinctive Judgment as a basic explaining principle in Psychology will then be seen to be necessarily a fact.

The roads our fathers labored over in cart or carriage, we pass over now by steam or electricity.

So the thought processes, which once struggled only a step at a time, now have the rapidity of light. Men have called this rapidity of thought, Association. It is maintained that it is essentially the Thought Process, and that Instantaneous Reduplication and the Instinctive Judgment furnish its explanation.

I.

Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation alone can Explain and Justify Introspection as a Method of Study for Genetic Psychology.

The line of argument here is this : Introspection necessarily stands as a fundamental method of all psychological study, whether this study be genetic or not. But unless this *moment's Consciousness carries in it the varied points of development reached in the past of Mind, Introspection cannot be this instrument of psychological study. Hence necessarily Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation is a fact.*

The theory of Instantaneous Recapitulation can alone give warrant for Psychology's dependence upon Introspection as a method of study in Genetic Psychology. Without Instantaneous Reduplication, Genetic Psychology can study, by the help of Introspection, only the highest reaches of Conception.

For, in the moment of Introspection, the Mind is functioning at the Conception point, and hence, introspective knowledge of mental processes, lower in the scale of development, must be impossible if the static view of Consciousness be held. But when it is seen that Instantaneous Reduplication is a fact, Introspection's place in Genetic Psychology is justified. For, according to the view herein presented, we may have a percept, and since our Mind can flash through, in a moment, all the mental development of the centuries, Introspection, standing far up at the conception point, starts forth and notes this particular percept living down, as it were, in the distant past of development.

Thus Introspection, which is itself, one of the highest mental operations, can study the whole genetic series of mental development, however long that series has been in process of development, because, in any moment of conscious life, that long course of mental development may be recapitulated by the Mind, which thus brings it before Introspection's gaze. Thus we can study the very infant Consciousness introspectively since the sleep point with us is the infant Consciousness.

As we are about to sink to sleep, thus reduplicating in that instant the infant Consciousness, our Consciousness or Interest may suddenly function away yonder on

the heights of Conception and Introspection, standing on the summits of the Mental Development of the ages, may look into the very face of the rudimentary Consciousness of generations gone by.

When this great fact of Instantaneous Reduplication is grasped and we realize that we are living ages in every second that passes, Introspection's place in Genetic Psychology is justified. There exists, at this moment, only the narrow segment of Mentality of the duration of a moment or two. The Mentality of five minutes ago is no more—the Mentality of five minutes hence has not come. Mind flies onward, over the waters of the Great Unknown Sea—a little bark. But within this little bark of the present Mentality are stored all the rich possessions and gains of the past. And Introspection can examine all aboard the bark, learn from all and construct a scientific explanation of the development of all, because all the past lives aboard this little craft. Of all things which this world has, truly only Mind is wonderful! Introspection catches a flash of thought passing from a percept to a concept and lo! here is the problem of the ages before it! The ages of the past are compressed into a second's time before Introspection's very eye.

A critisism was passed by some on my paper on file at the Hopkins Psychological Seminary to the

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effect that the paper studied cross sections of Consciousness instead of studying Consciousness in its longitudinal development, (*i. e.*, as it developed through the past.) My view then and now is, that because cross sections of Consciousness of, let us say, the duration of a moment or two, is, according to my theory of Instantaneous Recapitulation, a reduplication of ages of genetic mental development, the study of cross sections is the very method by which Introspection can study Consciousness at any and all stages of its development.

The only justification for the use of Introspection as a scientific method in the study of Mind in its development, is found in the fact of Instantaneous Recapitulation. According to this view, Introspection may, at any moment, hold in its momentary view, a miniature complete Mind, as it were, which presents the stages of the genetic mental progress of the past.

The biologist, to follow stages of development, must needs take different animals and forms of life for study.

The psychologist, however, it is maintained, can, seated in his chair, have before him the whole series of genetic advances by changing from a moment's drowsiness to an introspective view of that drowsiness in what, we may say, is the same moment's time.

For the passage from drowsiness to eager introspective psychological study of that drowsiness, marks the whole sweep of mentality's development. Or, again, Introspection may turn from the study of a percept to the study of a series of concepts of the highest complexity. Here, in an instant, the stage of development reached by vast struggles stands forth a living entity, and Introspection's eye is upon it. Out of the Great Past the Consciousness of this present moment rises like a spirit, but on its very face it bears the record of the way by which Mind reached all higher processes than sensation and perception.

An experiment showing exactly what is meant by Instantaneous Recapitulation may be readily performed. If, at this very instant, as you read these words, you lift your hands, and, placing your fingers upon your eye balls, press with some vigor, you have an illustration of what is meant by Instantaneous Recapitulation. For, in the very instant you thus give yourself physical pain, your Consciousness or Interest sweeps back from the higher point of conception to the point of mere physical pain—the years of individual mental development are crossed—the ages of racial mental development are passed, and you are back at the beginnings of Mentality.

II.

Only Instantaneous Recapitulation can give the Proper Point of View from which to Study the Wonderful Rapidity and Complexity of Mental Operations.

It is repeated, that the Static view of Consciousness can never hope to explain Mentality. No Concept that is not pregnant with the Dynamic idea can do justice to what Mentality really is.

The passage of Consciousness from the sleep point of development to the highest reaches of development, which, as has been emphasized, often occurs in a second's time, is not by mere association. No one can hope to establish such a proposition as that. The only explanation is such a view as this of Instantaneous Recapitulation. But if, in such extremes as that between a percept and a concept, Interest can thus rapidly function, why may Interest not function along all the so-called association tracks?

The Association of Ideas means, therefore, simply that Interest functions more rapidly through this particular stage of thought than before. When one is "reminded" by a certain word of a long forgotten incident which suddenly appears before the Mind, there is absolutely nothing like one idea calling

up the other. The explanation seems to be that Interest, functioning along a track made easy by past process, reaches the second idea with the rapidity of light. This line of thought is continued in the next chapter — that on Cognition being the development of the Cognitive strain in Interest, and in chapters following that.

The point to be emphasized here is, that the view that Consciousness and Interest are identical, leads to the position of Instantaneous Recapitulation, and Instantaneous Recapitulation leads to the position of Instinctive Judgments. With these explaining principles at command, Cognition, it would seem, can be more readily explained than it is by many. Cognition becomes but a study of this rapid functioning of cognitive Interest, and it is thought that simplicity of view is gained by a study from this point of view.

CHAPTER X.

All Cognition is the Development of the Cognitive Strain in Rudimentary Interest.

(If, in this chapter or any other, the author advances views which have been already expressed by others, he is not aware of that fact, and will greatly appreciate it if his attention is called to the matter.)

There is, as has been seen, a Cognitive strain in Interest. Interest is not only Affective and Conative, but also Cognitive.

The present thesis is that all the adult's Cognition is developed from the cognitive side, let us say, of the child's first gleam of Interest. However strange this thesis may appear, it is held that the facts substantiate it.

The thought upon this topic is given in brief outline. The subject is continued through several of the next chapters.

(1) The identification of Sensation (affective) and Perception (cognitive) constitutes, to the point of view of these papers, one of the greatest of fallacies.

Because of this fallacy the simplicity of the cognitive process is not seen, the nature of the Mind's true development is obscured and emphasis is placed upon the material object and the material world. The author holds that Sense-Perception is mediate, that Psychological Idealism is true and that Mind, hard up against the fixed conditions of Externality which it could know only by developing the ability to *interpret sensations* (affective) *coming from Externality*, did develop this ability. The arguments in favor of Psychological Idealism in a preceding chapter are necessarily far too brief. It is hoped to take up this point again and to use material already gathered on this subject.

(2) Thus Interest stands over against matter. Sensations (affective) come, just as to the telegraph operator the click of the keys come. The *learning process*, which the operator had to pass through in order, as we say, to understand the click of his instrument, Mind itself had to pass through in order to understand the external world. The operator must needs develop an interpreting power or he cannot hold his position. So the necessity of interpreting sensation's (affective) element was upon Mind.

(3) It is held that there are *Interest-Moments* which issue in a *Judgment*. To *judge is for Cogni-*

tive Interest to catch a new glint of meaning. It is maintained that the concept itself has its origin in these Interest-Moments. When we use language we are but passing from one concept, as we say, to another—*according to this view we are passing from one Interest-Moment to another.* The Interest-Moment is in some sense James' pause of Consciousness—the Judgment-Burst is about what James speaks of as the rapid flight of thought. With every Judgment-Burst (*i. e., the apprehension by Cognitve Interest of a new glint of meaning*) the nucleus of a new Mental Object may be given, or Interest may function in old ways, building up this new Interest-Moment or concept, until a *novel* (new) glint of meaning comes and straightway, we have the beginning of another concept or Interest-Moment.

(4) It is thought that here we have, in part at least, the explanation of Cognition—that from Cognition's dawn to brightest day the process is as is described above—that there are inchoate Concepts and Judgments far down in the scale of mind where we have never looked for them.

(5) Moreover, there are not *different kinds of Mental Objects* but, *in essential nature, there is but one kind, i. e.,* a sensation (affective) or feeling, externally or centrally initiated, *with its Judgment-Clusters. A certain constant Judgment,* or *certain constant Judg-*

ments in this Judgment-Cluster flashed forth by Interest, which we, in each case, may call the *Classifying Judgment or Judgments* or the *Instinctive Coefficient Judgments, decide whether this particular Mental Object is to be for us a Percept,* a *Memory,* a *Concept*—whether, in fact, it is *to be for us a taste, a touch, a sound, a thing seen or smelt.* In any case, were these classifying Judgments to vanish, this particular Mental Object would fall out of its group and the Percept not be known from the Concept. Different sensations (affective) may be essentially different. The point here is that to know them as different requires a Judgment and this Judgment becomes instinctive.

(6) The thesis is *also presented that there is a great class of Judgments which Psychology fails to recognize—this is the class of what I term Instinctive Judgments.* Only as we posit Instinctive Judgments can Mind be properly explained. Instincts are no mere reflexes—*there is mentality there.* But *as mentality consists, in part, as to its very essential nature, of Cognitive Interest, and as Cognitive Interest's very first step is one involving Judgment,* i. e., *apprehension of a glint of meaning, necessarily in Instinctive Mental Expressions there is Judgment involved and this Judgment it is which is here termed Instinctive.*

(7) How quickly do our Judgments, at first formed with the slowest deliberation, become *Instinctive* Judgments! Multitudes of examples could be given of this.

(8) The animal has Judgment. It is but instinctive, but none the less is there apprehension of that which for him answers to what for man is termed *meaning.*

(9) It is only Instinctive Judgments which can explain the standing forth of a precept before Interest. The particular precept is not brought back by memory as a thing once fused and now solidly a unit. *The Instinctive Judgment processes burst again instantaneously to the building up of a similar Mental Object to that we had before.*

(10) The thesis of this Chapter is that all Cognition is the development of the Cognitive Strain of Interest. Start with the rudimentary Interest of the babe—there is an objective reference in the babe's Cognitive Interest—the essential nature of that rudimentary Cognitive Interest is best expressed by "What?" The Interest-Moment bursts in a Judgment and *all the Mental Objects of the whole Life come in the same way. To my mind there is no essential difference between building two groups of meaning* (*two Concepts*) *together and building a smaller*

bit of meaning into a large unit of meaning. The authorities say that the first case is Judgment, but there is Judgment in each case.

(11) Cognition, instead of being a lumbering, many-jointed thing, is as simple as fundamental truth itself. Its highest reaches are just like its rudimentary beginnings. There may be vast systems upon systems of Concepts yonder at its highest development, but *the rudimentary Concept is found at the very beginning of Cognition.* The rudimentary Concept is the rudimentary Interest-Moment. Where one is found the other is found.

(12) Between *the Judgment-Cluster which constitutes the percept and the Judgment-Cluster which forms the concept there is no essential difference save that the clustering point in the latter case may be a Judgment and not a Sensation, but both are formed alike.*

(13) Of course, if it be true that there are Instinctive Judgments and that Mind has had to meet the hard and fast requirements of externality, by developing judging ability from the very beginnings of Mentality, the basic argument as regards Epistemology *is that correct knowledge of the external world, being the means of self-preservation, has, by the elimination of minds that were not fully developed in ability to interpret externality, become more and more perfected.*

CHAPTER XI.

The Theory of the Instinctive Judgment.

(I am well aware that to the psychologists my theory of the Instructive Judgment may seem a strange innovation. It is believed, however, that mind cannot be explained unless the Instructive Judgment be recognized.)

(1) Does the mind ever work as it were automatically—*i. e.*, without deliberation? Is there ever found any kind of mental functioning which bears the character of an instinct?

To ask this question is to answer it. Instincts themselves, whatever they are, are on the mental, not the physical side. Hence there are mental operations which are instinctive. Thus we see that the ground is clear for the consideration of the question as to whether there are *Instinctive* Judgments. For since there is clearly some mentality which is instinctive, there is no inherent reason why there should not be Instinctive Judgments.

(2) There is wide question among psychological authorities as to just where Judgment begins in the mental life. A view very common even to recent times, allowed Judgment only to the higher operations of Thought. But the trend has been to lower the mark which registers the beginnings of the Judgment. There is now much talk about Existential Judgments. Since this is the situation as regards the authorities, the question may receive consideration when one sees cause to write Judgment lower in the scale of Mentality than before. The tendency of thought, it is repeated, is in this direction.

(3) When sharp distinction between mere reflexes and Mentality is made, it becomes evident that an explaining Principle must be found. If the chick, just emerging from its shell, be a mere reflex, of course, no explanations are necessary—the nerve stimulation explains the reflex action. But if the chick have ought of Mentality, and certainly all admit this, the question necessarily arises : What is the nature of this Mentality? It is Instinctive Mentality, is the reply. But what is this Instinctive Mentality of which so much is made? According to my view, it is simply Instinctive Judgments—it is Cognitive Interest functioning in Interest-Moments

which issue in Judgment-Bursts without any deliberation or reflection.

The animal finds *meaning* in the food yonder that it does not find in the rock—he finds *meaning* in the call of his mate that he does not in the call of man, and this is *because* of *Instinctive Judgment.*

(4) We admit that the hound sees the fox. Is that which results mere automatic action? If so, the dog has no Mentality, he is but a reflex. But the fact stands certain that the hound has Mentality in some form. Then, if that be the case, there is some Cognition involved even in catching sight of the hare—in that there is Sense-Perception. But Sense-Perception of what sort? Of course, of an instinctive kind. Then my view is that this *Sense-Perception* which the dog has *is that of Instinctive Judgment Processes.*

(5) In the acquisition of a new language, we have ever before us examples of the formation of Instinctive Judgments. We come, when just beginning the study of German, to the word "Wiederernnerung." It has for us absolutely no *meaning.* But let us suppose that we now learn something about German prefixes. We come again to this same "Wiederernnerung," and find there perhaps a glint of meaning. We have now a lean Interest-Moment or Concept.

The next time we see the word, perhaps the meaning comes to us—our Interest-Moment or Concept has fattened with meaning. But all this has been under the influences of deliberate Judgment. We encamped, as it were, each time with all our batteries of thought before the closed gates of "Wiederernnerung." But now its gates are open to us. Today our winged Thought flies through these open gates, and through all the content of its meaning without a pause. But necessarily its passage must be along the route over which Thought has so often marched before. Judgment-Bursts are as necessary now as ever, but they come with lightning rapidity.

We can recall how Judgment, each time we found in our reading "Wiederernnerung," acted more and more rapidly until the time came when we did not note that Judgment was functioning. But the result of the rapid flight of Thought through the whole extent of that concept is just as logical and as consistent as before. This can but mean that Judgment still guides the process.

(6) The inherent nature of Cognition is, according to the view expressed here, shown in cognitive Interest. This is of the very nature of "Whatness."

The Judgment-Burst in its very nature is a "Thatness." So the shuttle-cock play goes on, the con-

stant play between "Whatness" and "Thatness." Now if this be found in higher Cognition, why not in lower Cognition? If this be the nature of Cognition, it must necessarily be found in lowest Cognition.

(7) The theory of the Instinctive Judgment forces itself upon us because of the wide explaining power of such a veiw.

(1) The Instinctive Judgment Explains Instincts.

There is for the homing pigeon, some glint of meaning somewhere which sets the wings in motion. In man there is bodily action as the result of a mental image, which sets off the trian of bodily operations. It must be so in the case of animals. The chick just out of the shell acts with precision in pecking at a piece of food. If there be Mentality there, there must certainly be Instinctive Judgments there also. The usual view of a mere reflex operation cannot stand. Mentality is not mere reflexes, and Instincts are on the mental side.

(2) Instinctive Judgments help to Explain Interest's Work in Apperception.

Interest apperceives, as is stated in Chapter II, but it is not by gathering up an idea or a bit of

meaning which in itself has power to attract other bits of meaning. *Apperception is by Interest itself flashing forth the whole Apperceived Content upon the proper stimulation.*

But this is necessarily so rapid a work, that almost all of it must be done instinctively. The Instinctive Judgment, thus, is a great explaining principle as regards the Percept, the Concept and the whole of Cognition. It is held that the Nature of Cognition cannot be properly shown unless we recognize the fact of the Instinctive Judgment.

(3) The Theory of the Instinctive Judgment Explains the Logical Processes.

There are few questions which have been more fully discussed than that of the nature of the Logical Processes and the guarantee of their validity.

Posit the Instinctive Judgment and it is seen that mind does not lose the acquisitions made in the past. The mind like a good general keeps the road which has been travelled in constant repair. Judgment band after Judgment band traverse the road over which the army of thought has passed, keeping it open and plain. Once Judgment had to struggle through gate after gate of Interest-Moment, with sometimes the way blocked. But now the gates fly

open wide and Judgment-Burst after Judgment-Burst comes so rapidly that they are not noticed.

(4) The Theory of Instinctive Judgment helps to Explain the Seemingly Incomprehensible Complexity of Mental Operations.

To one who studies Psychology the question how one Being or one Principle can have such different manifestations as the scores of different powers, etc., catalogued there, must needs arise. But now Sense-Perception is seen to differ from Memory only in this, that in Sense-Perception the raw material is a Sensation (affective), whereas, in Memory, the raw material is centrally initiated and Sense-Perception and Memory differ only in the fact that they have different Instinctive Coefficient Judgments.

Instinctive Judgments help to Explain the Emotions.

Here we have that which will be, it would appear, of importance for the explanation of the complexity of the Emotions. In the Emotions, as is the teaching of all the authorities, there are intellectual elements. There are certain Mental Objects in the construction of which the Emotional-Tinge comes. Yet these Emotional-Tinges are of vast numbers

and wonderful complexity. This is so patent that the greatest Psychologists say there is no reason in any attempt to properly classify the emotions.

Now from the point of view of the theory of Instinctive Judgment, this is as it should be—there should be just this complexity found in the Emotions. For with each Judgment-Burst, there is a Feeling-Tinge. Now multiply these Judgment-Bursts and the Feeling-Tinges are multiplied. They run together and we have the complexity of the Emotions.

Thus to fully explain the Emotion of Vanity, what vast systems of Judgment-Bursts must be unearthed? Up a certain road Mental Processes have come like spirits on the wing, passing through Interest-Moment after Interest-Moment, which in their time length are now but smallest fragments of a second, and yet, in each of these Interest-Moments, the Emotion has been perfecting its Feeling-Tinge until now it stands full-orbed Vanity.

(5) The Instinctive Judgment is the Explanation of Association.

Chapters would be necessary to even attempt to consider the literature of the great school of Asso-

ciationalists. There is space merely for me to suggest that Association of Ideas finds its explanation in the Instinctive Judgment. True, it may be said that one idea suggests another idea to Interest and that the second idea comes by Association.

This, however, is no proper statement of the case. The first idea is functioned first by Interest, *i. e.*, Interst feels, let us say a sensation, and cognitive Interest recognizes or interprets this sensation and and thus an Interest-Moment is found and a Concept or idea thus comes. Now it is said by the Associationalists that this particular idea suggests another idea. The fact is that Interest having functioned in the old track, does so more readily now, and by a line of Instinctive Judgments, Interest reaches the second idea.

Thus it is often pointed out in the psychologies that the line of association which seems impossible of demarcation can be sometimes traced. If we analyze such cases we find that there has been rapid Judgment-Burst after Judgment-Burst. In many cases it seems that certain sensations have been fused into a unit, and are now reproduced as a unit, as, for instance, our percepts. It is maintained, however, that this unity is but the unity of a concept, *i. e.*, that it is a Judgment-Cluster.

The author is fully aware that to properly consider from all standpoints his theory of the Instinctive Judgment, a volume would hardly suffice.

It is hoped in the future to give this subject, as well as others, the fuller treatment which they deserve.

CHAPTER XII.

Theses which, for Lack of Space, Can be Presented only in Outline.

The theses positions of this chapter are presented in brief outline in order that a compend of the thought along these lines may be given. To seek to give the development of these positions in consecutive chapters, as should be done, would carry this present volume beyond the unpretentious size which was planned. These theses, however, represent developments along this new line of thought which may cause consideration of the justice and validity of these views.

The following theses are therefore, merely enumerated in this volume. It is hoped that the opportunity for their proper development and defence may be found later.

These theses are :

I. The thesis of Interest-Moments.

II. The thesis of Judgment-Bursts.

III. The thesis that Psychological Idealism is necessarily the scientific position for Psychology.

IV. The thesis of Judgment-Clusters.

V. The thesis that the Raw Material of the Mental Object is originally a Sensation (affective.)

VI. The thesis that the Mental Object is a Sensation (affective) together with a Certain Judgment Cluster. (The raw material of the Mental Object may be what Kulpe calls an internally originated sensation.)

VII. That there is a great Class of Judgments which Psychology has failed to recognize, i. e., those I term Instinctive Judgments.

VIII. The thesis that Instinctive Judgments exist: (1) *because of the very nature of Cognition;* (2) *because of the facts of animal psychology;* (3) *because of the facts of human psychology;* (4) *because we see every day, in our own experience, judgments, reached with deliberation, becoming instinctive. If Mind today coins Instinctive Judgments, why has it not done so in all the past?*

IX. The thesis that Instinctive Judgments constitute one of the most important explaining facts in Psychology.

X. The thesis that the Percept in its essential nature is identical with the Concept—both being Judgment-Clusters.

XI. The thesis that there are certain classifying Instinctive Judgments which may be termed Instinctive Coefficient Judgments. These Instinctive Coefficient Judgments are the so-called "Coefficients." Thus the "Coefficients" of Reality are certain Instinctive Judgments. Reality has its explanation here.

XII. The thesis that the difference in these Instinctive Coefficient Judgments constitutes the essential difference between a Percept, an Image, a Memory or a Concept. The thought is that because a certain Judgment-Cluster has a certain content of Constant Instinctive Coefficient Judgments, it is instinctively classed as a Memory, a Percept, an Image or a Thought.

XIII. The thesis that the Science of Speech has its explanation in the passage from Interest-Moment to Interest-Moment, (Concepts being thus produced) each of which dies away as there comes a Judgment-Burst which gives a new glint of meaning, which thus becomes the nucleus around which Interest flashes forth Instinctive Judgments to the building up of another Interest-Moment or Concept.

XIV. The thesis that the Science of Epistemology is necessarily a study (1) of the Instinctive Judgments (2) of Deliberate Judgments, (3) of the validity of each kind of Judgment.

XV. The thesis that Interest with its instinctive Judgment-Bursts, is the Explaining Principle in Animal Psychology.

XVI. The thesis that the relative poverty or richness of one's Mental Life has to do with these Interest-Moments.

Some have Interest-Moments as lean as Pharaoh's lean kine. Some have Interest-Moments as fat as the fat kine Pharaoh saw. But, in every case, it is not association which brings together the contents of the Interest-Moments. It is Interest itself, which, functioning in old Interest-Moment tracks, with incalculable rapidity flashes forth Judgment-Burst upon Judgment-Burst until the Interest-Moment (Concept or Percept) reaches that point of development where there is a glint of *New Meaning* —the new Judgment-Burst— and in this Judgment-Burst there springs forth the nucleus for a new Interest-Moment. Thus ever on and on Interest functions, producing from itself its Mental Objects which are a true copy and transcript of External Objects, because the hard and fixed necessity has

been upon Mind that the Mental Object be the correct interpretation of the External Object, or the Mind must perish.

XVII. The thesis position is held (this position a friend and I are collaborating upon. See Chap. III, Part II.) that *Biological Life Development has found in Interest or Mind the dominant controlling factor of its progress.* Mind has been in its awful necessities, where mere body can never be. Mind has *had tremendous requirements and necessities* laid upon it that never were laid upon body. The animal Mind developed *ability to judge* in order to live. The so-called survival of the fittest is not in any sense the survival of the strongest merely, but of that animal *which best developed the ability to instinctively judge of his adversary's distance—of what was food, etc.*

Mind or Interest in Animal and in Man has been the determining factor and feature of Development.

The friend, of whom I speak in Chapter III, of part II, of this volume, who is largely concentrating his attention upon the one problem of Biological Life-Development, and who has ability of the highest order for this work, tells me that that field gives more and more promise with increasing research. It seems that the whole subject of Evolution must

be reopened. If Evolution be the true view of Life Development, it must be written from the side of Mind and not of Body. The position as stated in Chapter III, of Part II, on this subject, is that there is an "Inter-esse" between Matter and Life—that this is Interest and that Interest has been *the* determining factor in all advance.

XVIII. The thesis that the Science of Logic finds its validity not merely in the Deliberate Judgment of the present moment, but much more in the Instinctive Judgment.

XIX. The thesis that the Science of Epistemology must be largely governed in its deliverance by:

(1) *Psychological Idealism.*
(2) *The fact of the Instinctive Judgment.*

It is thought, however, in this connection, that perhaps a somewhat fuller statement in regard to the Interest-Moment, the Judgment-Burst and the Judgment-Cluster is required.

The phrase Interest-Moment is employed in order that the thought may be held to the Interest which is functioning.

The Judgment-Cluster is really the Mental Object. Whenever and wherever the Mental Object is found

there is the Judgment-Cluster. In the difference between Judgment-Clusters there is found the wonderful complexity of our Mental Objects.

Analysis can take a Mental Object to pieces and it will be found to consist of:

(1) Deliberate Judgments or a Deliberate Judgment.

(2) Instinctive Judgments.

(3) Instinctive Coefficient Judgments.

(4) The Raw Material (sensation, [affective] or a judgment.)

The Raw Material, the Instinctive Coefficient Judgments and the Instinctive Judgments are always found in the Mental Object. The Deliberate Judgment is found only in cases of what we call the higher operations of thought.

The Judgment-Cluster is a Cluster, not because these Judgments have a clustering affinity, but because Interest functions them forth and holds them by its synthetic power. Emphasis here is upon the acquisition already made. The Judgment-Cluster is the Meaning-Cluster.

The Interest-Moment.

The first Interest-Moment of the infant ends when something becomes a *Sign*. In these lower cases the sign is usually a sign or *meaning* for action.

Here, for instance, are two men who are alone in the great forest fighting the Indians. Each is behind a sheltering tree ; one makes a sign to the other, the other understands the sign and drops on the ground and thus saves himself from the bullet of the foe. This is but an illustration of the daily and hourly importance of being able to understand *signs* and to act upon *signs.* Now, *it is a fact of the very first importance that all bodily acts on the part of animal or man is upon some sign*—the *idea or meaning gives the power to act. When one loses the idea one cannot act. Bodily acting is in virtue of having received a Sign or Meaning.*

Now we begin to have an opportunity to measure the length of the Interest-Moment, and to in some sense describe it. *The Interest-Moment is the incubating time of a Sign or of a Meaning-Glint.*

The incubating time ends in the Judgment-Burst which is a kind of Thatness and which is in itself the Sign or the Meaning-Glint.

Hence the three definitions are given :

(1) *The Interest-Moment is Interest's incubating period in the production of a sign or glint of meaning.*

(2) *The Judgment-Burst is the flashing forth by Cognitive Interest of a sign or glint of meaning.*

(3) *The Judgment-Cluster is the Instinctive Judgments which Interest functions forth in a particular Interest-Moment in the developing incubation of a sign or glint of meaning.*

(This answers, in a sense, to the idea of a concept, but the idea concept is a poor term for Psychology, because there is no Dynamic connotation. No term seems worthy of having place in our psychological terminology, which is Static in its connotations, as this term concept is. We need terms which keep our thought to what Interest is doing. Hence, it is thought that here a term like Judgment-Cluster may serve better than concept.)

Now, as the Interest-Moment is the incubating period of a sign or glint of meaning, *i. e.*, the period in which Interest is functioning in an incubating way —the whatness functioning—the second Interest-Moment will be shorter than the first, because it has the first Interest-Moment back of it.

Now by these definitions and considerations we reach a great law of the Mind. It is this :

The whole tendency of Mental life is toward Rapidity of Interest-Moments, and this means :

(1) *Increase of Judgment-Bursts or Meaning-Glints.*

(2) *Ease of Judgment-Bursts or Meaning-Glints.*

(3) *Complexity of Judgment-Clusters or Meaning-Clusters.*

Thus Judgment-Clusters necessarily become complex, and we see that, necessarily, according to this explanation of Mind, percept and concept must arise in their complexity just as they do.

There are two kinds of Interest-Moments, the instinctive and the deliberate. The Judgment-Cluster is produced by Interest functioning through a number of instinctive Interest-Moments, each of which results in an instinctive Judgment-Burst. These instinctive Judgment-Bursts help to constitute the Judgment-Cluster of the deliberate Interest-Moment, which results in the deliberate Judgment-Burst. This same deliberate Judgment-Burst, Interest soon, it may be, functions forth as an instinctive Judgment-Burst in the formation of some instinctive Judgment-Cluster.

Thus there is:

(1) The instinctive Interest-Moment and the deliberate Interest-Moment.

(2) The instinctive Judgment-Burst and the deliberate Judgment-Burst.

Thus cognitive Interest both makes advances and preserves its communications. All these advances which have been of real permanence have been preserved by the processes of the instinctive Interest-Moment and the instinctive Judgment-Burst. The acquisitions made today are reproduced by the instinctive Interest-Moments and instinctive Judgment-Bursts.

The usual teaching, that the faculty of memory recalls the acquisitions made in the past or that there is such a distinct faculty, is, it is thought, utterly misleading. Interest functions through instinctive Interest-Moments and thus the results usually attributed to memory are reached. The instinctive Coefficient Judgments in a memory object bespeak it a memory for us.

Thus Cognition has to do with (1) the Interest-Moment; (2) the Judgment-Burst, or what we may also call the Meaning-Glint; and (3) the Judgment-Cluster, or what we may also call the Meaning-Cluster.

The problems of the Deliberate Interest-Moment, of the Deliberate Judgment-Burst, are taken up in the Chapter on the Conscience and the Will. These problems involve the questions of Free-Will and the rise of Personality.

CHAPTER XIII.

All Feelings and Emotions are the Development of the Affective Side of Interest.

(This chapter is a compend of a part of the paper submitted at the beginning of the term of 1904 and now on file at the Hopkins. If the view herein presented be correct, the whole extent of the feelings and of the emotions must yet be thought through in a genetic way, beginning at the lowest and ascending to the highest.)

This chapter seeks :

(1) *To lay a proper foundation for a genetic study of the Feelings and the Emotions.*

(2) *To justify the validity of such a study of affective Psychology.*

(3) *To give the proper working tool for such an attempt, i. e., the affective tone of Interest.*

If feeling be the expression of Interest, the ordinary identification of Feeling and Interest is readily explained. "How is it possible that it was not seen

that Feeling is the outcome of Interest if that be the case?"

The view here is, that the true situation has been reversed in the past. Interest was made the outcome of Feeling, *i. e.*, an emotion, whereas in fact, Feeling is the outcome of Interest. This error is subtle and hence easily overlooked.

The natural supposition is, because of the identification of Interest and Feeling, that one is the outcome of the other. But we have seen that Interest is fundamental to Feeling—(Chapter VI.) Hence Feeling in its nature is but the expression of Interest.

Another probability in this case is this: Motives are given by Interest. This statement is very generally accepted by psychologists. But motives are affective and Interest is fundamental to Feeling. Here, then, we have Interest reaching up through Feeling to fashion motives in the sphere of the Feelings, or to describe the situation in another way —there is a part of the Feelings which is the direct outcome of Interest. The probability is then that all Feelings are the outcome of Interest.

But to pass from probabilities to the proof that Feelings in their essential nature are the outcome of Affective Interest.

(1) Interest is fundamental to Feeling. This we have already seen.

(2) Interest, at least, in a part of its nature, is *affective.* Interest, wherever found, has a *feeling tone.* A feeling tone is of the very nature of Interest. This is so clear that it needs no proof. The fact is that the first Feeling does not follow Interest, although Interest is fundamental to it, but rises as a part of the outgoings of Interest.

Now these two facts, that Interest is fundamental to Feeling and that the Feeling tone is of the essential nature of Interest, means, at least, this : that a part of our feelings is the direct outgoings from Interest.

But how as to the rest of our Feelings ?

Now the ordinary view that the human mind has a great stock of feelings, sensations, etc., *at once* is, as we know, erroneous. The mind really, at one time, has only *one* Feeling at the height of its swell, another may be receding, another may be coming in, but there is only one that holds chief place. Now the contention here is that if that Feeling, which is at the swell, be caught, it will be found to have been born of the Interest Feeling Tone.

When we come to deal with the Feelings, we are admittedly upon uncertain ground. All psychologists admit, while they deplore, this fact. Hence in

considering the thesis which now is presented that *All* Feelings spring from the *Interest Feeling Tone*, we must take our bearings from the positions of the psychologists.

As to Ideal Feelings.

Baldwin gives the following definition of Ideal Pleasure and Pain: "Strict analogy, accordingly, from the philosophy of the sensuous Feelings leads us to define Ideal Pleasure as the conscious effect of that which makes for the continuance of the apperceptive life or its advancement, and Ideal Pain, the conscious effect of that which makes for the decline of the apperceptive life or its limitations." (Baldwin's Psychology, Vol. II, page 150.) This definition of Ideal Pleasure and Pain is strictly in line with his broad definition of all Ideal Feeling. Hence, admitting my thesis, that *Apperception is Cognitive Interest, Ideal Feeling* becomes *Affective Interest.*

There are so many different kinds of subdivisions and sub-subdivisions among Ideal Feelings that, at the first blush, it seems foolish to speak of identifying all Ideal Pleasure and Pain with Interest Feeling. But in this connection, a statement made by Ward gives light: "By *a* pleasure or pain we mean

some assignable presentation or presentations which are pleasant, *i. e.*, afford pleasure; by *pleasure* simply is meant this subjective state of Feeling itself. The former, like other objects of knowledge, admit of classification and comparison. But, while the causes of Feeling are manifold, the Feeling itself is a subjective state, varying only in intensity and duration." (Ward's Article, Psychology, in Encyclopedia Brit.)

This is all true. We, then, while having many pleasures, have only one *sense of Pleasure.* On the Content side there are *pleasures*—on the Process side there is simply "Pleasure." This explains how it is, that though there is a sea of *pleasures* and a sea of pains, there is simply, on the Process side, *Pleasure* and *Pain.* Thus we reach a simplicity which is compatible with the idea that the Affective nature is simply Affective Interest.

In the Dictionary of Psychology this definition is given: "*Pleasure and Pain*—an antithesis of qualities which characterize the Affective aspect of Consciousness."

"The pain (1) which attaches to organic conditions has recently been distinguished somewhat sharply from (2) so-called unpleasantness, the former being considered, on the basis of considerable evidence, as a *sensation*, the latter as a more general

affective character attaching with its antithesis, pleasantness, to the mental life in all its phases." Hence, our discussion really turns, as regards Ideal Feelings, upon the nature of Ideal Pleasure and Pain.

Stout, in his Analytic Psychology, has this to say on this subject: "The antithesis between pleasure and pain is coincident with the antithesis between free and impeded progress toward an end; the unimpeded progress is pleasant in proportion to the intensity and complexity of mental excitement. An activity which is thwarted or retarded, either by the presence of positive obstruction or by the absence of co-operative conditions, or in any other conceivable way, is painful in proportion to its intensity and complexity, and to the degree of the hindrance." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, page 270.)

Now my line of argument here is this: Stout's position respecting pleasure and pain really means that they constitute the hedonic tone of Interest.

Stout says: "We begin with that class of pains which is in any way due to being bored or distracted. There are manifold ways in which this form of disagreeable Consciousness may arise; but all have one point in common. The *attention* is in some way confined to comparatively indifferent or actually distasteful subjects, so as to suppress the

free flow of mental activity which tends in other directions." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, page 273.) But the *attention is the outcome of Interest*—the *attention is but the mental activity*—the impeded activity of Interest—*it is to Interest* and not *to the attention* that the pain belongs, which is caused when mental activity is impeded.

Again, Stout says: "It is the arrest of mental activity, in the repressed tendency to pursue other lines of thought or action, which causes pain. (Same page.)

But the mental activity is the outcome of spontaneity, and belongs to that—the arrest of the activity is the arrest of this spontaneity—Interest; hence the pain belongs to that, psychologically.

"The pains we have so far discussed are due rather to competition than to conflict. They arise from attention being drawn simultaneously to disparate objects, rather than from any obstruction which it encounters in a given direction." (Page 275.) That is, they arise from *Interest* "being drawn simultaneously to disparate objects," and hence are subjective to Interest.

"The pains of bereavement are easily referable to thwarted activity. The person taken from us has formed part of our life. So far as this is the case, his removal means the repression of our previous

modes of *thought* and action. While the loss is recent, *these preformed mental tendencies* are stimulated by everything which can remind us of the deceased; but they are stimulated only to be crushed." (Page 278.)

But "these preformed mental tendencies," which are stimulated only to be crushed, and the crushing of which gives the pain of bereavement, mean simply *Interest.* Hence *it is* the *crushed Interest* to which the pain attaches.

Quotations might be multiplied, to show that Stout's view, that pleasure and pain are the result of unimpeded or impeded mental activity, really *has reference to Interest of which this activity is the outcome.*

Arguments, from the position of other psychologists, as to the Ideal Feelings might be given. But brevity requires that Baldwin's and Stout's views suffice. Their views substantiate the position that *Ideal Feeling is Affective Interest.*

As to the Affective Element of Sensation being Affective Interest.

Having argued that Ideal Pleasure and Pain are the Affective tone of Interest we come to consider Sensation.

The problems of Sensation are the battlefields of the centuries. One can well spend a lifetime studying the one problem of Sensation. Systems of Philosophy, as well as systems of Psychology receive their direction here. The uncertainties here are so great that I can hope but to point out some facts which narrow the special problem.

(1) The present tendency is to make more and more of the cognitive life, *Apperceptive.* Stout by his noetic synthesis really makes *perception an apperceptive process.* Thus his definition of "noetic synthesis" is: "That union of presentational elements which is involved in their reference to a single object." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, page 1.) "In almost *every moment of our waking life an apperceptive* process is taking place. Whenever *an object is attended to* the presentation of it is apperceived. These aspects of the presentation which are congruent with the apperceptive system acquire special significance. Others remain outside the sphere of

the Attention process." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, page 113.)

Other authors might be quoted to show that Perception is being more and more considered a process, not of mere association of percepts, but of *Apperception*. But, as has been seen from chapter II, Apperception is cognitive Interest, and therefore the Feeling accompanying Apperception is affective Interest. Thus, as the *range of Apperception is extended into the domain of Perception, the range of that Feeling which has been shown to be affective Interest is widened.*

That part of sensational Feeling which does not enter into Perception remains for consideration. But there is none, so many psychologists hold, that does not enter into Perception. Hence, *since all sensational Feeling is the subjective side of Apperception (which is Cognitive Interest), it is Affective Interest.*

Hence it is seen that *all Feeling* is affective Interest. And all Feelings are the output of affective Interest.

Now, Wundt defines Feeling *as the mode of reaction of Apperception upon Sensations, i. e., Feeling is Affective Interest.*

Kulpe says of this theory of Wundt's, as to Feeling: "The homogenity of Feeling agrees excellently with the homogenity of Apperception; and

the Feeling which accompanies a sensation in Consciousness may be conceived of as originating at once with its Apperception. *All that this theory leaves to be desired is a more exact determination of the substrate of the specific affective qualities.* (Kulpe's Outlines of Psychology, pages 274-75.)

Kulpe thus says that if this substrate of the Apperceptive process could be found, Wundt's theory that Feeling is the reaction of that substrate would be the best theory of Feeling. Now, *Interest is this substrate of Apperception.* Interest is *that which apperceives,* and hence the lack in Wundt's view is supplied and *Feeling is seen to be affective Interest.*

Royce makes the same point that Kulpe makes against Wundt's Apperception: "Psychologists are interested," he says, "in a power whose influence upon mental phenomena seems to be of so ambiguous a character as that which the Wundtian *Apperception* possesses." (Royce's Outlines of Psychology, page 329.) But when Wundt's principle of Apperception is seen to be *cognitive Interest* the whole situation is simplified.

Hence it is maintained that all Feelings and Emotions are the development of the affective side of Interest.

Thus it is to be noticed that the aim of this chapter is, as is said in the first paragraph, to seek to

establish what may be termed a working basis for the genetic consideration of the Feelings and of the Emotions. The thesis has been presented that the Feelings and the Emotions are the development of the Affective Strain in Interest, with, of course, in the case of the Emotions, intellectual elements involved. It has been thought best to give full consideration to this basic position. If this be true, the genetic study of the Feelings and of the Emotions *must be found along this line.* The *fact of Instinctive Judgments is also to be considered in this connection. It is thought that the Instinctive Judgment is an explaining fact in the sphere of the Feelings and of the Emotions.* Reference is therefore made to the whole treatment of Cognition in these chapters, especially to the views advanced upon Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation and upon the Instinctive Judgment. Also the whole position as to Interest-Moments, Judgment-Clusters and Judgment-Bursts comes in as regards the genetic explanation of the Feelings and of the Emotions, which is given in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Genetic Explanation of the Feelings and of the Emotions.

Using the last chapter as the basis of work, the following Genetic Explanation of the Feelings and of the Emotions is given in mere outline. To attempt properly to work out this theory of the Genetic Development of the Feelings and of the Emotions, would require a volume. The position, therefore, is merely stated here, in order that future work may be attempted in this field.

(1) *The reader is requested to consider in this connection the chapters of this book which deal with The Instinctive Judgment.* (*Chapters X, XI, XII.*)

(2) *It is thought that The Instinctive Judgment is an explaining principle in the sphere the of Emotions and of the Feelings.*

(3) The vast complexity, especially of the Emotions, is so notable, that the greatest psychologists maintain that it is time wasted to attempt to classify them. There are such varieties of Feeling-Tinge, giving such complex emotional coloring, that the

attempt to properly classify the Emotions is vain. *But, as has been pointed out in another place, this complexity of Feeling-Tinge in any Emotion is just what should be, supposing that there are Instinctive Judgments and postulating that the explanation here given, of Cognition is correct. For the Emotion has developed by a series of Interest-Moments, each with its peculiar Feeling-Tinge being rapidly functioned through by Interest. The Emotion stands fully developed only by such a process as this and hence, it must necessarily have the complexity which we find it to possess.*

It is thus by the complex Feeling-Tinge, a part of which is gathered in each separate Interest-Moment that the Emotion is constituted. Just as the bee carries pollen, which is a mixture from many flowers since it has sipped the sweet of each, so Affective Interest gathers its Feeling-Tinge by a combination from the tinge of each Interest-Moment through which it passes.

(5) *In the course of the development of Envy, let us say, Interest functions through many Interest-Moments. There are many Judgment-Bursts. In each Interest-Moment or Judgment-Burst there is a new Tinge of Feeling. Now when the passage is rapid and when the Judgment-Bursts are instinctive, they become so numerous in a single second as to give an Affective*

Tinge of wonderful complexity. Thus, it is thought, the Emotions are developed.

The theory of the Emotions which James advanced in Psychology and which holds sway in psychological thought today, does not do justice to the facts of Mind at all. In no sense does the Emotion arise from the bodily expression. The bodily expression is but a reflex matter—a result from mentality on the physical. That which James and other thinkers seem to be striving after, in their insistence upon the inrush of bodily influences to account for the emotions, it is here held, is effected by the view of the Instinctive Judgment. There is an inrush, but it is all after Interest has been aroused, and hence, is all on the Mental side and it is an inrush that comes from the functioning processes of Interest itself as it sips up the Feeling-Tinges of countless Interest-Moments into a Single Tinge which we term an Emotion.

(6) Perhaps the best method of presenting my views as to the genetic treatment of the Feelings and Emotions, may be given by the study of the development of a single Emotion.

Suppose that in reading a book we come to a certain paragraph which has in it a most affecting description. The paragraph which closes the page,

let us say, has been of a distinctly ludicrous tone. We turn the leaf and now our eye catches the first word of the paragraph of which I speak, which is distinctly one which will engender, let us say, a sympathetic Emotion, by the time we read to the close of the paragraph. We have here then, an experimental opportunity to study the development of a sympathetic Emotion. As has been said, we knew nothing of the contents of this particular paragraph when we turned the page. The closing paragraph of the last page was, as has been said, distinctly ludicrous. Hence, here, in the space of one minute's reading, a sympathetic Emotion *will be absolutely produced from its very inception.* If we can discover how this single Emotion comes, we have insight into the development of the Emotions.

Now, the page itself, as we turn it, stands forth as the page of a book because of certain Interest-Moments in which Instinctive Judgment-Bursts come to the flashing forth by Interest of the Judgment-Cluster, which we call a "page." In this case Interest-Moments, Judgment-Bursts and Judgment-Cluster are seemingly all bound up together. They can, however, be readily differentiated by analysis. They give, as is said, the "page." The same occurs with the first word our eye catches on that page. There is still this series of almost in-

stantaneous Interest-Moments, instinctive Judgment-Bursts and the resulting Judgment-Cluster which constitutes for us the *meaning* of that one word.

Now, the above is the description of that which takes place, as word by word, we read the paragraph, spoken of. But in each and every Interest-Moment, since Interest makes that Interest-Moment and since Interest is affective as well as cognitive and conative, there is the Interest Feeling-Tinge. The Interest Feeling-Tinge in a particular Interest-Moment may predominate or may vary to all the extremes as regards the presence of much conation or cognition.

Now to continue the reference to the particular paragraph, which we are supposed to be reading. The first sentence which is read, simply because the mental process pursues its onward way along the lines above indicated, may, in its totality, give little of a distinctly Feeling-Tinge.

Interest here *may be almost altogether cognitive,* and in the primal instinctive Interest-Moments the cognitive element of Interest may predominate, and hence, as has been said, there may result, when the end of the first sentence of the paragraph of which we are speaking has been finished in our reading, no particular and distinctive Feeling-Tinge. But it is very probable that already the Feeling-Tinge has changed from the ludicrous which was ours a

moment since as we read the preceding paragraph on the preceding page. The Interest-Moments of this first sentence have had their effect on our Feeling-Tinge already, and in fact may have given already the trend toward an Emotion we call Sympathetic.

The second sentence is now read. There are the same kind of mental processes as in the case of the first sentence—the same wonderful and almost inconceivable rapidity of the simplest operations, already described, go on. There are Interest-Moments, Judgment-Clusters (with their primal raw material of sensation [affective]), and Judgment-Bursts which result in the beginning of Interest-Moments and the repetition of the same thing as before. *In every one of these Judgment-Clusters there is flashed forth what has been termed Instinctive Co-efficient Judgments.* Thus, this paragraph which we are reading may be descriptive of the sufferings of Columbus in his imprisonment. We reach the word "Columbus," and there are in the Judgment-Cluster, which constitutes the concept "Columbus," certain Instinctive Co-efficient Judgments which are the test of a thing remembered. Thus, it is repeated, the wonderful rapidity of these simple primal operations go on. On through the gates of each Interest-Moment, Interest flashes its way. Judgment-Clus-

ters are flashed forth—Judgment-Bursts come, and, through the gates of another Interest-Moment, Interest passes on, gathering in each Interest-Moment a shade of Feeling-Tinge, until, now that the paragraph's close is reached, and the brief description of how Columbus suffered in his prison has been read, there *is in our minds a well-developed sympathetic Emotion.*

This, it is thought, is a genetic explanation of the origin of any particular Emotion in our Mind at any time.

It is also the genetic explanation of the origin of Emotions.

Now, when it is remembered that our Interest may really take in several seconds of time, and that hence there is in the synthetic grasp of Interest complex systems of Judgment-Clusters, *i. e.*, systems of what are usually termed concepts, one can readily see how wonderful the complexity of the Emotions must be.

Of course the proper explanation of this position, as regards the development of the Feelings and Emotions, would require critical consideration of all other theories and proper amplification of positions in this chapter which have, because of the necessities of space, been compressed into a sentence or two.

The author does not wish to be misunderstood as to his position. The positions advanced are the result of mature deliberation, but they cover so wide an extent that necessarily the proper opportunity to present arguments and proofs is not now at hand. A busy man, who has many duties upon him, may, perhaps be pardoned for merely stating, in brief outline, some of his thought. It is hoped that the opportunity may be found to take up the views here presented as to the genetic development of the Feelings and of the Emotions, and to give them proper support in critical examination and discussion of other positions and in presentation of arguments and illustrations.

CHAPTER XV.

The Principle of Interest is the Psychological Ego.

(This thesis is one of my earliest positions as regards Interest. During the spring and summer of 1904 it was worked upon, and much material was gathered for a very much fuller presentation than that contained here. In order, however, that a glance may be given at Interest Philosophy, in the latter part of this work, the treatment of this subject is abridged.

This thesis is contained in my paper at the Hopkins, and several paragraphs of this chapter are taken therefrom.

Strict Psychology, of course, asks only after the Psychological Ego. The question of the Pure Ego, or of the Soul is for the domain of Philosophy. In the Philosophical section of this volume the Philosophy of Interest itself is taken up. Just as Consciousness itself has not the capacity in and of itself to originate, so the very Spontaneity of Interest must depend on something deeper.)

JAMES' POSITION.

(a) Argument from James' Teachings as to the Self.

"The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is tempted to call by the name of *ME.*—In the widest possible sense a man's self is the sum total of all that he can call his." (James' Psychology, Vol. I, page 291.)

In his Chapter on "The Consciousness of Self," James argues at length that the Self is one's *Interests.* Thus things in which one is supremely interested in one's *Self* or *various Selves*, according to James.

But if the Self is identical with one's *Interests,* the Psychological Ego which builds up the *Self* or *Me* is necessarily the *Principle of Interest.* It is only by Interest attaching itself to an object that that object becomes "*an Interest.*" Now, if these Interests constitute the *Me*, the Psychological Ego, which is the Psychological Subject as regards this "Me," is the Principle of Interest.

(b) Argument from James' view that the Passing Thought is the Thinker, or Psychological Ego.

James holds that, psychologically, "*the passing Thought is the Thinker.*"

"For how would it be if the Thought, the present Judging Thought, instead of being in any way substantially or transcendentally identical with the former owner of the past Self, merely inherited his title and thus stood as his legal representative now? It would then, if its birth coincided exactly with the death of another owner, find the last Self already its own as soon as it found it at all, and the past Self would never be wild, but always owned by a title that never lapsed. We can imagine a long succession of herdsmen coming rapidly into possession of the same cattle by transmission of an original title by bequest. May not the title of a *collective Self be passed from one Thought to another in some analogous way?*

"It is a patent fact of Consciousness that a transmission like this actually occurs. Each pulse of Cognitive Consciousness, each Thought, dies away and is replaced by another. It is, as Kant says, as if electric balls were to have not only motion but knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit both its motion and its consciousness to a second, which took both up into *its* consciousness and passed them to a third, until the last ball held all that the other balls had, and realized it as its own." (James' Psychology, Vol. I, page 339.)

Now, as against James:

(1) James does not make it absolutely clear whether the "Passing Thought" is on the Process or on the Content side of Consciousness. It would seem, however, that this "Passing Thought" stands in his estimation, on what we would call the Content side of Consciousness, for he speaks of the title of a collective Self being passed from *One Thought* to another. If it be meant that this "Passing Thought" is on the Content side, his position is plainly wrong, for Content cannot of itself and by itself generate Content.

(2) If he means by the "Passing Thought" the Passing Thinking, the criticism is that to make this the Psychological Subject or the Ego is to leave out of the question all reference to the Spontaneity of Feeling and of Conation. It is to commit, on the side of Cognition, the same error which so many have committed as regards Conation—*i. e.*, to make one expression of the Psychological Ego, the Psychological Ego itself.

(3) Supposing the question of the Soul to be referred to Philosophy where it properly belongs, there is nothing which Psychology can find as the Thinker save the Principal of Interest. It fulfills all the conditions which James lays down. The Present Interest which a mind has is heir to the

Past. It will bequeath its possessions by means of what Stout calls "Mental Dispositions" to the Interest of the next moment. This Interest has the appropriating power of which James speaks. It is not a mere Thought on the Content side of Consciousness. It belongs to the Process side. It is in its nature, as has been seen, Conative, Affective and Cognitive and hence meets the conditions of the Psychological Ego.

(c) The view of many Psychologists as to the Psychological Ego is that it is Conative.

It would seem that biological explanation of Psychology has been carried much too far. Twenty years since Life was explained in terms of Matter. Today Mind is being explained in terms of mere biological Life. The question is raised whether, after all, just as the attempt to explain Life from a materialistic standpoint has failed, the view that Mind is to be interpreted biologically will not also pass. *The fundamental law may be posited that all biological explanations affect merely the conditions of the Mind's activities.* This biological fact or that is nothing more than a stimulus to arouse Mind. *Mind in its entity does not stand in any of these biological facts which are so much insisted upon.* James'

theory of the Emotions, for instance, deals with the inrushing tide of stimulations from the body. But the Emotions are not in the body or a part of the body. The inrushing mass of stimulation from bodily processes can do no more than arouse Interest *and after that has been touched the Emotions themselves are born.* Because of this trend of the times to explain Mind from a biological point of view it has been very easy to make Conation (striving) *the* fundamental feature of Mind. The protoplasm and the animal *strives* after food, etc., and hence it is thought that all higher mentality must be described in terms of this *striving.* It has been forgotten that in man the physical *striving comes after a mental image* (*Cognition*) *has given the idea of striving and that therefore there is Cognition intermingled with all mental striving.* So, as is pointed out at length in the Chapter on The Fallacies of Conation, many authorities posit Conation as the fundamental fact in Psychology.

Hence the supposition that the Psychological Ego is mere Conation—that it is mere striving with Cognition and Feeling afterwards worked in, is not an uncommon one among our psychological authorities. Moreover, many think that the point of transition from mere life reflexes to mentality is seen in Conation or striving and *that, if it cannot be shown that*

Matter passes gradually into Life, it can, at least, be shown that mere Life passes gradually into Mentality. Against this view, these Chapters insist that with all mental striving there is at least inchoate Cognition—that Interest is the Basic Principle, and that *for mere Life to develop into Mind it must be shown how mere reflexes develop into Interest.* It is not said this cannot be shown, but it is held that the *indications seem to be that, just as fuller discussion has caused admission that Evolution has a break between Matter and Life, so fuller investigation of the nature of even rudimentary Interest will show another break in Evolution's chain, i. e., between the mere reflexes of biological Life and Mind.*

Hence, it is maintained that the very common view that Conation is the Psychological Ego is incorrect. One expression of the Psychological Ego, the Willing expression, is taken to be the whole of the Psychological Ego. This is plainly fallacious.

(d) Argument from Bradley's Position as to the Psychological Ego.

It can be readily seen that Bradley's view is that the Self is identical with our Interests. Thus he says: "We may say, generally, the Self here is that in which it feels its chief Interest. For this is both

indivisible from and prominent in its inmost being." (Bradley's Appearance and Reality, page 96.)

But the argument used in the consideration of James' position applies here also. If the Psychological Self be our Interests, the Psychological Ego must be the Principle of Interest which builds up these Interests.

Yet Bradley's search for what he calls the essential Self (by which he can only mean the Psychological Ego) is vain.

He says: "But this inner nucleus is not separated from the average Self of the man by any line that can be drawn." (Appearance and Reality, page 81.) My point, however, is that there is a distinct separation between the Psychological Ego and its Content.

Moreover, Bradley, in approaching the problem of the Psychological Ego from the point of view of Subject and Object, finds the relations of Subject and Object one he cannot explain and hence he finds no light as to the Psychological Ego here. He maintains that Subject and Object have contents and are actual psychical groups (page 89.) His view is that anything in the psychic mass may pass over to become Subject or may be Object, and that Subject and Object arise merely by the shifting of the psychic mass. (Appearance and Reality, pages 92-93.) It would seem that Bradley leaves out of

question all reference to that which produces the "psychic mass." The view here is that everything turns on just what Bradley leaves out of view—that this "psychic mass" is the product of the Physiological Ego and that, however, much of mere "Appearance," according to Bradley's view, there may be about the "psychic mass" itself, the Interest which produces it, is a Reality, and the Basic Reality for Philosophy.

Again, Bradley says: "The question is whether we can state the existence and continuity of a real Self in a way which is not ruined by the difficulties of previous discussions." (Appearance and Reality, page 113.)

It is thought that the view given here, in connection with the whole treatment of Interest in these pages, meets Bradley's demands. Positing Interest as the Psychological Ego explains the mass of facts and answers the question as to what the Psychological Ego or Subject is, and answers this question in so simple a way that a child may understand. This matter of simplicity is important, for whenever, in dealing with psychological or philosophical problems, plain and simple statements cannot be made, it means that we are in the domain of fog and not of true science.

(e) Argument from Royce's Views as to the Psychological Ego.

Royce really stands with James and Bradley in identifying the Self with one's Interests. Thus Royce says :

"By a man's Self you mean a certain totality of facts, viewed as more or less immediately given and distinguished from the rest of the world of Being. There facts may be predominantly corporeal facts, such as the man himself and also his neighbors may observe and comment upon. In this sense my countenance and my physical deeds, my body and my clothing—all these may be regarded as more or less a part of myself." (Royce's The World and the Individual, page 257.)

Again he says : "There is the equally empirical and phenomenal self of the inner life, the series of states of Consciousness and the feelings, thoughts, desires, memories, emotions, moods." (The World and the Individual, page 257.)

Hence it is seen that really to Royce also one's *Interests* constitute one's Self.

But as to the problem of the Pyschological Ego, Royce is also far afield. He says : "No purely rational principle guides us in defining the Self

from moment to moment in the world of common sense or in distinguishing it from not-Self. But there still does remain one psychological principle running through all these countless facts and explaining in general both why they vary, and why we always suppose, despite the chaos of experience, that the Self of our inner and entire life preserves a genuine although to us a hidden unity." (The World and the Individual, 260.)

"This psychological principle is the single one that in us men the distinction between self and not-self has a predominantly social origin and implies a more or less obviously present contrast between what we at any moment view as the life of another person, a fellow being, or as what you may for a short time in general call "him," an alter, and the life which by contrast with that of the alter is just then viewed as the life of the Present Ego." (The World and the Individual, 260.)

Now, the play between the Ego and the Alter may give the *idea of self*, *i. e.*, Self-Consciousness. This Self-Consciousness means Interest in Self. But the *idea of Self* and the Self-Principle—the Psychological Ego—are very different things. A man who never saw another, and who, hence, never had an opportunity to obtain an idea of Self, would still

have a Psychological Ego, and the question Royce is on is as to the nature of this Ego. Hence he is greatly afield in giving Dr. Baldwin's explanation of society as the explanation of the Ego. The situation as regards Royce is just this—he starts out to consider the Ego, but really considers the *idea of the Ego which one has.*

Our question is not how my idea of myself developed, but what the Psychological Ego is, and Royce does not touch this point.

No idea of Self gathered from others gives a unity to a Mind. This unity is given by the Physhological Ego, and this must be the Principle of Interest.

(f) Ward's Views as to the Psychological Ego.

Ward's view is that the dualism of Subject and Object must not be investigated. He says: "We start then with this duality of Subject and Object in the unity of experience. What a Subject without an Object or what an Object without a Subject would be, is, indeed, as we are often told, unknowable; for, in truth, the knowledge of either apart is a contradiction. It is their unity that especially interests us, for we look to this to free us from the perplexities of dualism." (Ward's Agnosticism and Naturalism, page 119.)

Now, his arguments in this passage just quoted for the absolute inseparability of Subject and Object, even as regards scientific consideration, are two. To the first argument, that one without the other is unknowable, the test of fact has to be applied, and when it is applied, it seems that it is readily seen that the Psychological Subject is Interest, and the Object is, or tends to be, Interests.

Ward's second argument is, that because the Subject and Object are inseparable we are saved from the dualism of Mind and Matter. But, however much the good may be that an error accomplishes, that good does not cause the error to become truth. So let us suppose that by positing the inseparability of Subject and Object we are freed from dualism. The question still stands open as to the justice of such a declaration that Subject and Object must not be considered apart.

Again Ward says: "We infer that the distinction between Subject and Object is not given in our earliest sensation. The sensation felt is all that the infant at first is conscious of; it tastes before it perceives the cause of the taste; there is no distinction of Subject and Object, of the Ego and the Non-Ego." (Page 224.)

This is very true. But because the bee does not distinguish itself from the flower upon which it

rests, are we to say that the bee and the flower must not be distinguished by Science? The question of the Psychological Ego is not as to when that Ego distinguishes itself from the Non-Ego, but as to what principle of the Mind constitutes this Ego.

Ward, continuing this same subject, says: "You cannot dismember percepient and percept, individual Subject and concrete Object, into two distinct and separate things—the attempt leaves us with an indeterminate X on the one side, which we have no right to call a Subject, and on the other an indeterminate X which has as little claim to be called an Object." (Ward's Agnosticism and Naturalism, page 198.)

Here then is a spot where the investigator's foot must not tread. Ask questions concerning all things else, but Subject and Object must ever be studied as a union! As to what they are, individually, you must not ask! And why this caution? Why is this ground sacred? This answer comes back: The attempt (*i. e.*, to study them apart) leaves us with an indeterminate X on either side. This position means simply that one is not to attempt to study them apart, for if he makes the attempt, he will fail. But Science is not accustomed to decide, because there has been failure along a certain line in the past, that effort must cease. It

seems that when we posit Interest as the Psychological Subject or Ego, having already, from several authorities, learned that Interests constitute the Psychological Self, we have, so far as Psychology is concerned, the solution of the problem.

Hence, against all the great School of Empirical Psychologists who maintain that a Subject in Psychology cannot be found or that a Subject is unnecessary, it is insisted that here, in the Principle of Interest, we have a Psychological Subject. It may be stated, in this connection, that this has bearing on our ideas of the Subject of all. The view held by many thinkers today that since there is no Subject in Psychology, the idea of Causation is essentially wrong, is seen to have no support. There is a Subject in Psychology, and hence our concept of Causation is correct, and we have firm ground beneath our feet when we ask as to the Subject of things—as to even the first cause of things. It is also seen that the usual view that there is something which produces things is psychologically correct. In Psychology itself, it is the Principle of Interest which produces the Mental Object. Since we here find justification for our inquiry as to what it is which, psychologically considered, produces the Mental Object, we are absolutely within the scientific field when the problem of what produces Mind and Matter is

taken up. Science cannot rule this question out of Court simply because the answer may not be forthcoming. To thus find the psychological Subject, and to find it producing Mental Objects, stamps, as absolutely scientific, the pursuit of the question as to the Subject of all. If we cannot in this pursuit find that which is absolutely and clearly the answer, the scientific spirit insists that we build our best hypothesis. This question as to the best hypothesis of causation being forced upon us by rigid Science itself we have to examine all hypotheses. Among these hypotheses is that which the Church holds of Creation by an Omnipotent Being. Scientifically, this hypothesis must be examined, and if it seems the *most reasonable*—the one most capable of defense, the scientific spirit will impel scientific thinkers to accept it as Science. Great hypotheses which yet lack absolute verification stand as scientific truth in Physics, Biology, Astronomy, Botany, Geology, Psychology, etc., etc.

It would seem that we are in danger in this day of having Science neglect even to consider the explaining hypotheses which the Church has, while the Church neglects to consider the explaining hypothesis which Science has. Truth is Truth, whether Science or the Church holds it.

Scientific Philosophy has to ask after the Subject of all, for we find, as has been said, that which in Psychology shows itself as the Subject. Now, if, after all things have been considered, if after all the facts that can be reviewed have been reviewed and in it all one keeps himself honest and holds no brief for either side, one comes to a matured conviction that the best and most truthful view which can be held is that which the Church holds—that of a Being as the Subject of all, who is Omnipotent, it is here maintained that that conviction has been reached in a scientific way.

CHAPTER XVI.

Interest in Other Individuals is the Basic Principle of Social Psychology.

(The following paper, in which Rousseau's Social Contract was reviewed, is part of the paper read in the Hopkins Psychological Seminary in May of 1904, as the completion of my year's work in Social Psychology.

In the discussion which followed the reading of the paper, the point was raised that Rousseau's Interest here was but Self-Interest. My reply was that that criticism struck the weak point of my paper, but that if the criticism was a correct one, and if Rousseau's Interest, which he made the cause of the Social Contract or Society were mere Self-Interest, a distinctly new thesis position was left me, in the view that Psychological Interest in Individuals is the Basic Principle in Social Psychology.

A careful examination of this paper will, I think, convince one that Rousseau is speaking of Self-Interest when he makes Interest the socializing force.

Hence, my position at the head of this Chapter stands as a thesis position.)

While Bosanquet stands with Rousseau in maintaining a General Will, he forsakes the Social Contract view of the origin of that Will.

The book in which de Greef insists upon Contract as the explanation of Society, is not in any of the Baltimore libraries. Barth, however, in his Sociology as the Philosophy of History, gives a brief statement of de Greef's position.

The Contract idea to him is the idea of volition. He maintains that the socializing power is the voluntary act. Barth says however, that de Greef has this idea only in the germ, giving little attention to it. It is not necessary, however, to give special attention to de Greef's view, since it is not comprehensive enough, as an explanation of sociality, for it leaves out of view the whole field of instinctive sociality.

However, it is plain, that men who never knew each other cannot upon their first meeting become socialized or develop a general Will merely by willing to do so. By willing to be social they would have Rousseau's will of all, but not Rousseau's General Will.

Hence, having glanced at Bosanquet's and de Greef's explanation of the development of the General Will or of Society, and finding them unsatisfactory, we turn to Rousseau.

As has been stated, Rousseau's explanation of the General Will, is the Social Contract. The logical order of his great themes is this :

(1) The state of Nature.

(2) The Social Contract.

(3) The Social Contract produces the General Will.

(4) Sovereignty, which is the exercise of the General Will.

(5) Government—the agent of the General Will—the means by which the sovereignty of the General Will operates.

Certainly one reason why Rousseau employed the idea of a Contract as the solution of the General Will was, that it was an idea current in literature—it was a kind of ready-made explanation that especially suited his views as to government, and he was far more interested in giving an explanation of government than of the General Will. If government depended upon a Contract, those who wrote the Contract, could abrogate it. The theory of government and of sovereignty which he gave, was all things considered, the most powerful factor in

superinducing and continuing the French Revolution. Hence, since this explanation of the General Will in terms of the Social Contract looked really to a Theory of the State we must not look for a scientific formulation as regards the Social Contract.

To Hobbes the Contract was an act of surrender on the part of the many to one or to a number—to Rousseau it was an act of association among equals who remained equals, and this constituted Civil Society.

It has been seen that Rousseau makes the Social Contract the explanation of Society or the General Will. But what does he make the Explanation of the Social Contract? This, after all, is the fundamental question, for the Social Contract is but a fiction and hence, the question as to what he makes the cause of the Social Contract, is really a question as to *what he makes fundamental to the General Will. This question, which I now take up, none of the commentators* of Rousseau so much as raise. True, Bosanquet, in one division, does glance at the point, but he does not bring out the logical relations of Rousseau's position.

Morley sees nothing worth considering in the General Will, and, of course, he does not bother about what Rousseau may have held as the explanation of the Social Contract.

Now the point I wish to make is that Rousseau showed his genius not simply, as Bosanquet maintains, by grasping the fact of a General Will—there is intuitive genius in that—but also by giving an explanation of the Social Contract, and hence of society also, which should cause him to be classed with those who have sought psychological explanation of Society. His explanation of the Social Contract, *i. e.*, of Society, is so simple and commonplace, that one is certain to overlook it unless, because of special reasons, his attention is drawn to it. Because for a long time I have been interested in the subject of Interest, my attention was drawn to what is Rousseau's explanation of the Social Contract. In a word, his position, which can hardly be called his position, since he does not emphasize it or in any sense show that he realizes that he is doing more than dealing in hackneyed facts, is this: Interest lies at the *base of the Social Contract*, which means, since he makes the Social Contract the cause of the General Will, that *Interest is the socializing Cause.*

I have made this statement only after a careful examination of Rousseau's statements. In order for me to substantiate it, it will be necessary to quote a number of passages.

"If scattered individuals are necessarily enslaved by a single man, in whatever number it may be, I see in it only a people and its chief; it is, if you please, an aggregation, but not an association (*i. e.*, not society), there is neither public property nor political body. This man, had he enslaved half the world, would still be an individual; his *Interest* separated from that of others, is always a *private Interest.* Should this man die, his empire would remain after him, scattered and without union." (Social Contract, Book I, chap. 5.)

Here the reason why this aggregation is not socialized is, Rousseau says: "That the ruler's *Interest* is a *private* Interest."

"As soon as this multitude is thus united, (*i. e.*, by the Social Contract into a body), one of the members cannot be injured without attacking the body, and still less can the body be injured without the members feeling its effects. Thus Duty and *Interest* alike oblige the two contracting parties to mutually aid each other." (Book I, Chapter 7, page 4.)

"In fact each individual can, as man, have an individual Will contrary to or different from the General Will which he has as a citizen: his individual *Interest* may speak quite differently from the Common Interest." (Book I, Chapter 7, page 7.)

That is, the Common Interest produces the General Will.

"There is often a great difference between the Will of all and the General Will: one regards the common Interest only; the other regards private Interests." (Book II, Chapter 3, page 2.)

"Why is the General Will always right and why do all desire constantly the happiness of each, unless it is because there is no person who does not appropriate to himself the word each, and *who does* not think of himself *while voting for all?* Which proves that equality of rights and the notion of justice produced by it, comes from the *preference each gives to himself* and *consequently from the nature* of man. (Books II, 4, 6.) Here is Interest.

There are several passages in which Rousseau describes the destruction of the General Will. "But when the social knot begins to relax and the state to weaken, when individual Interests commence to be felt, and small societies to influence the great, the Common *Interest* changes and finds opponents—the General Will is no longer the Will of all."

"Finally when the state, near its fall, exists only by a vain and illusory form; when the social tie is broken in all hearts, when the vilest *Interests* flaunt boldly in the name of public welfare, then the *Gen-*

eral Will becomes silent * * * Iniquitous decrees are passed falsely under the name of law, which have for their object, individual Interests only * * * Each in detaching his own Interest from the Common Interest sees that he cannot separate it entirely * * * This particular good excepted, he desires the general well-being for his own Interest as strongly as any other." (Book 4, 1, 6.)

There are two passages which of themselves would suffice to show that Rousseau naturally turned to Interest as the explanation of Society.

"The citizens having but one Interest, the people but one Will." (Book 4, 2, 3.)

"Only the General Will can direct the forces of the state according to the object of its establishment, which is the common good; for if the opposition of individual Interests had rendered the establishment of societies necessary, it is the accord of these same Interests which has rendered it possible. *It is what is common in their different Interests which forms the the Social Tie; and if they were not in accord, no Society could exist.*" (Book 2, 1, 1.)

It would seem that Rousseau's position can be worked into a complete description of socialization with Dr. Baldwin's position as a part of that whole.

(1) The material that is socialized is thoughts. (Baldwin.)

(2) The method of association is the "self-thought" situation—Imitative and Invention being the ways in which the "self-thought" situation is worked out. (Baldwin.)

(3) Then comes in Rousseau's position that Interest is the *socializing force* which causes Imitation and Invention, produces the "self-thought" situation and makes Society.

(The question as to Rousseau's meaning when he uses Interest stands open for consideration. If, as has been said, he means only Self-Interest, I have a clear field for the thesis that Psychological Interest in Others is the Basic Explaining Principle in Social Psychology.)

CHAPTER XVII.

Interest, the Basic Principle of Psychology, is, by its own Nature, the Basic Principle of the Philosophies.

The "I" (the question of what this "I" is in its essential nature, is considered in the last chapter of this book,) and the "me" or the "self" are, according to the view herein presented, the Principle of Interest on the one hand and one's Interests on the other. James has a long chapter on one's Interests being one self, *i. e.*, *the me.*

Now when we come to examine this *me* (our Interests) we find that it is, in a sense, identical with the *Mental Object.*

Suppose a man had never had a single glint of the idea that he has a physical body. Would he, in his "me" or "self," whatever else of content he had there, have the idea that the body entered into the "me" as part of it? The answer is plainly negative. Never having had, as a Mental Object, the thought of his body, his "me" or "self" would contain no thought of a body.

But let a man's only Mental Object, *i. e.*, his subject of constant thought, be his body and his body becomes the whole of the "me" or "self," for him. If, on the other hand, God be made the single Mental Object—*the one Interest* to which one's Principle of Interest clings—God has become to this man his "me" or "self."

(It is stated in the preface that the view is held that Psychology looked at, as in these papers, finds striking agreement with the Psychology of Paul and of Christ. This thesis has not been fully developed and is not now presented. But here it may be said that the New Birth of the Bible affects this "me" or "self"—*i. e.*, affects the *Interests* which constitute the "me." The individual's *Interests* are changed in the hour of the New Birth, however men may explain it. But to change his Interests is to change the "me"—the "self." Hence here is a New Birth. According to this view a man's Mental Objects after the New Birth must be different, for these constitute the self. But the New Testament insists on this very point—that the test of the New Birth is heavenly-mindedness—*i. e.*, new and better Mental Objects.

But the view of these papers is that the Mental Object is the product of Interest. Hence to change the trend of Mental Objects, to revolutionize their

character, means that the Principle of Interest itself is affected in the New Birth. This point is here inserted in order that it may be insisted that New Testament Psychology may be thought over from this standpoint.)

But the point which I wish to make is this, that the Sciences and Philosophies have their centre in the Principle of Interest.

The Principle of Interest stands as the Nexus *of the Sciences and of the Philosophies.* The three Great Concepts, Matter, Man (all Life) and God, are in themselves and in their ramifications the Basic Concepts of the Sciences and of the Philosophies. Yet even in the Sciences, Interest stands in the midst. There is a Science of geology, not merely because there is an earth, but also because there are the two concepts, Interest and the earth. The side of Consciousness (Interest) is usually presupposed as regards the Sciences, but it is none the less true that one of the two basic concepts in geology is *Interest.* Let mind be different from what it is and the Science of geology would be different.

All that the Science of electricity can give is this, Interest in its relation to electricity. There may be ranges of electrical fact which Human Interest (knowledge) cannot reach after; if so, they are

beyond the bounds of this Science. This is true also of all the Sciences. The limits of the possibilities of a Science may lie either on the side of the basic concept Interest, or on the side of the basic concept which distinguishes this particular Science from other Sciences.

There may be either no possibilities of Interest to reach after all the possibilites of electricity, or on the other hand, no possibilities of electricity for all the possibilities of Interest to reach after.

The Principle of Interest stands as the centre, not only of the Sciences, but also of the Philosophies.

(1) There is the Philosophy of Matter. The basic explaining Principle here is Interest—not because it is maintained that Interest is a part of Matter, or because it is held Interest dwells in rocks and mountains, etc., but because the only approach man has to Matter is through Interest. All that is known of Matter is what Interest's (the Mind's) interpreting power gives us.

It is held that the Philosophy of Matter must be written with the understanding that one of the basic explaining Principles of Matter, so far as we know, is Interest. For Interest might have turned to vibrations of the ether lower than those we have in the solar spectrum, and thus all our color world would have been entirely different. Could not Inter-

est have fixed itself upon something in that sphere we call Matter, which it has never been attached to, and so has never made into a Reality? And if this be possible, as it is, why may it not have been possible for the whole of Interest to have fixed itself upon something absolutely different from all that we now call Matter, and then our Sciences of Matter would be entirely different. The bird, Interest, has winged its way through the great void—that which it has seen and felt, it has called Reality or Matter. But its way could have been winged along another route, and that it saw and felt would have been a world entirely different from our so-called world of Reality. Hence it is maintained that the very Philosophies of Matter must posit Interest as an explaining Principle.

(2) There are the Philosophies which deal with man. Here, too, the basic explaining Principle is Interest. *Interest in the Man, i. e., Interest in Others,* has rendered possible all Sciences appertaining to Society.

Hence the Philosophies of the Sciences respecting Man must start with *Interest as the Basic Principle,* adding in each case the *Concept, which is the fundamental one of the particular Science.* Thus the

Philosophy of Social Psychology finds its basic explaining Principle to be *Interest in Others.*

(3) There are the Philosophies which deal with Divinity. Here, too, it is held Interest in its relationship to Divinity must be studied.

It is not held that matter is not a Reality, but it is thought that Psychological Idealism is true. Therefore the question is raised whether there is not just this same mediate knowledge of what is termed "Spiritual Realities."

The view herein presented is that the Mind (Interest) is not a mere heavy-footed plodder, tied by its own weight to the material and bound by its own nature to the mere bodily and earthly, dependent upon materialistic, physical and biological explanations for the secret of its activities; but that it is a light-winged bird of incomparable rapidity of flight which has senses for the material, it is true. But may it not have senses for regions higher—regions which we call eternal?

Because the Philosophies find in Human Interest their common basic Principle, Philosophy finds its synthetic point in Interest, and we have naturally Synthetic Interest Philosophy.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Problems Concerning the Principle of Interest.

(Read in the Hopkins Psychological Seminary, November 29, 1904.)

Sixteen years ago I faced one of the greatest problems concerning Interest I think I ever faced. This problem was how I, as a public speaker, could cause my hearers to become *interested* in what I said, and that problem lives with me today.

The second problem concerning Interest which I faced all these years is this: How to *interest* men, *in order to manage men.*

The third problem concerning Interest which I faced was this: How to place Interest as fundamentally in Psychology, as I knew it to be in practical Life, and how to do this scientifically. The thesis that Interest is "The *Mental Dynamic or Law of Physic Progressions Determining the Construction of Every Mental Object,*" was my endeavor to answer this problem.

My fourth problem respecting Interest was what Interest was, if it determined Mental Objects.

With Interest *right up against the Mental Object,* as was the case, in the view that Interest was the

Mental Dynamic, this great problem as to what Interest was, I faced in my thinking.

So I hit upon the view that *Interest is the Nexus of the Mind, holding all together, and that Interest is the Psychological Ego.* But the question I ever carried with me was as to how Interest could determine Mental Objects, if it were only Conative, or if it were only Conative and Affective. So, I came to see, as I think, *that Interest is Cognitive also.*

I reached, also, the view that *Interest is the Apperceiving Principle, and then, that Interest and Consciousness are identical.*

Now as to whether Interest is Cognitive:

(1) To suppose that Interest, defined as affective—conative process, can deal directly with Mental Objects, involves, to my mind, a fallacy. It is established, as certainly as anything in all Psychology, that the cognitive function deals directly with Mental Objects. Then, if this be true, that the cognitive function constructs mental objects, and if Interest constructs mental objects, Interest must be Cognitive.

(2) The axiom must be admitted that *whatever deals directly with meanings, is Cognitive.* The very nature of an idea is to have *meaning—meaning makes the idea.* Now, to say that conative-affective

process deals directly with *meaning* is, to my mind, impossible. I can only say what seems to me to be the case.

(3) But, again, my view is that Psychology does not start with *Interest and the Object*, but with *Interest*.

It is true that when Interest stands forth as developed Interest, there is objective reference. But Science is not content to take a swarm of bees, as it clusters on the limb of a tree, and study that as a whole—it will do that of course. Just so Science can never be content to take Interest and the Object together and say, as, for instance, Ward does, in one of his volumes, in regard to Subject and Object, that you must not ask questions about them—that you must take the two together. Science insists that it has a right to ask, not only about that cluster of bees, as a whole, but also about each bee and about the constituent part even of each bee.

Just so my view is that we are forced by the scientific spirit to study, examine and differentiate the dualism of Interest and the Object.

But, moreover, to start Psychology with Interest (as conative-affective process), and the Object *is, paradoxical as the statement may be, not to start with mere Interest, (conative-affective) and the Object.*

For *in the very fact of the Object* being there, Cognition is involved. Certainly there can be no Object without Cognition. Hence, in starting with Interest (conative-affective) and the Object, there is the fallacy, it seems to me, of starting also with Cognition.

Now as this Cognition has to inhere in Interest (there being nothing else for it to inhere in) this means that really my position, that Interest is Cognitive as well as conative-affective, is fallen into.

Another problem concerning Interest.

But a question which is very important in Psychology is as to whether our knowledge of the external world is immediate. The usual teaching of the psychologists is that we are immediately conscious of externality. There is much to be said in favor of that view. The long line of illustrious names of those, who stand for the view that knowledge is immediate, give one cause to pause in proposing to think even of a different view. The new psychologists are almost a unit in maintaining that immediate knowledge is the true view. He who holds to Idealism among the psychologists has to take his stand with the little company in which Spencer is the central figure. Of course, it is different as regards the philosophers. The same man, it

may be, will be as a psychologist keenly insistent on the immediacy of knowledge, and as a philosopher, a rank Idealist. One hardly, therefore, knows where to take his place. Yet sometime or other he must, if he is to think for himself, decide or seek to decide whether Idealism or Realism in Psychology is right, and in the Genetic study of Psychology he must decide early in the action.

The philosopher is swung toward Idealism by his view and theories of Matter. If Matter be not what it seems—if there be not being there, but mere motion—if all that Matter has is but attributes, as it were—if Matter be but electric points the philosopher has ready reason to declare that our so-called knowledge of a tree or of a horse is not immediate.

But, of course, this whole argument of the philosopher turns upon the nature of the Matter. Change your theory of Matter and, it may be, your theory of knowledge would also change. Hence, you make your Psychology wait upon your Physics and you are in the position where certain results cannot be hoped for. How frequently the theories concerning Matter have changed—they are changing today. Twenty years from this time they may be teaching, in the Physical Department of this University, theories entirely different from those held now. If this Psychological Department must, for its theory

as to the mediacy or immediacy of knowledge, wait upon the deliverances of the Department of Physics, we would be in bad shape indeed.

Then too, if you take your stand as a Psychological Idealist with Spencer, let us say, you are in danger of feeling that your great and distinguished companion is where he is, in great part, because he wanted a good evolutionary explanation of the Mind, and finding one in the hierarchies of feeling which he imagined were built up one on another, he was content to live and die on the Idealistic side in Psychology, not so much from an absolute scientific and critical examination of that view as because it suited him.

The view which I hold, that Interest is Consciousness, does not give much light here. I have made a study of this question of the immediacy of knowledge from the standpoint of each one of at least three different thesis subjects of mine—from the standpoint that Interest is the Nexus of the Mind—that Interest is the Apperceiving Principle, and that Interest is the Psychological Ego, and I have to confess that while my faith in the teaching as to immediate knowledge of the External world has been shaken, I do not see my way absolutely clear as to the matter of Psychological Idealism. I believe, however, that when the opportunity

presents itself for me to take time to properly classify, in my own thinking, the arguments, pro and con, that Psychological Idealism will have another humble believer.

(1) The philosophers are largely in favor of Idealism.

(2) The psychologists, in great part are of uncertain sound on this subject—it would seem that many prefer to bear the ills they know than fly to others that they know not of in Psychological Idealism.

(3) The identification of Sensation (affective) and Perception (cognitive) is certainly fallacious.

(The treatment on Psychological Idealism of Chapter VIII was written after this paper was read and expresses my matured convictions on that subject. I therefore refer to that in this connection.)

CHAPTER XIX.

The Principle of Interest is the Psychological Subject.

(This thesis is one contained in the paper submitted at the Hopkins, October, 1904. No farther development is given than that contained in that paper. Of course what this Psychological Subject is, in itself, is considered in the philosophical section where it is held that Interest is an expression of something deeper.)

Ward in his celebrated Article in the Encyclopedia Brittanica stands emphatically for a Subject in Psychology. But what the Subject is, psychologically, which many psychologists realize must be posited, he cannot say.

Stout, in his last Psychology (1903), takes the position held by many that investigation as to a Psychological Subject is fruitless.

Now in Cognition, the Subject, so far as Psychology can discover it, is Interest. The extended

treatment of Interest as the Psychological Subject, given under the topic of Interest as the Psychological Ego is referred to in this connection. Because the thesis of this chapter has already been treated in that connection, it is thought that it is unnecessary to continue the subject here.

CHAPTER XX.

The Will.

There can be no attempt in this connection to properly consider the Will from the standpoint of the line of thought of these chapters. The only thought here is to point out one or two facts which seem to be basic in any treatment of the Will from this standpoint.

(1) The *question of the Will first rises when we pass from the study of an instinctive Interest-Moment to the study of the reflective Interest-Moment.* In the instinctive Interest-Moment there is the mere striving or energizing or conative tendency. *But in the reflective Interest-Moment there is the deliberateness and the premeditation which are essential characteristics of a Will and of a Person.* Hence the problems of the reflective Interest-Moment are those which deal with the Will and Personality. Could one fathom all the mysteries of a single reflective Interest-Moment the secrets of the meaning of the Will and of Personality would stand unveiled before him. This reflective Interest-

Moment, which is, according to our definition, the period of Interest's incubation of a new gleam of meaning, has in it problems vaster than any which have been considered. How has this deliberate Interest-Moment arisen? In what does it differ from the absolutely instinctive Interest-Moment? Is that which seems to be the case, the truth of the situation and is there developed from the instinctive that which has the form of choice, as we term it? There seems to stand something upon the foundation of the instinctive processes of our minds which looks into the face of this instinctive Judgment-Cluster or of that, and which seems to say, "This I take" and "That I reject." Have we here the sweep of fixed necessity, and is this seeming freedom but that which hides the iron bonds of absolute Fate, forged by the instinctive mental processes? Or is there in the difference between an absolutely instinctive Interest-Moment and a deliberate Interest-Moment that which may truly be called the difference which comes from Personality existing in the latter case? Can it be possible that Mind has in it the possibility of the development of that which we call a Person and of that we call Free Will?

May it not be possible that, according to evolutionary theory itself, there should evolve from the

fixed and awful necessities of the case that we call a Person? (This, of course, became just as in this thing we call Mind or Interest, there is the possibility of Personality just as there is the possibility of knowledge.) There has been found a stage wherein mind had to develop *ability* to judge the external world, which it did not know immediately, and can never know in the slightest detail in an immediate way, and the mystery of knowledge was born. Can it be possible that the mystery of Personality and of what we call Free Will has been born in some such a way? Let us suppose that that which is a person and that which is Free Will should give, in and of itself, tremendous advantage in the matter of survival and in the matter of preservation, why may not this wonderful and mysterious thing we call Mind or Interest which, in its very embryonic state, showed itself capable of real and true interpretation, show itself, at a vastly later epoch of its development, capable of *real and true choice?* According to strict evolutionary view, if it could be shown that real Free Will and real Personality are tremendous advantages in Mind's development and survival, science would not and could not hesitate to write even such an hypothesis. Science does not hesitate at the wonderful, because it is strange and wonderful; she hesitates at the wonderful only

when the wonderful is posited without, as she says, good and sufficient reason. But if one can show good and sufficient reason,—if one can show that this wonderful thing is a *fact explaining thing*, science has no hesitation in writing it in the very text-books. Hence, it is repeated, all that which has been written in regard to Evolution being the final decision against the idea of real Free Will and of a real Person is but false science. Show that your real Free Will and your real Personality are tremendous factors as regards advance and progress, as tremendous factors as any the world has had, and science itself must needs consider whether just as real cognitive powers have been developed, real Free Will and real Personality may not have been developed, or rather whether as Mind started with an affective process, it did not also start with an inchoate Personality, or did not attain to this in process of development.

Supposing the evolutionary hypothesis to be true, let us go back to the first embryonic mind which is supposed to be the progenitor of all minds. In this first mind, we study its first Interest-Moment. This first Interest-Moment, according to the definition of the Interest-Moment, was the period during which Interest incubated a glint of meaning. At last this

glint of meaning comes. The first Interest-Moment has resulted in the first Judgment-Burst of all time. There was in all probability immediate bodily action upon this first Judgment-Burst. In man all action depends upon an *idea—meaning* of some sort must stand before the mind before there is bodily action. Hence, if this be true as regards man, we can reason that it must be true as regards animals.

Then follows the second Interest-Moment of all time; but this is wonderfully different from the first, for cognitive Interest has already functioned in a particular way and this tends to become an instinctive Interest-Moment. Very probably this first Interest-Moment is repeated—is made a part of the second Interest-Moment. The second Interest-Moment issues in a new glint of meaning.

Thus the processes went on. The whole trend being absolutely to the *development of instinctive Interest-Moments.* By the time, let us say, the millionth Interest-Moment was reached, a mass of possible instinctive Interest-Moments stood ready to rush in on every new Interest-Moment. Now has all development been the result of the storm, stress and fight between instinctive Interest-Moments struggling to enter into the composition of a present Interest-Moment? Has there been here just a

case of the survival of the fittest? Has the strongest killed off the weakest? There can be no question that when the facts are fully considered, one is forced to the conclusion that if Evolution be true, the problems of Evolution are not the so-called struggles of animals as masses of bone and sinew—as material things. Darwin's view of Evolution utterly fails to view the true battle-field of survival. This also is true of the Organic Evolution of Dr. Baldwin and others. If there were this great stress and strain for survival in the past, if ages have been marked by unending struggle for ascendency and development has proceeded along evolutionary lines, the battle fields have been in the province of Mind. This may be posited, it would seem, as a necessarily axiomatic truth. What is strength and muscle if there be no judgment to tell the distance of an adversary or to tell if such an object is an adversary? The struggle between instinctive Interest-Moments, or to put it perhaps in a better way, between instinctive Meaning-Glints for reinstatement in a person's Interest-Moment have been necessarily the absolutely decisive battles of the ages. For here have been decided not the fate of earthly kingdoms or empires, but the fate of categories of knowledge, of logical processes and of epistemological systems.

All other battles and struggles have turned upon this struggle between instinctive Meaning-Glints for reinstatement.

As has been said, we are trying to follow the development of instinctive Interest-Moments and of Instinctive Meaning-Glints, supposing Evolution to have been the case. The battles described above, for supremacy in Interest's attention on the part of instinctive Meaning-Glints, would result in certain of the strongest Meaning-Glints surviving in almost every Interest-Moment. This indeed has been the case. *The so-called categories of space and time*, etc., are but some of these strongest instinctive Judgment-Bursts or Meaning-Glints which have found for themselves the place they deserve in almost every Interest-Moment or in certain great classes of Interest-Moments. They have fought their battles and won their place. *Now this would all necessarily tend to fixedness along certain lines.* These instinctive Meaning-Glints which gained the day would dominate more and more in each new Interest-Moment. There would be the discovery of new meanings along the track they set, but Interest would pass by, unnoticed, all other possibilities which Interest might have noticed. This is exactly what we see in the case of the dog or horse. There are cer-

tain lines of *meaning* for them—certain Interest-Clusters predominate and rule. The grooves have been fixed and Interest functions only in certain fixed lines and Interest-Moments can incubate only a narrow class of *New meaning* for them. Now the *essential difference between man and the animal is that in the latter we see deliberate Interest-Moments and deliberate Judgement-Clusters.*

But if man has developed from the animal in the sense that the Human Mind has absolutely nothing which the animal mind has not—if so-called Free Will and so-called Personality be but a myth, why has not the tendency for Interest-Moments to run in narrower and still narrower grooves been followed in his development? Behind him are the mental processes of the ages—in him are gathered vast instinctive possibilities, and, because these tend to fixedness, he, of all animals, should be the most fixed in his mental operations. The Instinctive-Judgment should work in him with all the force of the highest development of its automatic powers, and nothing else should work.

Yet the very opposite is the case. Instinctive Judgments there are, but there is a wide opportunity for variation. There is the widest variation of human Interest. The child, according to the view which

makes human Interest absolutely the same as the dog's, would be most fixed in his instinctive Judgments. Yet he is not.

"Language explains this," says one, "the use of concepts prevents the Mind from running in a fixed channel." But the laborer's store of concepts amount to some hundreds—the dog or the monkey may have several dozen rudimentary concepts. The dog is fixed in his mental processes, the laborer is not. Are the two or three hundred concepts he holds sufficient explanation why the mighty tide, which in all Minds tends to the strengthening of instinctive Judgment Processes, has been absolutely stayed, and why another bent and direction is found within him?

Necessarily it would seem, even supposing Evolution to be the case, that there has arisen, either from within the sphere of Interest or the Mind or from the sphere of what we call the Spiritual, this thing we term Personality which is the Breaker of instinctive Judgment Processes and the Giver of mental variations.

There is that which seems to stand upon the very categories and upon the instinctive processes and choose, reject or accept. It is held that this is a real fact because only this can explain the breaking

up of the fixed tendencies which have been formed for Interest to function in a certain way. There are facts which require the positing of what we call Matter. There are facts which require the positing of what we call Life. There are facts which require the positing of what we call Mind, and, just so, there are facts which require the positing of what we call Personality.

There is a fundamental law of Mind that *bodily action is always in view of a Meaning-Glint or Judgment-Cluster, i. e., in view of what is called an idea.*

Now in the deliberate Interest-Moment the incubating time of this idea or Judgment-Cluster may be delayed. Judgment-Bursts (Meaning-Glints), one after the other, may be thrown out and not allowed to go into the composition of the idea and *hence, bodily action is delayed.*

Now James, in the first volume of his Psychology, in the section in which he treats of the question as to the possibility of personality, raises the question as to whether what is called a person can really *delay a decision* for so much as a second. James says that if this can really be done, almost everything is involved therein. Now it is certainly true that if physical action can be delayed for a second,

let us say, we thereby put ourselves in accommodation with what is really different external Reality from that we would have accommodated to had the action taken place a second sooner. The passage of the locomotive over the spot on the track where we a second ago were standing does not injure us; the difference of a second in accommodating to environment has in this case saved our life. Here, then, *in the delay to complete the image or idea or Judgment-Cluster, in view of which physical acting occurs, there is one of the very essentials of Personality and of Choice.*

Now this delay in physical action about which James raises question, and which he counts so tremendous a factor, if it does exist, is one of the characteristics of the deliberate Interest-Moment. While a bit of new Meaning is being incubated instinctive Judgment-Bursts are thrust aside. The Mind functions on, but its product is allowed to fade away until the *new* Meaning-Glint comes, and lo! instantly there is built up the image or Judgment-Cluster because of which we act physically.

Hence, we see that there is in Mind wonderful instinctive processes which act with precision and validity, because processes just like these have been the very means of the preservation of the race. The

race has interpreted Reality more and more correctly, and the possibilities of these correct interpretations have been written into us and have become a part of our heritage.

The categories are ours—they live in us—logical ability is ours, because the correct ability to interpret Externality aright has been an incalculable blessing, and the race has preserved these gains by heredity. Thus the primal operations of our Mind at any moment are largely instinctive. The Instinctive Coefficient Judgments are instinctive. The flight of logical thought is often, as we say, intuitive, *i. e., an instinctive process backed by the validity of the correct reasoning of all the Past.*

But there is, also, in every moment of our conscious life, that which stands upon this base of instinctive operations, and breaks, rejects, alters, builds in Meaning-Glints, delays the complete formation of the Mental Object, or hurries that formation, and thus alters constantly the time of accommodation to the External World. Here, by James' own test, it would seem, we have what must be called a Personality.

CHAPTER XXI.

Meaning.

A word should be said as to Meaning. It is held in these papers that the Interest-Moment is the incubating time of a glint of Meaning—that all Meaning we have in any mental state is flashed forth by cognitive Interest upon sensation (affective) stimulation—that in this moment this is done because the ability to do this has been given by acquisition of ability—that there are instinctive Interest-Moments in which Meaning is incubated and flashed forth, and (2) deliberate Interest-Moments which essentially mark the incubation of a *New* Glint of Meaning.

It is by this acquisition of Meaning that Reality comes. Just as *Meaning* is extended Reality is extended. No *Meaning means no Reality. All Meaning means all Reality. No nearer to what we call Reality can we come than through Meaning, tested and authenticated.* Our *Meaning we may test, i. e., we may examine whether the sign or the interpretation is valid in the light of other Meaning, but Meaning stands*

closest to Reality. Through Meaning we infer what we call Reality.

Now, there is in all Mentality at this moment just so much Meaning. There is just so much true interpretation of Reality. All this Meaning has come through Interest-Moments each of which incubated a new glint of Meaning. Hence the unit in the Meaning sphere is the Judgment-Burst or Meaning-Glint which Interest gives as the result of its functioning in a single Interest-Moment. These Meaning-Glints are gathered or synthesized into the Judgment-Clusters (concept or percept) —These Judgment-Clusters are synthesized again and thus, from the unit which we have found to be the product of the first Interest-Moment, all the Cognitive Content is given.

It is to be pointed out that there is in Meaning also the Conative or Volitional side. "I mean to do that" means "I purpose to do that." The whole question of Conation's relation to Meaning has to be deferred. This only may be said, (1) *physical actions by a Mind are always in view of Meaning;* (2) *much physical action is psychically automatic, i. e., instinctive Judgment gives Meaning and the physical action is a kind of reflex upon the presentation of that Meaning. The point, however, is to be absolutely*

insisted upon that one of the fundamental errors of the psychology of today is that this Meaning-Glint in the so-called instinctive reflex action is not recognized. (3) *The point is made that the sphere of Free Will may be found alone in the sphere of the formation of the Mental Object and the physical action may be automatic upon the full satisfactory formation of that Mental Object, or we may have to look for Free Will also in the projection of the Mental Object into physical Action.*

PART II.

Outlines of New Philosophies—Interest Philosophies.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

A number of these Outlines of Philosophies were developed in my earliest thinking on Interest.

The theses are merely stated. No endeavor is made to give the treatment, which in several cases, is already of some extent. It has been felt that it would be better merely to indicate the line of thought.

Thus, any one who may be interested will the sooner have placed before him, a compend of what the author hopes to attempt in these fields. There is no Philosophy presented here, which does not demand separate and protracted investigation. The whole of Psychology must be thought over from the standpoint of Interest before the proper Philosophy of Psychology can be produced. A new field seems opened in this department of investigation by the identification of Interest and Consciousness.

In the sphere of Life Development, the friend of whom I speak in Chapter III, of this Part, has already much material gathered and we have the plan and outlines for a volume.

In the domain of Social Psychology, there are no theories or positions held by any of the great scien-

tists which will not have to be reviewed. When the Basic Principle of a science or of a Philosophy is found, all other principles, of necessity, take their proper and subordinate place.

Imitation may claim to rule in Social Psychology or Suggestion may assert that it holds dominion there, but when the Principle of Interest asserts its rights, as it will, both must give place. They must stand subordinate to the one great explaining principle. Hence, in order to review *the vast extent of the literature of Social Psychology, to examine the various theories, to show their real subordination to Interest, to trace the genetic progress of Interest in Others in the constitution of society as a whole, and in the formation of social groups, should have a volume or rather volumes, in itself.*

There can be no doubt that volumes may be written upon this one aspect of Interest as the psychological explaining Principle in Social Psychology.

As to the sphere of Practical Life, the same statement may be made. Sociology itself is but a study of Interest at work. In the varied life of our civilization, there are thousands of throbbing *Interest Centers* and few more fascinating studies can be found than studies of such Centers. The labor organizations of today, the trusts and combinations,

etc., show the field of investigation for him who comes to study the Interest Philosophy of Practical Life. Everywhere the mighty motive force will be found to be Interest of some kind. But *to differentiate Interest, to note its developments, to watch its productive operations, to follow its way, when seemingly it has disappeared, gives a wide and varied field of investigation.*

Or, in the sphere of History, the subject has equally important ramifications. As to Law and Government, the same is true. In the sphere of Ethics and of Religions the same Basic Explaining Principle demands fullest consideration.

As has been said, it has seemed best in regard to each Philosophy for the author merely to outline his general position. Thus he will have the opportunity at a later day, it is hoped, to take up subject by subject and consider them in some sense as fully as in his estimation they deserve.

CHAPTER I.

The Interest Philosophy of Psychology.

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of Psychology.

The Philosophy of Psychology is, from this point of view, found in that which is the Basic Principle of Psychology—the Principle of Interest.

Psychology, if the theses presented in that part of this volume which deals with Psychology, be correct, finds its explaining principle in that which is at once its basic principle and its constructive principle.

The treatment in the part of the volume called Analytic Interest Psychology, has been, as the name indicates, Analytic, and hence its results are but a tracing of the explaining principle itself. We find that Interest is the Basic Principle of the Mind, that it is that which constructs Mental Objects—that Interest is the Nexus and the Psychological Ego—that Interest is the Mental Ultimate fundamental to Cognition, Feeling and Conation, and they but express the Nature of Interest—that Interest is

the Apperceiving Power of the Mind—that Feelings and Emotions are the product of Interest—that Interest explains Abnormal Psychology—that Interest is to be identical with Consciousness of Process.

Now, if these original theses positions be true, it means that Interest itself is a Philosophy of Psychology.

CHAPTER II.

The Interest Philosophy of Social Psychology.

The thesis here is: *Interest in Others is the Basic Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of Social Psychology.* (This thesis was advanced in my paper read at the Hopkins, May, 1904.—See Chap. XVI, Part I.)

Dr. Baldwin maintains that Suggestibility is the fundamental socializing factor. My position is that Suggestibility is no Suggestibility unless it arouses Interest—that were two persons to live on either side of the street all their lives and there be absolutely no Interest on the part of one in the other, there would be absolutely no social tie between them. Yet every day there would be Suggestions to sociability (unconscious though they are) coming from one to the other. Yet, because one has no Interest in the other, there is no social tie—no trace of the social bond—between them. Hence it is clearly seen that Suggestibility is not the fundamental socializing force.

It is also held by Tarde (in his narrow use of the term) and by Dr. Baldwin (in his wider use of the word) that Imitation is the Explaining Factor of Social Psychology.

But, however we may define Imitation, one thing stands fixed and sure—*that there is no imitation on the child's part or on the adult's part without Interest in that which is imitated and this Interest is the Explanation of the Imitation. Then, since the explanation of the Imitation has been found, the Imitation no longer stands as the Explaining Principle.*

The Imitation which these authors speak of is imitation of persons, but this imitation is of persons simply because we are *more interested in persons than in animals. Were we more interested in animals than in persons, our imitation would be of animals and social bonds would bind us to the dog or horse and not to the human family. Imitation is but the pathway in which the mighty living socializing force of Interest treads.* Even though we make our Imitation self-conscious Imitation, the fact stands certain that this self-conscious Imitation exists only because *Interest prompts thereto.*

Take the child in its earliest social aspect. It is first drawn by Interest to note the mother's face—the outline of that face is built up—Interest clusters to this form, and the child is socialized, so far

as the mother is concerned; and the mother, because of her intense Interest in the child, is socialized, so far as the child is concerned. So the family develops. The mighty social bonds which unite the family are no mere imitation of father and mother on the part of the children—no mere imitation of the husband by the wife or of the wife by the husband. That which socializes the family is the Interest of one in the other—this Interest is the heart of all love and affection. This *Interest it is which is the Social Nexus*, just as in *Pure Psychology we have found it to be the Nexus of the Mind itself.* Let this social bond fail in the family and the disunited units fall apart—the father is now at variance with the mother and, it may be, the divorce court is invoked.

The child, socialized in the family circle by Interest in the other members of the family, finds, however, in his school life contact with another circle of life. There is no county school in all the land where socialization is not taking place and this socialization is along the line of the child's Interest. The boys flock with boys because their Interests are common—they love to run, to play, even to fight, it may be. The girls, however, on their side, are kept together by their Interests. Just so far as their Interests find union, and boys

and girls are interested in common things, the socialization between the males of the school and the females is complete. Then too, there is the case of the "Tom boy"—the girl whose Interest is altogether in boyish sports. There is also the case of the "Miss Nancy"—the boy whose Interest is in dolls and whose social ties are not with his own sex.

Soon the child feels, it may be, the socializing force of the Church. But here, too, it is Interest in the Church and in the great verities for which the Church stands which makes him a social unit in his denomination. *No mere imitation, even of the Divine Master himself, suffices to socialize him in the "City of God." Only as he has vital Interest in his fellows of that faith and in the faith itself, is he socialized in the Church.*

The youth finds himself face to face with political parties. Here, again, it is *his Interest which gathers him into the social unit of the party.*

It is greatly regretted that the demand for space prevents the extended treatment of the present thesis that Interest in Others is the Basic Explaining Principle in Social Psychology. A few facts, however, may be noted.

One great authority insists that Society is to be explained, in part, at least, by what he calls "Consciousness of Kind." Thus animals have a "*Con-*

sciousness of Kind." *But this* "*Consciousness of Kind*" *means simply Interest in their Kind. As has already been shown, Interest and Consciousness are identical, and Consciousness of Kind becomes Interest in their fellow animals.* That this Interest does exist there is no question. That it explains Sociality there can also be no question. Mere imitation of animals by animals or of man by man does not explain vital Society, *i. e.*, Society that lives and moves and has its being in our streets. Nor does it explain the socialization of the animal species.

Again, Dr. Baldwin's "Social Impulse" is nothing save Interest in others. *The child becomes interested in persons. Persons become a great part of his Mental Object and simply because persons become a great part of his Mental Object does that result follow which Dr. Baldwin stresses* in his Social and Ethical Interpretations, *i. e.*, the reading of one's self into others *—the fact of a common self. The explanation of this common self is found in this—a man's Mental Object tend to become his self—persons become in great part one's Mental Object, hence they tend to become one's self. Thus we see that it is Interest in others which produces the very situation which Dr. Baldwin,* in his volume, Social and Ethical Interpretations, makes *the fundamental fact in socialization. Hence the fundamental fact is not that we have, as it were, a common*

self, but that this common self exists because Interest, attaching itself to persons, makes them a self for us.

(2) Dr. Baldwin has much to say in the same volume about social tradition and social heredity as explaining facts in social psychology, the idea being that social heredity avails itself of social tradition. But social heredity lays hold on social tradition only through Interest being aroused in this tradition. *Hence social heredity reduces to Interest.*

Thus all these leading scientific explanations of Society, like that of "Consciousness of Kind," "Imitation" (Tarde), "Self-Conscious Imitation" (Baldwin), a Self which is Common (Baldwin & Royce), "Social Impulse" (Baldwin), "Social Heredity" (Baldwin), are totally defective in that they do not state the root of the matter.

(1) *One may have a Consciousness of Kind in the sense of a knowledge of his kind and yet not be socialized.*

(2) *One may imitate another all his life and yet not be socialized.*

It is *only as the imitation is the outcome of Interest that there is* socialization, for the imitation may be the outcome of hate itself. *Imitation may be imitation of one's enemy in order to become as strong as*

one's enemy, and hence, although there is complete imitation, complete "self-conscious imitation" even, there is absolutely no socialization.

(3) Thus one may have "self-conscious imitation" and be an *absolute enemy of the man imitated. The Persians would have been glad to self-consciously imitate the Greeks in warlike acts. But had they been able fully to do so there would have come no wave of socialization—they would have still fought on.* Hence self-conscious imitation has been mistaken for the true socializing factor simply because the true factor —Interest—shows itself therein.

(4) "The Social Impulse" (Baldwin), is nothing save Interest in others. If there is not Interest in others there is no "social impulse"—*whenever "the social impulse" exists there is Interest in others.* Hence, *since the explanation of "the social impulse"* is found, *"the social impulse" as an explaining principle falls away.*

(5) The thought that the Ego and the Alter have a common self (Baldwin) is either: (1) *a figure of speech,* or (2) *it is to be reduced to what has already been pointed out, i. e., that Persons become a self for us because we are interested in them since the psychological law is that our Interests tend to become a self.*

(6) "The social heredity which absorbs social tradition" (Baldwin), cannot mean that the social tradition is absorbed in a mere biological way as though the striving to absorb it were all. Hence, since the social tradition can be absorbed only in a cognitive way, the social heredity which absorbs it becomes necessarily a cognitive process in part. But this means that Interest cognizes the social tradition.

Thus the various scientific explanations which have been given of socialization are seen to depend absolutely upon Interest for their validity. Hence they all fall away as real and fundamental explaining principles when Interest in Persons is posited as that principle.

Hence Social Psychology will have necessarily to find revision. "The social tradition" of Dr. Baldwin is nothing more or less than the Interest-deposits, to which reference is made in the Philosophy of History.

A statement is here given of some of the chapters in my work on the Interest Philosophy of Social Psychology which is in preperation:

Chapter I. *A Historical Review of former theories of Socialization.*

Chapter II. *A review of present explaining theories of Social Psychology.*

Chapter III. *Interest and the Individual.*

Chapter IV. *Interest and the Mental Object.*

Chapter V. *An examination of the character of the Mental Object we call a Person.*

Chapter VI. *We understand the other person not because we really have a Common Self but just as we understand anything else, i. e., by our judging ability,* (the idea of a Common Self is a figure of speech—my Self is *my* Self.)

Chapter VII. *Interest is the Social Nexus of the Family.*

Chapter VIII. *Interest is the Social Nexus of the Party.*

Chapter IX. *Interest is the Social Nexus of the Church.*

Chapter X. *Interest is the Social Nexus of the State.*

Chapter XI. *Interest and Institutions.*

Chapter XII. *The Effect of Institutions upon Interest.*

Chapter XIII. *The Genius from the standpoint of Interest.*

Chapter XIV. *The Social Incompetents explained from the standpoint of Interest.*

Other lines of investigation will be taken up in this connection. This somewhat fuller statement as regards Social Psychology is given in order to show that each separate Philosophy given here, although it is in but brief outline, is capable of full amplification. Necessarily that which is the basic principle of the Mind, will be basic in the sphere of the Philosophies. We have but to dig to strike the vein of truth.

I well recall a certain walk taken, in December, 1903, in Druid Hill Park, Baltimore. At that time, I was seeking, in my thinking, to place the Principle of Interest, properly, in the human Mind. As I state, in the Preface, no psychologist, so far as I could see, had done this. I chanced, as I walked that day in the Park, to see a rare and beautiful flower nestling in the grass. Just as I discovered the flower, a gentleman and lady, whom I had never seen before, passed and caught sight of the flower. Immediately, there were, as it were, three flames of Interest round that rare plant. No introduction was needed. In a second's time, because of our common Interest in that flower, we were socialized. We talked of the flower for a few minutes, and were I now to meet and recognize them, there would be between us the social bond of that common Interest.

I well recall how, for almost a year, I lived two doors from a gentleman, of whose existence I was hardly aware. One day I saw him walking down the street, half a square ahead of me, carrying a fishing rod and three fine black bass. In a trice I was socialized so far as he was concerned. Common Interest in one single sport socialized us.

If you are a business man, a professional man, a man who knows men by constant contact and association, you say to me: "Why, in a chapter that pretends to deal with scientific subjects, do you inflict upon us so self-evident a proposition, as that Interest is the socializing factor in human life?" My reply is this: "This great fact, that Interest is the socializing factor, Science has not dealt with. The great theories of Socialization and of Social Psychology overlook it. This theory, that Interest is the socializing factor in the world, which looks so commonplace, is new in scientific literature, as are the other theses of this volume."

It is maintained that the whole extent of Social Psychology may be thought over—that the so-called basic stones of the structure are not the true foundation—that the so-called Explaining Principles are not the true Explaining Principles.

It is believed that when the Principle of Interest is posited as the explaining Principle in Social Psychology, scholars have new opportunities for successful work.

CHAPTER III.

The Philosophy of Life Development.

The Thesis here is that, just so far as Evolution is true, Interest is the determining factor, and that, in the Sphere of Individual Life Development, Interest is the determining Factor.

(A friend and I are collaborating on this theory of Life Development. He is a man of high ability, with fine scientific sense.)

(1) *Between Matter and Life there is an "Inter-esse."* (*This means that Life and Matter never stand in immediate relationship—that there is always an "Inter-esse"—a something between.*)

(2) *This "Inter-esse" between Life and Matter is the great determining Principle in all Life Development.* (*This means that Life Development is not merely biological, but that the controlling factor is the Mental factor.*)

(3) *This "Inter-esse," which stand between Life and Matter, and which is the determining principle of Life Development, is Interest.*

Whether Evolution be true or not, in the sense that Man has evolved from the animal, it is maintained that *all Life Development has as its determining factor the Mental—that Interest and Interest alone sets the pace of Life Development.*

CHAPTER IV.

The Philosophy of History.

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of History.

Many scientific historians question whether, after all, there is such a thing as a real Philosophy of History. Progress there has been, but the scientific secret of that constant progress in human betterment they cannot locate. The Christian historian, on the other hand, asserts, and properly so, that there is a Divine Hand in Human History and maintains that progress is due to Deity. But here again the question comes as to the method employed by Divinity, in the slow but certain work of civilization's advance. The question of how the coral reefs are built is important. How much more important the question as to the secret of civilization's certain advance—the question, as to what, after all, is the Philosophy of History!

The thesis herein presented is, that there has been a slow but sure evolution in *human Interest*—

that the *secret of a tribe's advance, of a people's progress, of a church's enoblement, of the world's developing civilizatian, is that human Interest has risen imperceptibly but surely to higher and better things.*

The thesis is, that on earth, "The City of God" itself, will appear, when, in the slow course of the centuries, human Interest has risen to the sphere of eternal verities.

Hence, it is maintained that in the historical study of *Human Interests*, which are *the deposit of the living principle of Interest*, is to be found the very key to the Philosophy of History.

He who traces the course of human history as the course of *Human Interest*, will *find the very Philosophy of History in the History itself.*

The thesis is also held that History itself is but the *Study of Human Interest at work in the past.*

Only as History is able to lay hold on the vital principle of a people's Interest, at a particular stage of development, can History make the past stand real before us. Unconsciously the trend of historical investigation in recent years has been turning in this direction. The position of this chapter is borne out by this fact.

Author after author, professor after professor, could be named whose historical study, they must allow, when their attention is called to the fact, is

almost altogether with the Interests of the people they study, i. e., with the products of human Interest at a particular date.

"Interests" are the things to study as regards the past—the touchstone of emphasis upon historical fact must be: "Was this a matter of Interest to that generation." The scientific historian can now seize upon all that he can see to have been of Interest to the age, and generalizing from these facts he can present the age vital and real. He can do this in accordance with strict psychological truth, for Interest is the Psychological Ego.

Not only therefore, is the principle of human Interest the explaining principle in the sphere of the Philosophy of History, but it is, also, *in its development, in its results, in its deposits in human institutions, laws, customs, religions, etc., the one great subject of the historian's investigation, as he comes to deal with any nation's history, or any epoch of the world's history.*

The question ever with the historian, therefore, from this point of view, will be this: "What is the Interest of this people at this stage of their development?" The *key* of history is here. Just as Interest is the key of Psychology, of Social Psychology, of Abnormal Psychology, of Education, of

all Development; so the key of the Philosophy of History itself is the Principle of Human Interest.

Reference is made in this connection to Chapter III, Part I, in which the thesis is defended that Interest is the Nexus of the Mind. In that chapter a description is given of how the Mental Object is held momentarily in the synthetic grasp of Interest —of how Interest loses the least interesting parts of the Mental Object and is drawn on in its functioning by the most interesting part of the dismembered Mental Object.

Now, all this is descriptive also of a nation's advance—the people are to be studied as a unity and their unity is found in their Mental Object, *i. e.*, their Interests. That which holds the thought of the people is the Mental Object of this nation. Its most interesting part becomes the nucleus of the new Mental Object or Interest and so, on and on, the nation goes with constant transition in the Mental Object which stands before the gaze of men. *The Interest of the nation functions forth the Interests which become fixed in institutions, customs, etc.*

Thus the Philosophy of History reduces itself, if the terminology of the first part of this volume be allowed, to this:

(1) The Interest-Moment of a people.

(2) The Meaning-Glint which come to a people.

(3) The Mental Object of a people.

(4) The physical reactions produced by the National Mental Object, (just as the image in the individual Mind may start the reaction of bodily movement, so may it be in the National Mind.)

(5) The Judgment-Cluster, which constitutes the National Mental Object at any time, is the subject for study and analysis by the historian, just as the Judgment-Cluster which constitutes the Individual Mental Object is the subject for study and analysis by the pyschologist.

The object here is only to give that which is indicative of the trend of the author's thought. Of course the genetic progress of Interest's development in the case of a number of nations must be traced for the proper presentation of this Philosophy of History. It is, however, thought that while this would be a work requiring much effort and investigation, the basic working principle is here found and the lines sufficiently indicated to show that a Philosophy of History with Interest as the basic explaining principle, is no mere idle thought.

CHAPTER V.

The Philosophy of Practical Life.

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of Practical Life.

Practical Life has within itself History, Religion, Sociology, Ethics, etc. It is complex in the extreme. Yet this explaining Principle Interest, reveals its secret.

Interest, in the Business World, has, largely, with many become Self-Interest. Yet, even here, where, in the rush and war of business of all places on earth seemingly, Self-Interest rules, it is by no means the tremendous factor Interest itself is. The bonds of Business Life are not forged by mere Self-Interest, although the latter is a powerful factor.

The youth frequently follows his bent in the matter of employment. His Interest leads him to this position or the other. There is developed an Interest in that he does. He who has none of this, fails in his class as a workman. With vast multitudes business is a pleasure. The multi-millionaire does not continue business merely to make money—

it is the making of money—the business itself—which is fascinating to him. The old man who gives up business soon dies, it is said. His Interest was yonder —the business was his very self. This self has been cut away and he dies.

The Man's Mental Object—his very self—is his farm or business or profession. It is Interest in that, which is the inspiration of his endeavors.

Interest, which is the Nexus of the State, of Society, of the Man's own Mental Objects, *is the Nexus of what he calls his life.* He is but a unit in the millions of earth, but each one of these millions is like him, in the fact that his Interest is the inspiration of his life.

In the diversification of industries and development of business we have not an exhibition of a mere money-making spirit, as it is generally held. If this business world be carefully studied it will be found that *almost every one of the great business houses has been founded by a man whose passion was not so much money making, as it was that in and with which he worked.* His was the spirit of the discoverer with the land he has found or of the inventor with the instrument he has produced. *The Interest which gave vigor to his effort and brought ultimate success to the business enterprise, was not Self-Interest. His was an enthusiasm which Self-Interest never knows. His*

was a consecration to his business which Self-Interest cannot imitate successfully. Just as Interest produces the Mental Object, causing it to stand before the mind, so his Interest has been that which has at last produced the magnificent business plant which is his.

This description is not that of an isolated case, but it is the rule.

Just thus has it been with that great class of men who have risen by their own unaided efforts to high places. Self-Interest has not been that which has alone nerved them for their endeavors. There has been, it is true, the thought of their own betterment, but that which they have followed has had a fascination for them.

Only as we realize these facts can we do justice to the life around us. There is not mere cold-blooded selfishness prompting every action, but in the very business world itself, where Self-Interest seems to be the God of All, pure spontaneous Interest holds dominant place.

CHAPTER VI.

The Philosophy of Law and of Government.

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of Law and of Government.

The rule may be stated that, the greater the Interest in any Object, the greater the tendency to safeguard it by laws.

The Interests of a people, at any epoch of their development, determine the character of their laws. The tribes of lake-dwellers must have given, in any legal arrangements that were theirs, especial attention to the rights of fishermen—their Interests were in that direction.

A pastoral people, on the other hand, has laws regulating affairs appertaining to cattle.

Soon, of course, the great motives of Self-Interest come into play in the enactment of law. This side of the problem has been treated by Hobbes and by Rousseau, etc. But the trend towards law and government finds its origin not in mere Self-Interest, but in Interest itself. For Self-Interest is but a development of Interest.

The codes of a People present fine historical material simply because the codes were produced as the result of the People's endeavor to safeguard their Interests, and, since Past Interests are, as is stated in another place, the true subject of historical investigation, the codes of former times give fine historical data.

The government of a country is the expression of what Rousseau would call the General Will. This General Will, which many modern philosophers admit to exist in some sense, is really the General Interest. This is not necessarily the general Self-Interest, but the general Interest as Interest.

It was not the Self-Interest of England, Germany and France which prompted them to send their thousands to fight as Crusaders for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre; yet the General Interest was so intense that men were drawn into those great Crusades by the hundreds of thousands. Self-Interest is calculating and cool; Interest is spontaneous and instantaneous, and has been the dominant factor in the organization and continuance of government.

Government or the State has almost always its origin in some burst of Interest, which fuses together otherwise disunited districts or divisions of country. This Interest may be in some one

man who becomes the focus of attention. He stands before the eye of human Interest, and men are fused together through him and a State has its origination.

The test of the great man in human affairs has ever been his ability to interest men. If he be a general he welds them to his purposes, and his soldiers become as very organic units of his own body. If he be a politician, men are swayed by him as though his were a magic wand. If he be a great statesman, he follows his far-reaching plans, and the nation follows him.

But the State usually has its initiation in some great idea which dominates the Interest of the time. Thus our country began. One of the French philosophers asserts that each nation is the incarnation of some one great idea. If this be the case, it is simply because this great idea has been the constructive factor in the nation's development. This idea has caught men's Interest, and has been for men, their standard. Thus, it cannot be doubted that the idea of Jehovah was that which made Israel. When that idea was forgotten, their Interests became diversified, the tribes became segregated and ruin came.

It is only as there is Common Interest that a State stands. Decay comes with absolute differentiation of Interests.

The thesis that the Principle of Interest is the basic explaining principle in law is worthy of consideration. It is believed that just as Interest is the Nexus of the individual mind holding together the constitutent parts of the Mental Object, so it is the Nexus of the State.

CHAPTER VII.

The Philosophy of Ethics.

Interest in the Right is the Basic Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of Ethics.

There is Interest in Self—This is Self-Interest. There is also Interest in Others—This is Alter-Interest. Now Interest in its relations to Self and to Others presents the problems of Ethics.

The Basic Explaining Principle of the Philosophy of Ethics is *Interest—Interest in the Right.*

The *meaning* of this latter concept—the Source of its Meaning—the question as to what Reality answers to the Universal Instinctive Judgment-Burst or Meaning-Glint of the Right, is the great question.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Philosophy of Education.

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of Education

The proper explanation of Education many have attempted. The Educators, forced to recognize the vast importance of Interest as a practical means of securing educational advance on the part of their pupils, have done much effective work in the treatment of Interest. The great psychologists who have emphasized Interest have been generally those who were concerned with educational matters. Thus Herbart advanced his views on Interest in his letters upon the subject of Education. Dewey, who has given much attention to Interest, but unfortunately, as has been stated, wholly from the conative point of view, has done so, it would seem, largely under the inspiration of the fact that he was interested in Pedagogics. Stout and Royce stand almost as exceptions among psychologists. They seem to have been led to consider Interest without reference to Education. But both are unfortunate

in that they have not realized the place or importance of Interest.

We find one Educator after another emphasizing the importance of Interest in the matter of the acquisition of knowledge. Their uniform position, however, is that merely their experience teaches that Interest on the scholar's part must be aroused in order for acquisition. They, in no case, enter upon a critical psychological consideration of the reason why Interest is so important in Education. As one who has made such an investigation reads the writings of this Educator or that, the wonder grows upon him that no one has been led to take up the careful consideration of this question.

The thesis here is that the Basic Explaining Principle in Education is Interest.

(1) For acquisition it is necessary not merely that one will to study but that one be interested in that which he studies. There can be no doubt that Interest is cognitive in its nature. *There is nothing so absolutely cognitive as a consuming Interest. The slightest hint is caught. The faintest glint of meaning is seized upon. The least sign brings cognitive response.*

(2) *There is no essential difference between so-called mediate and immediate Interest.* The so-called medi-

ate Interest finds something in the object or line of action that is really interesting. The boy may study only to keep from being whipped, but he is at least interested in not being whipped, and this gives the lesson which otherwise has for him no attraction, something of Interest.

(3) There is always found in the so-called Genius a marvelous Interest in that line wherein his genius shows itself. The great artist is as a man hypnotized—he, indeed, is hypotnized by Art. Other things, other lines of effort, all the world of life and effort do not exist for him. *There is little or no Reality for him save the world of Meaning he finds in Art. There is a world of Meaning for him in that which other men do not even notice.* There is a wealth of *Meaning*, for the Artist, which overpowers him, in this landscape which the laborer works amid with never, in all his long and uneventful days, a single glance of Interest for.

The same is true of the Genius in any field. He has eyes for *Meaning* in his particular field to which other men are blind. He wonders that others do not see. When he sees a certain stretch of Meaning he thinks that certainly all men must know this. He goes forth confident, that this wealth of Meaning which has flashed forth for him and shines for him,

he can with no trouble make others see and lo! they yet are blind. He is ahead of his generation. Men think of him as given up to a single idea. But that which to them is but a single idea is a whole world of *Meaning* to him, and when he has gone on his way, never having brought men to see with his eyes the truth which shone for him, that truth at last begins to shine for a few men—*their Interest is kindled and a new Science, as we say, has been born. But this science has been really born in the one man whose Interest was of such a kind that he caught Meaning where no other man found it.*

Thus Sciences are born. Out into the wilderness of the Possibilities of Meaning, where never human Interest set foot, the Genius goes and builds a very world of Truth and lives therein and then other men move in and this region of Truth becomes a Science. This is the history of every Science. Some Prometheus brings fire down from heaven. It is generally the case also that he is bound to the Mountain of Man's Blindness to suffer all his life.

The Genius does not need to be educated in the sense that the term is usually employed. Yet his is a wonderful education, which in itself presents the Philosophy of Education. His education goes on while other men sleep, or laugh, or jest or rest. His thought has a single resting place when it comes

home from the excursions of business or social demands.

The problems which the teacher sets for the pupil, which the professor insists that the student consider, are ever before him. He is fascinated by these problems. He struggles with them. He seeks to explain them. Interest flashes forth a glint of meaning for him away yonder in what seems to him an impenetrable wilderness. The fascination is upon him. He follows the seeming will-'o-the-wisp. His Interest dwells on this glint of meaning. The second Interest-Moment begins for him and so, on and on, the process goes.

Thus it is seen that the so-called uneducated genius is educated after all. The difference between him and the college bred man is simply this : In his case his own bent—the impulsive tendencies of his Interest—have set the problem, while, in th case of the college man, the professor has set the problem.

(4) The emphasis placed upon Memory in Education is, from the standpoint of this Philosophy of Education, one of the great evils of the day. To attempt to bring a pupil or a student to remember a thing is, as has been seen in the analytic psychological section of this volume, a misnomer. There

is no such thing as the faculty of Memory in the ordinary use of that term by psychologists.

There are certain instinctive Coefficient Judgments which are functioned forth by cognitive Interest which decide whether the Judgment-Cluster of which they form part shall stand as a "Memory" for us. This is all there is in so-called memory.

Yet many Educators will take a line of work and insist that the pupil drive it home upon his Memory. Now the only way this can be done is to drive it home upon his Interest. Then, since Interest-Moments tend to become instinctive, the next time, when the teacher thinks that the pupil's memory is working, instinctive Interest-Moment processes are going on and that which was learned is being recited because of these processes.

Hence, to be true to the Philosophy of Education, a scientific and careful study of the trend of childish Interest is necessary. There is in the childish mind vast instinctive Interest-Moment possibilities. What these possibilities are, in what order easiest development may be made, what studies are best suited to appeal to only the absolutely instinctive Interest processes at first, just when the attempt should be made to arouse the deliberative Interest-Moment, whether there be danger to Personality if this is aroused too soon in the child's life, just what part

in educative work the instinctive Interest-Moment must bear to the deliberate Interest-Moment, are problems worthy of the attention of the greatest scholars of the day.

Here is a wonderful trunk which had been packed by many hands—precious are its contents but wonderfully fragile—the contents seem to be interlaced and interwoven. We must needs send for one who is an artist in his line that the trunk be properly unpacked. The mind of the child is just this trunk—vast and wonderful are the possibilities which the Past has stored therein. To unpack these contents, or rather these possibilities, is the work of Education, and the way best to do so is the problem of the Philosophy of Education. But who knows, in any sense, as much of what we may call the strata of the child's instinctive judgment processes as the most unskilled geologist knows of the strata of the earth's crust? He was a genius, who, in the grasp of his intellect held the facts appertaining to the earth and evolved the science of geology, but he, who will hold in his mind the multidinous and complex facts presented by the operations of the instinctive judgment and who will properly classify the strata of instinctive mental processes, so that the Educator will know, from strict Science, the proper way of approach in begin-

ning to bring forth the instinctive mental powers of the child, will be a greater genius than the founder of geology.

Here then, in briefest outline, is the Interest Philosophy of Education. Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle.

The instinctive possibilities which the Mind has must be brought out by Interest, for it has been Interest which packed these possibilites therein.

CHAPTER IX.

The Philosophy of Religions.

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of Religions.

Interest in what we may call the Religious Concepts explains the rise, the development and the continuance of Religions. Because a certain people had artistic Interest their Religion embodies the artistic element. Because another race is intellectual in their Interest, the intellectual side is emphasized in their Religion. Because another people's Interest is sensual, their Religion is sensualistic.

From this standpoint, one could study a people, without knowing their Religion, and from a knowledge of their Interests gather much knowledge of their Religion. True, this particular people may have traditions or written records which are counted sacred and which help to prevent the present Interest from affecting the trend of religious thought, yet even here the Interest of the people will largely type the Religion.

The Christian Religion, although possessing the greatest of sanctions, has, in the centuries past, re-received a hundred different variations dictated by the Interest, (not the Self-Interest) of men. Some have found certain doctrines *interesting* and lo! a sect with these doctrines as the basic principles.

Another sect have been interested in a line of doctrine the direct opposite, and so stand as the very antithesis of the first.

The explanation, from a human standpoint, of Judaism, is that the Jews were interested in the conception of Jehovah. In those times when, in their God, their Interest was vital, they were unified. When their Interest failed they fell apart. "Jehovah was," as one of their sacred writers said, "their standard."

Just as from the spring on the mountain side, the streamlet can be traced through miles of meanderings, down to the valley and on and on through stretches of verdure, until it becomes a river and at last a pathway of commerce, so a heathen Religion, had we the data at hand, could be traced by the single means of the Interest of the people.

Where there is no interest in this doctrine or that—or in this aspect of faith or that—these things atrophy and become but dead excrescences on the

living body of the cult, as it is held by the people of that particular age.

Hence, many of the changes of Religion, on the part of heathen people, are due to the gradual approximation of that stage of Interest in the newer faith, at which the change can come rapidly.

The missionary finds that this explanation of the Philosophy of Religion is true. His experience shows that where a race is stolid and fixed in their Interests, where, if their faith does not teach immortality, there is no Interest in that doctrine, that his doctrine has no quickening power. Whereas, if the missionary finds a ready Interest in the truth he brings, his work is easy.

It is to be noted here that the question as to what it is which quickens Interest in the religion is not discussed. The point is made that Interest must be quickened in the doctrines of the Christian Religion before converts to that faith can be gained, and that hence there is no exception in the case of the true Religion to the rule that Interest is the explaining principle here. It may be stated, incidentally, that the author has, in his thinking, been brought to take up the question as to whether Interest may not be quickened (1) by Externality, (2) by Mind and (3) by what we call the Spiritual.

According to this view, there have been few religions founded by impostors. There has stood forth some one man who, like Buddha or Mohammed, was intensely *interested* in that he held and taught. He himself was a flame of Interest in that he called his doctrine. We find one or two or a few who responded to his teachings, whose Interest was kindled. Thus the assimilative process went on until a nation, it may be, was built into the new faith as a living whole.

The law which other religions follow, the true Religion itself, when it was given, followed also. In "the fullness of time" the Messiah came. Had He come three hundred years or seven hundred years before the time of his Advent, there would have been found none or not enough to become *interested* in Him as the type of Messiah he was. But, coming when he did, he found an Anna, a Simeon, a John, a James, a Simon Peter, etc., who were drawn by the bands of Interest, which soon passed to love, and He thus found a few who were, by their Interest in Him, assimilated to Himself. Christianity, in later centuries, often grew, because, with kings and emperors as her votaries, it was Self-Interest which prompted the convert's adherence; but the real and permanent growth came as men became *interested* in her truth, her ritual, her practice and the

life and immortality she offered. Just as Interest has been the single great constructive and determining factor in Psychology, in the field of Social Psychology, in all the extent of History, etc., so, in the domain of Religions, Interest has been building. Interest, the Nexus of the mind, as has been seen, is the Nexus of the body politic and of society and also the Nexus of the Church and of Religions. *Interest is thus the explaining principle in the sphere of the Philosophy of Religions.*

PART III.

Synthetic Philosophy—The Interest Synthetic Philosophy.

CHAPTER I.

Preliminary View of Interest Synthetic Philosophy.

We owe a certain debt to the Truth we find. For Meaning to reveal itself to us and to do this in such a way as that we feel no doubt, necessarily implies an obligation on our part to this Meaning or this Truth. The one reason therefore that I even think of such a thing as a Synthetic Philosophy is that the Meaning-Glint of an Interest Synthetic Philosophy came to me in my thinking. But the very thought of such a thing seemed too daring.

That first Glint of Meaning in that direction having come to me, however, I could not stay the line of thought. The stones of several Philosophies seemed to take their place of themselves in the wall. From the earlier period of my thinking on Interest, the line of philosophical work has been part and parcel of the whole, and the Philosophies have naturally taken place together in an Interest Synthetic Philosophy.

That which explains the Human Mind itself should be the explaining Principle in the Philosophies. It is maintained that the Human Mind has not been seen to be the real and potent explaining principle in all circles of Human Life, because the essential nature of the Mind itself has not been seen. Only as we stress the fact that *Psychology is the Science of Interest, can the Human Mind stand forth clear and distinct as a Synthetic Philosophy in itself.* The concept "Consciousness," as has been said, is Static. What idea of progress, of action, of marvelous ability, does the statement, "I am conscious," convey? But the statement, "I am interested," has connotations of another kind. *Here the essential of Mind stands forth before us as it exists, ready for action.* I can find no better term than the term Dynamic to express just this view of Mind. Now it has been *this acting Mind*—this Interest—which *explains the facts of Mind.*

As has been said, there is a series of powers and qualities catalogued by the psychological authorities which one feels must find much farther reduction before the fundamental truth can be found. *Association of Ideas, Memory, Representation, Perception, Conception, Apperception, Imagination, etc., cannot stand segregated departments, as it were, of Mental ability.* We, of this age, may be satisfied with such

a view, but the *thinkers of coming centuries will inevitably throw themselves against the great Problem of the Reduction of this complexity to simplicity. The thinkers of coming times will inevitably posit, as fundamental truths, statements something like these:*

(1) *That Mind itself must be a clear and simple explanation of the facts of Life, for Mind has produced Human Life.*

(2) *That, if the idea of Mind or Consciousness does not give true explaining light, there must be examination made of this concept itself.*

(3) *That scientific basic truth is being reached when that which is clearly seen to be the explaining truth in Psychology is seen also to be the explaining truth in Social Psychology, in Education, in Law and Government, in History, in all Life Development, in the field of the Religions, etc., etc.*

The search after a Synthetic Philosophy is valid. Spencer, although some derided him, was but expressing *the necessary and inevitable demand of Mind that unity of explanation be found.* That the views here advanced are simpler than those Spencer advanced—that they are views which the laymen may more readily understand, should not be held against the positions herein presented. The axiom

must stand that *Truth is simple—Truth is of such a character that when we read it* we think, this I really almost knew before—*this has a ring of familiarity about it.*

The ring of familiarity which the views of this book may have to any one, comes because he has heard the ring of humanity's heart throb, not because he had read these views in scientific literature. However old these truths may be in human life, they are, so far as I know, after examining the American, German, French and English literature, new in literature and in science.

The axiom must and will stand as a beacon light for Science of the coming centuries—a Synthetic Philosophy must be found—a Synthetic Philosophy already made, lies hidden in the mines of Truth. All that is necessary to find this true Synthetic Philosophy is to search and ponder, fascinated by the search.

Now the question, raised in this part of this present volume, is this: *Is the true and real Synthetic Philosophy, Interest Synthetic Philosophy?* These chapters are presented in the hope that thinkers may take under consideration this question.

CHAPTER II.

Interest Synthetic Philosophy.

In the preceding chapter the question as to the possibility of a Synthetic Philosophy has been touched upon. It has been insisted that such a thing is possible. Let us suppose that various Philosophies have been worked out—that we have a Philosophy of Religion, a Philosophy of History, a Philosophy of Social Psychology, a Philosophy of Education, etc. After long and assiduous labor, we have, let us suppose, reached what to us are fundamental explaining principles in each field. There stands now for us a separate and distinct Philosophy in each field. Yet the same spirit, which drove us to inquire as to the "Why" of things and which impelled us to continue our investigations until we reached what for us is fundamental truth in a particular field of Philosophy, will *lead us to continue our investigations in order to discover whether we cannot find an explaining principle fundamental to each and all the explaining principles of the different Philosophies which we have found.*

(1) Certainly Mind has produced Human Life. However vast the deposits which Human Life have made—however complex the systems of development which are found—however different the sciences which appertain to man, if Mind has been the constructive factor, Mind must explain all this. The explanation of the building which stands before us is found only in the architect's own mind. So the building and fabric of all human Philosophies have their explanation in Mind itself.

Now it is maintaned:

(*a*) *That Interest is essentially human Mind and that human Mind is essentially Interest.*

(*b*) *That when, without any reference to what Interest is, we study Human Life from the standpoint of Interest we find that Philosophies can be written from this standpoint.*

(*c*) *That since that which is essentially Mind and that which is the explaining principle in the facts gathered about Mind, and that which is the explaining principle of the Philosophies, are one and the same thing, we have necessarily a Synthetic Philosophy and this is Interest Synthetic Philosophy.*

(2) The failure, partial or complete, of other attempts in the line of a Synthetic Philosophy should cause one to consider well the attempt to

outline a Synthetic Philosophy. The fact that authors in the past have pressed too far their explaining principle should be taken into account. All this leads to the position, however, that one must be careful in his building—not that one must not undertake to build.

That there are subsidiary explaining principles in the domain of each Philosophy is not denied. These must be searched out and properly used. *The thought is not that there are no Colonels or Captains which have helped to marshal the army of facts, but that the General who has marshalled the very Colonels and the Captains, and thus, through them, marshalled the multitudinous army of facts, is the Principle of Interest.*

(3) As has been stated, the reason for this attempt to write Synthetic Philosophy is found in the fact that it has been forced upon the author.

The only credit that I take to myself for the truth found here, if it be truth, is that for long years in my thought I have been intent upon the problems herein presented. The Meaning-Glints, which have led me on in these lines of Thought, came intuitively. In a second I was in another sphere of Thought. Hence, to be true to what is held to be

the truth, I must attempt to write Synthetic Philosophy from the standpoint of Interest.

(4) The positions of this part of the book, and in fact, of all the volume, are in but mere outline.

It may be, therefore, that the writer does not make himself clear, that he does not properly stress points in the chain of thought which should be amplified into chapters, and which are presented only in some thesis position as those of Chapter XII, Part I. The position of Chapter I, Part I, that Interest is the Mental Dynamic, the Basic Principle of Psychology, was to the writer, when it flashed upon him, far removed from all he had read and heard before, but the positions, advanced in the remaining chapters of Part I, are still farther removed from the line of present psychological thought. Hence, the Interest Psychology, upon which the very Interest Philosophy is based, has to be first examined by thinkers, and tested. The positions of *Interest as cognitive, of Interest as identical with the Consciousness of Process, of Interest as the Psychological Ego and the Psychological Subject, of Instantaneous Recapitulation, of Instinctive Judgment, of the Genetic Explanation of Cognition, of the Genetic Explanation of the Emotions, of the Interest-Moment, the Meaning-Glint as the unit of Cognitive Content, etc., etc.*, must

all be tested by thinkers before they come really to the testing of a single Interest Philosophy.

Then, of course, the *question of Interest in the sphere of the Philosophy of Psychology, must be taken up and tests made here. The same processes must be followed as regards the place of Interest in Social Psychology, and as regards Interest's place in all Life Development, from the lowest biological life to the highest human life. All the line of thought in regard to Interest's place as the Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of History and of Religions would have to be considered as well as the question of Interest's place in the development of Law and Government, its place in the Philosophy of Ethics and of Education, etc.*

Only then can the thinker take up the question of Interest as a Synthetic Philosophy.

Hence all that the author might write as to Interest Synthetic Philosophy would have to await decisions reached, appertaining to his positions in Psychology, and to his positions in the field of the separate Philosophies. Hence, it is thought that the attempt to amplify in any degree, the position that Interest Synthetic Philosophy is the True Synthetic Philosophy may be delayed, while the problems which lead up to this position, are being considered. To the mind of the writer, however, the position is

one well matured. The problems which presented themselves in Psychology, it is thought, have been in some sense satisfactorily explained, and the way opened to the proper presentation of the position that the only Synthetic Philosophy is Interest Synthetic Philosophy.

PART IV.

The Philosophy of Interest Itself.

CHAPTER I.

The Philosophy of Interest (i. e. the Philosophy of Synthetic Interest Philosophy iteslf.)

My view is that Interest, as the Psychological Ego, is itself a manifestation—an expression.

But of what is it an expression? Of the mere chemical processes of the brain neurones? Is Interest but a flame coming up from the depths of Matter itself—an efflorescence upon the bosom of the material ocean?

But what is the Material? How is it known, even if Interest be but the result of chemical processes in brain neurones, that the so-called Material, is Material, after all, in our sense of the term? How can you prove that the so-called Material is not really the so-called Spiritual? Let us suppose the Spiritual to be hard and fixed in its conditions and to have ever compassed Mind on all sides, and just the same results would exist as do exist. Matter, so one of the latest theories goes, is bits of electric points; why then may not the Material be the very Spiritual?

But this aside, it is to be said: The views presented here constitute an absolute antithesis to the materialistic tendencies of much Psychology. The view here is that instead of mere biological facts reaching up to explain Mentality, Mentality reaches down and explains biological facts. It is the view here that the supposition that Matter first brought forth Mind, and that then this inchoate Mind turned to dominate Matter cannot be held. The thought that it can be shown that Life is evolved from Matter has nothing of the strength it possessed twenty years ago. Shall we, however, go beyond such a view and maintain that Mind itself is but a flame from the depths of the Material?

Instead of Matter bringing forth biological life and biological life bringing forth Mind, why may it not be possible that Mind or Interest has been the constructive Principle itself?

Is the Mind dependent upon a brain, or is, in strict evolutionary sense, a brain dependent upon a Mind? The two are now found together and Materialism holds that the brain makes the Mind. But, from a strict evolutionary standpoint, the view herein presented is (see Chapter III, Part II, on Life Development, on which a friend and I are collaborating) that *the* factor in Life Development has been Mental. Then the Materialist has to say: "Matter brought

forth Mind, but having brought forth Mind her work was done in this line and Mind has done the rest." But this cannot be the case. That which brought forth Mind must continue to support Mind and to direct Mind, and to give the bent to Mind.

It is said, in the Philosophy of History (see Part II), that the secret of civilization's advance has been that Interest has risen to higher things. But the question comes back, why has Interest risen to higher things? What is the Philosophy of Interest Synthetic Philosophy itself? Interest there is, and Interest constructs all life—it is the explaining Principle of all Life—it is the Synthetic Philosophy. But what then? Is the last word said?

After reducing all Philosophies to the one problem of Interest we have to ask: Is there a Philosophy of Interest itself? Can the problem of what this Ego is, which holds in its bosom the explanation of so many mysteries, be solved? The advantages of an Interest Synthetic Philosophy now become apparent. For now the deepest problems of the ages can be reduced to the one problem of Interest. Interest, the solution of so many problems, becomes the problem we now attempt to solve. It is here, in the Philosophy of Interest Synthetic Philosophy itself, that great thinkers may spend their lives. It is well to seek to know whither the

ship is bound by investigating what is aboard the craft, and by noting the effect of wind and wave on the vessel, but it is better to seek to know the vessel's destination by a study of the direction from which it has come and in which it is bound. So it is well to study, that which this vessel, Interest, which plows the unknown spaces of the great void, has aboard; it is well to note that the very way in which the vessel has been constructed explains the position, situation and relationship of all which it has on board and of all which it has ever carried. It is better, however, to ask what the vessel itself is. This is the problem which I venture to term the Philosophy of Interest itself.

CHAPTER II.

The Conscience.

(This chapter on Conscience is placed here, instead of where it properly belongs in the Psychological Section, because it is thought that the Philosophy of Interest may gain some light from certain positions which, it seems, one must take as regards Conscience. There are at least three great questions as regards Conscience:

(1) *Is the feeling in Conscience an intellectual feeling or a primal sensation (affective) of some kind?*

(2) *If Conscience be an intellectual feeling what is the nature of the Interest-Moment in which it is produced, and what is the Raw Material of the Judgment-Cluster or idea in which it is involved?*

(3) *Since the Judgment-Burst or Meaning-Glint in Conscience is instinctive and universal, why does not this Meaning-Glint answer to Reality?*)

Is Conscience a mere feeling of the "Ought" which, as some teach, has developed from the "Must"? Has Conscience thus developed from the constraint laid upon individuals in the past, and does

Analytic Psychology reveal the fact that there is in man nothing save the absolutely animal nature which has taken on what may be called higher types? Is the Ought, which seems to rule our lives, an instinctive feeling which has come up from the mere fact that men have been under constraint?

(1) Now, the feeling of Ought seems to be an intellectual feeling. Hence the question arises as to whether this be not the feeling which accompanies a Meaning-Glint or a Judgment-Burst, and whether Conscience has not a Judgment here, fundamental to the so-called Feeling. In all functioning of so-called Conscience there is an apprehension of *Meaning*—the Meaning of Oughtness is given, and, with this, that feeling is given which some think to be the whole of Conscience. The real question of Conscience is as to this *Meaning in Oughtness.* What is this *Meaning*—has it followed the law of development which all *Meaning has followed, i., e., has it developed because of fast and fixed necessity in the face of Reality?* There is no *Meaning* which Universal Instinctive Judgment gives which has not thus developed. The Universal Instinctive Judgment has played its part in survival—it has helped in the battle of life—it has proven a real interpretation of Reality and has thus become a part of human

endowment because it is true to Reality. But how as to the *Meaning* which is in the intellectual feeling of Conscience? This has come because there have been Interest-Moments which issue in a Judgment-Burst or Meaning-Glint. Now is this Meaning-Glint which is involved in Conscience unlike all other instinctive Meaning-Glints in that it tells nothing of Reality?

(2) As has been said, some authorities hold that the Ought comes from the Must. This can only mean that the Judgment-Cluster or concept of Ought has as its raw material the Judgment-Glint Must—that genetically there is a glint of the Must at the base of all Ought.

One trouble with such a view is that insistence here is placed upon the idea of Subjection, *i. e.*, the Idea in *Must*, and this idea of Subjection, which is adverse to the evolutionary view that the strongest must survive, is made a basic principle in survival—such a basic principle or fact as that only those survive who have it.

(3) Moreover, when we come to a problem in our philosophies which we cannot solve, we are thrown back upon the answer of the "Must," which is in itself no proper explanation. We have seen that the Mental Object, *i. e.*, the world in fact, is

explained not from the standpoint of "Must," but from the standpoint of a Subject. Why may it not be that the deep problems, which are the residuum problems of the Philosophies, find their explanation in a Subject as well? The orbit of Interest has been eccentric to a degree which has forced upon the author's thought the question as to how this is to be explained. That there has been progress Interest well explains, but what sets the trend of this progress? That man has a religious nature, in some sense, must be admitted, but how came this—what is its utility from the evolutionary standpoint, and how came it to arise so early in human development as to have become universally instinctive?

(4) There is always danger on an author's part in forcing an explaining Principle too far. He should take warning by the past. The evolutionary hypothesis is already burdened with difficulties of explanation—there are great questions to be settled as regards it. Hence, one feels cause to pause when he attempts to write Philosophy from a certain standpoint, to examine the validity of his explaining Principle as something which explains all life. The author can only give that which to him seems the most feasible hypothesis. He maintains that as the

facts bear out the theory of the Instinctive Judgment, the facts bear out the theory that Interest can be affected by something besides Human Mind and Externality. This chapter is one of the last of these papers to be written. The thesis that Interest may be affected by something beside Mind and Matter would not have been here maintained had it not been for the line of thought pursued in the Outlines of Philosophies. The fact stands that only as we maintain the above thesis can the trend which Interest has followed be explained.

Science, therefore, must needs determine whether so-called Spiritualism is based upon such a fact as that Interest can be affected by that we call a Spiritual World—whether the results attained by the Societies of Psychical Research have any bearing here—whether the facts of religion have not some explanation here—whether Conscience is not best explained thus—whether certain instinctive religious judgments are not best explained thus—whether the unexplained residuum in the Philosophies is not best explained in this way. Science must have simplicity of explanation, and properly so. She does not turn a deaf ear to the wonderful because it is wonderful. She insists that her hypotheses must be fact-explaining hypotheses, and that they must be as simple as possible. Hence, as a

fact-explaining hypothesis, this hypothesis, that Interest may be affected by something beside human Mind and Matter, is advanced. You may call this unknown influence affecting Interest, God or the Spiritual World or what you please, but to the author it seems that it must be posited. Then, if that be the case, the only scientific way to posit it is to write, in Psychology itself, that Mind or Interest may be affected by something beside human Mind or Matter.

Hence the question is raised as to whether the raw material of the Conscience Judgment-Burst, *i. e.*, of the Ought concept is an impression arising from what we call another world. The proper elaboration of the above thought would require extended treatment. *That Conscience has a Judgment in it is certain. That this is an Instinctive Judgment which has become a racial Instinctive Judgment is clear. The battle must be as to the raw material of this Judgment which Conscience has.* To my mind the *Philosophy of Interest itself cannot be properly written unless it be written that Interest may be affected (1) by Externality, (2) by Interest itself, (3) by what we may call a Spiritual World.*

CHAPTER III.

Can Interest be Affected by Ought Beside Human Mind and Matter?

It may seem passing strange to even suggest such a supposition as that Interest may be influenced by something beside Human Mind and Matter. It would seem that Science has postulated as an axiom that there is no Spiritual World, and that the supposition of such a thing cannot be allowed.

Now, it is readily admitted that Science has suffered many things by the disposition to unload upon the Spiritual World one's inability to explain the natural world. The absence of any disposition to think about the great problems of life or the lack of any ability to consider these problems may be concealed by the assertion that one, who holds with the Church, need not consider such things. There are thousands, in the world today, who really think that, as regards the great problems of Free Will, of Personality, of Conscience, of Immortality, of God, of the Soul, etc., they have firm and decided convictions, whereas they have absolutely nothing but traditions—*the truth of none of these great prob-*

lems has, in any sense, been assimilated by them. They have the word merely; there has been no series of Interest-Moments for them in which Interest functioned forth Meaning for the term God, or for the term Immortality. Anything which may be difficult of explanation and which they are indisposed to ponder upon, is made a mystery, and its explanation is referred to the Spiritual World. *There are thousands who would groan, if, for the space of an hour, they had to think intently upon the great and fundamental problems of existence, who, yet, from the heights of their vast and colossal ignorance, look down and pass judgment upon men, who, fascinated by these same problems,* never rise in the morning without pondering them or never sleep at night without meditating upon them and who live and have their being in the very atmosphere of these fundamental questions.

Science has had so much of this disposition of mind to contend against—she has found such ready dependence placed in the hypothesis of a Spiritual World that she has seemingly swung off almost absolutely to the other extreme, and one of the most fundamental axioms which Science has, it appears, is that there is no Spiritual World and that there can be none. Then, too, the evolutionary hypothesis, with its insistence upon matter and

mere biological life as explaining all, has fixed Science in its view that it is absolutely unscientific to even dream that there can be a Spiritual World. Of course, on Sunday, it is proper to take the Spiritual World as a fact and hear some discussion about it, but for scientific thought it must not be considered.

In the early centuries of the Christian Faith, the Christian scholars were intent upon explaining their Religion and their Philosophy so that they could be shown to agree. There seems little of this disposition today. Science must swing on its way with never a thought for that the Church holds to be fundamental and absolute truth, and too often the Church goes on its way with never a thought for that which Science maintains is absolute fact.

Now, truth is truth wherever found. It matters not whether it be between the lids of a Bible or in rocks, groves and trees. To neglect the consideration of any sphere of even so-called truth, in constructing scientific hypothesis, is plainly wrong.

My position is that the scientist cannot reject a hypothesis because it comes from a certain source. There must be no question as to whence the hypothesis comes—there must be no question as to how much the hypothesis may have made Science suffer

in the past—*the only question is as to whether the hypothesis is the best which can be formulated.*

Now to explain Interest there are two hypotheses, and only two.

The first is that Matter and Human Mind together have produced Mind. Now this, necessarily, since Mind (human Mind) is not eternal as to the past, reduces to this—that Matter produces Mind. But we have, from our psychological analysis of Part I, firm ground under our feet when we talk of a Subject, whatever this may mean. There can be no question that Interest is the Subject of the Mental Object, hence, the above hypothesis, that Matter produces Mind, means that Matter is the Subject of Mind—that as the Mental Object is flashed forth by Interest, Interest itself is flashed forth by Matter. Matter thus first produces the interpreter, and is then interpreted.

Now, Science has to choose between this view and the supposition of a Spiritual World. There is no other alternative.

It is not to be supposed, for a single instant, that psycho-physical parallelism gives any aid when we come to philosophize. Either Matter is *the* fundamental fact or else there is a Spiritual World. *This alternative may not be written clearly and plainly*

in text-books and magazines, but, none the less, it is written in the minds of thinkers. The kind of tacit understanding not to raise the wraith of discussion does not prevent men from thinking and deciding, and in the world today there are just two classes of scientists: (1) *Those who, in their heart, hold that Matter is the fundamental and that Mind is but its efflorescence, and* (2) *Those who hold, in their heart, to a Spiritual World.*

Now there can be no doubt that the sympathies of many are with the view that there is a Spiritual World, but the facts seem adverse to such a position. There is many a scientist, today, whose sympathy is with the declaration that there is a Spiritual World, who, in his own heart, feels that there is not sufficient evidence to think of such a thing as a Reality.

The usual line of thought is this: *Science must have simplicity of explanation. Science abhors the postulation of a number of explaining principles. Matter is a fact—it is a Reality—it explains much. It should, therefore, explain all. To posit the Spiritual World is to go out of one's way—it is to multiply explaining principles. It is to resort to what we do not know—it is, in a word, unscientific. Matter is real*

to us; the so-called Spiritual World is not; hence the so-called Spiritual World must not be considered.

But the view of Psychology, given in these chapters, shows that Reality comes through Meaning. (See Chap. XXI, Part I.) *Only as there is Meaning is there Reality, and wherever there is Meaning there is Reality. The whole problem of Reality reduces to this.* The extent of Reality is even being widened. Franklin widened it when he began the science of Electricity. His Interest found Meaning, and Reality in the electrical field was the result.

But Reality is that which Meaning, tested and authenticated, gives. Reality does not exist simply because I imagine it to exist. It does not exist because I merely have an image in my mind.

The only way to be sure that Meaning bespeaks Reality is to have this Meaning tried and tested as though by fire. Now this fire which has been the trial and test of Meaning has been the struggle of Life Development or Evolution itself. If the Meaning has stood this test—if still there be this interpretation, this sign, we must accept that which it points out as Reality—all the testing we can give has thus been given. We can do no more. This is, in all cases, the limit of our testing of Reality.

Now, of all testing of Meaning the absolutely fundamental and conclusive method is that of Meaning-Survival. The thesis is held and is stated here, in order

that the author may have opportunity at a later day to work out the position properly, that the Basic Explaining Principle in the Science of Epistemology is this Principle of Meaning-Survival as described here.

This method of testing Meaning is, in fact, our method as individuals—the Meanings, which have lived with us, not for a few days, but for years, which have been beacon lights for us, which have stood all the storm of the years and *which have survived, live now for us with increased clearness and power. But this is a thousand fold truer as regards Humanity or Mentality as a whole. The one and final authentication of Meaning has been Meaning-Survival. The storm and stress of the centuries and of the ages—the fierce battles for ascendency on all the Past—the unending conflict for self-preservation, has placed transcendent premium upon valid and true Meaning.*

The animal whose Meaning was valid, whose interpretation of Reality was correct and who thus had the power of best reading the signs of sensation (affective) ranked highest in the scale of those who could hope to survive.

Thus the animal which had a better sense for Space Meaning (this Space Meaning being, according to the view of these papers, an interpretation of Space Reality), had a vast advantage over his

competitor whose Space Meaning was invalid. For the first was accurate with the blow of his paw or in his reach for food, while the second was not. The first had advantages every day over the second, and thus there was the Space Meaning-Survival. *This Space Meaning-Survival we have in what is called the Category of Space. For all animals and for man this interpretation of Reality has survived.* It has become written into the very texture of our mind itself, as it were. Or, to speak according to what is held by the author to be the scientific explanation (See Part I, chapters on Cognition, and especially Chapter XII), *Interest has so often functioned this Judgment-Burst or Meaning-Glint that it is basic in the Judgment-Cluster which is a percept.* Just as there is always bread, at a meal, whatever else may or may not be found on the table, so there is always in every percept a Meaning-Glint of Space. *Here is a case of the Survival of the Fittest which has counted for far more as regards real progress than the survival of any species of animals.* In fact, in this single Space Meaning-Survival—*i. e.*, the survival of the space interpretation—there is the survival of all life, for life cannot continue without it. Hence, according to strict evolutionary theory, those animals, which were not exact and accurate in their instinctive space judgment, soon

went to the wall. That which has been stated in other places of this volume is repeated here—*the absolute and essential conditions of animal survival, supposing Evolution to be true, were not in any sense, those which Darwin, Huxley, Wallace, etc,, of yesterday, and Baldwin, Morgan, etc., of today, hold to have been the essential conditions. The whole matter of survival, the whole question of selection, the whole trend of Evolution was decided long before those later conditions arose where their theories of Evolution can come into play. They start with the animal, however minute he may be, as a thing which sees, hears, smells, tastes, remembers even. Now the position of these papers is that the absolutely decisive battles of Evolution were already fought when the animal stood forth, capable of seeing, smelling, tasting, etc. For vast processes of judging had to be passed through before an animal series reached the point where the animal could see with accuracy.*

In this one matter of differentiating light from darkness, which we do instantly, what stages of struggle once went on? Only those animals could have survived which developed the instinctive ability to make this differentiation and then to use this instinctive judgment differentiation of light from darkness as a background against which objects of one sort or another might be brought out. In the

mere fact that we distinguish light, what struggles do we not recapitulate! Thus there was not only space Meaning-Survival but sight Meaning-Survival.

Mentality also reached the Meaning-Glint of Time. What imagination can picture the first dawn of that Meaning-Glint in the first mind in which it came! But come it did and this mind stood forth, armed and panoplied for life's struggle, as no other mind of that age was. This mind which had gained this Meaning-Glint of Time stood forth, the Genius of his day, and survived, in virtue of the advantages which were his, because he possessed Meaning, *i. e., interpretation of Reality, which no other Mind had.*

Thus, too, there has been the *Time* Meaning-Survival. The races of animals went down in which this did survive. Today Time Meaning lives in us—Instinctive Judgment flashes forth the Time Meaning-Glint with automatic precision as part of the content of each Judgment-Cluster.

Then, too, there has been *Past* Meaning-Survival. *What tremendous advantages in this one thing of ability to judge that a thing has been seen before—an ability to recognize! Those animals, which had this ability, survived and those which did not went down in the struggle.*

Time would fail to speak of the Taste, Touch, Smell, and Hearing Meaning-Survival. *Those ani-*

mals in which Instinctive Judgment processes gave Meaning-Glints along these lines survived, and, because they survived, there has been the survival of the Meaning-Glints themselves, in the sense that they have become Instinctive Processes.

Now all this seems, certainly, a far cry to a Spiritual World. All this seems, it may be, to some, a digression from the line of thought of the first part of this chapter. *The truth, however, is that all this leads up to the very thought of the chapter itself. For the point of all the above is that there has been, in every case, the Meaning-Survival of that which is a true and absolute interpretation of Reality. But there has been also, and this is the point of the whole chapter, Meaning-Survivals in the sphere of what we call a Religious Nature and Conscience. Are these Meaning-Survivals exceptions to the great law which has been already found, that all Meaning-Glints, which have survived the storm and stress of the ages, are stamped as valid and authentic? It is repeated that the absolute test of Meaning's validity is this Survival. But here are Meaning-Glints of the Religious Nature which are instinctive and universal—here are Meaning-Glints of Conscience which are instinctive and universal—these have survived and are Meaning-Survivals. Do they not interpret or stand as signs for Reality? Science, to be true to her own fundamental laws, must answer that they do. She cannot*

say that Space Meaning-Survival is the survival of a valid Meaning and Conscience Meaning-Survival is the survival of an invalid Meaning. She may say this, it is true, after she has scrutinized the whole situation and found sufficient cause to say it, but it is maintained that Science is saying this very thing today without giving the subject, in any sense, the attention it demands.

One says: "Matter is a Reality. I know it to be a Reality because of Meaning—of interpretation of this Reality, tested and tried." "Yes," it is answered, "that is all that you know of Matter, absolutely all, for Psychological Idealism is true."

Just so, the so-called Spiritual World is a Reality —I know it is a Reality because of Meaning, *i. e.*, of interpretation of this Reality, tried and tested by the very evolutionary test itself—*that of the survival of the fittest Meaning. The instinctive Judgments of the Religious Nature and of Conscience are in-wrought into all humanity and hence, by the great Evolutionary Law, laid down in these papers, of the Survival of the Fittest Meaning, they must stand as valid and true interpretations of Reality.*

If, in one case or in any case, we hold that the law here laid down is correct, and that the authentication of the validity of Meaning is Meaning-Survival, we must, necessarily, hold to this same law in other cases.

There is, then, nothing else for us but in our very Psychology to write, as a scientific fact, that Interest may be affected by something beside Human Mind and Matter.

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